A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Quoted in A Single Spark Can Start a Prairie Fire, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Letter to Comrade Lin Biao, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 3, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk and London, 1995.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a letter from Comrade Mao Zedong to Lin Biao written at Shanghang, Gutian, Fujian, China and dated the 5th of January, 1930. It was first published in the 1947 edition of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong.

Comrade Mao Zedong wrote this letter to criticize Lin Biao's Right-opportunist pessimism, which was then prevalent among a number of leaders of the Communist Party of China.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#A SINGLE SPARK CAN START A PRAIRIE FIRE

#LETTER TO LIN BIAO

#Mao Zedong

#5th of January, 1930

#★

#Comrade Lin Biao

Several days have gone by since New Year, and I still have not replied to your letter. One reason is that some things have kept me busy, and another is that I have been wondering what I should actually write to you. Do I have anything good to offer you? After racking my brain, I still could not find anything suitable, so I put it off. Now, I have thought of a few things. Although I do not know whether they really apply to your situation, the few things I have to say are indeed about an important problem in the present struggle. Even if it does not apply to your particular circumstances, it is still a crucial general problem, and that is why I am bringing it up.

Some comrades in our Party still do not know how to appraise the current situation correctly and how to settle the attendant question of what action to take. I felt quite strongly in the past, and, to some extent, I steel feel now, that your evaluation of the situation is rather pessimistic. This viewpoint of yours was most obvious at the meeting on the evening of the 18th of May, 1929 in Ruijin. Though you believe that a revolutionary high tide is inevitable, you do not believe it to be imminent. Therefore, you disapprove of the plan to take Jiangxi and only approve of roving guerrilla actions in the three areas on the borders of Fujian, Guangdong, and Jiangxi; at the same time, as you do not have a deep understanding of what it means to establish council power in the guerrilla areas, you do not have a deep understanding of the idea of accelerating the nationwide revolutionary high tide through the consolidation and expansion of council power. Judging from your belief in the policy of Taiping-style roving rebel bands, you seem to think that, since the revolutionary high tide is still remote, it will be labour lost to attempt to establish political power by hard work. Instead, you want to extend our political influence through the easier method of roving guerrilla actions, and, once the masses throughout the country have been won over, or more or less won over, you want to launch a nationwide armed uprising, which, with the participation of the Red Army, would become a great nationwide revolution. Your theory that we must first win over the masses on a countrywide scale and in all regions and then establish political power does not accord with the actual state of the Chinese revolution. This theory derives mainly from the failure to understand clearly that China is a semi-colonial country, for which many imperialist powers are contending. If one clearly understands this, one will understand, firstly, why the unusual phenomenon of prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes is only to be found in China, why this warfare is steadily growing fiercer and spreading, and why there has never been a unified regime. Secondly, one will understand the gravity of the peasant problem and hence why rural uprisings have developed on the present countrywide scale. Thirdly, one will understand the correctness of the slogan of workers' and peasants' democratic political power. Fourthly, one will understand another unusual phenomenon, which is also absent outside China, and which follows from the first (that in China alone there is prolonged and tangled warfare within the ruling classes), namely, the existence and development of the Red Army and the guerrilla forces, and, together with them, the existence and development of small council areas encircled by the White regime. Fifthly, one will understand that, in semi-colonial China, the establishment and expansion of the Red Army, the guerrilla forces, and the council areas is the highest form of peasant struggle under the leadership of the proletariat, the inevitable outcome of the growth of the semi-colonial peasant struggle, and undoubtedly the most important factor in accelerating the revolutionary high tide throughout the country. Sixthly, one will understand that the Red Army and the councils of peasants' deputies are undoubtedly the most significant allied forces of the proletarian struggle in the semi-colonial countries, and that the proletariat must step forward to lead them. And, seventhly, one will also understand that the policy which merely calls for roving guerrilla actions cannot accomplish the task of accelerating this nationwide revolutionary high tide, while the kind of policy adopted by Zhu De, Mao Zedong, He Long, Li Wenlin, and Fang Zhimin¹ is undoubtedly correct — that is, the policy of establishing base areas; of systematically setting up political power; of close coordination, organization, and training of the Red Army, the guerrilla troops, and the broad peasant masses; of deepening the agrarian revolution; of expanding the people's armed forces by a comprehensive process of building up first the township Red Guards, then the district Red Guards, then the county Red Guards, then the local Red Army troops, all the way up to the regular Red Army troops; of spreading political power by advancing in a series of waves; and so on, and so forth. Only thus is it possible to build the confidence of the revolutionary masses throughout the country, as the Council Union has built it throughout the world. Only thus is it possible to create tremendous difficulties for the reactionary ruling classes, shake their foundations, and hasten their internal disintegration. Only thus is it really possible to create a Red Army which will become the chief weapon for the great revolution of the future. In short, only thus is it possible to hasten the revolutionary high tide.

Now, I would like to say more about what I feel are the reasons for your rather pessimistic evaluation of the situation. I feel that your evaluation is the exact opposite of the evaluation by the faction within the Party who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity. Comrades who suffer from revolutionary impetuosity overestimate the subjective forces of the revolution² and underestimate the forces of the counter-revolution. Such an appraisal stems mainly from subjectivism. In the end, it undoubtedly leads to adventurism. You have not made this mistake, but rather, your shortcomings seem to be of another kind, namely, underestimating the subjective forces of the revolution and overestimating the forces of the counter-revolution, which also constitutes an improper appraisal and is certain to produce bad results of another kind. Therefore, in judging the political situation in China, it is necessary to understand the following:

• Firstly, although the subjective forces of the revolution in China are now weak, so also are all organizations (bodies of political power, armed forces, political parties, and so on) of the reactionary ruling classes, resting as they do on the backward and fragile socio-economic structure of China. This helps to explain why revolution cannot break out at once in the countries of Western Europe, where, although the subjective forces of revolution are now perhaps somewhat stronger than in China, the forces of the reactionary ruling classes are many times stronger. In China, the revolution will undoubtedly move towards a high tide more rapidly, for, although the subjective forces of the revolution at present are weak, the forces of the counter-revolution are relatively weak, too.
• Secondly, the subjective forces of the revolution have indeed been greatly weakened since the defeat of the revolution in 1927. The remaining forces are very small, and those comrades who judge by appearances alone naturally feel pessimistic. But, if we judge by essentials, it is quite another story. Here, we can apply the old Chinese saying: «A single spark can start a prairie fire.» In other words, our forces, although small at present, will grow very rapidly. In the conditions prevailing in China, their growth is not only possible, but indeed inevitable, as the 30th of May Movement and the Great Revolution which followed have fully proved. When we look at a thing, we must examine its essence and treat its appearance merely as an usher at the threshold, and, once we cross the threshold, we must grasp the essence of the thing; this is the only reliable and scientific method of analysis.
• Thirdly, similarly, in appraising the counter-revolutionary forces, we must never look merely at their appearance, but should examine their essence. In the initial period of our independent regime in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, some comrades genuinely believed the incorrect appraisal made by the Hunan Provincial Committee and regarded the class enemy as not worth a rap; the two descriptive terms, «terribly shaky» and «extremely panicky», which are standing jokes to this day, were used by the Hunan Provincial Committee at the time (from May to June 1928) in appraising the Hunan ruler Lu Diping.³ Such an appraisal necessarily led to adventurism in the political sphere. But, during the four months from November of that year to February 1929 (before the war between Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi warlords),⁴ when the enemy's third «joint suppression expedition»⁵ was approaching the Jinggang Mountains, some comrades asked the question: «How long can we keep the Red Flag flying?» As a matter of fact, the struggle in China between Britain, the United States, and Japan had by then become quite open, and a state of tangled warfare between Jiang Jieshi, the Guangxi clique, and Feng Yuxiang was taking shape; hence, it was actually the time when the counter-revolutionary tide had begun to ebb and the revolutionary tide to rise again. Yet pessimistic ideas were to be found not only in the Red Army and local Party organizations; even the Central Committee was misled by appearances and adopted a pessimistic tone. Its February letter is evidence of the pessimistic analysis made in the Party at that time.
• Fourthly, the objective situation today is still such that comrades who see only the superficial appearance and not the essence of what is before them are liable to be misled. In particular, when our comrades working in the Red Army are defeated in battle or encircled or pursued by strong enemy forces, they often unwittingly generalize and exaggerate their momentary, specific, and limited situation, as though the situation in China and the world as a whole gave no cause for optimism and the prospects of victory for the revolution were remote. The reason they seize on the appearance and brush aside the essence in their observation of things is that they have not made a scientific analysis of the essence of the overall situation. The question of whether there will soon be a revolutionary high tide in China can be decided only by making a detailed examination to ascertain whether the contradictions leading to a revolutionary high tide are really developing. Since contradictions are developing in the world between the imperialist countries, between the imperialist countries and their colonies, and between the imperialists and the proletariat in their own countries, there is an intensified need for the imperialists to contend for the domination of China. While the imperialist contention over China becomes more intense, both the contradiction between imperialism and the whole Chinese nation and the contradictions among the imperialists themselves develop simultaneously on Chinese soil, thereby creating the tangled warfare which is expanding and intensifying daily and giving rise to the continuous development of the contradictions among the different cliques of China's reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradictions among the reactionary ruling cliques — the tangled warfare among the warlords — comes heavier taxation, which steadily sharpens the contradiction between the broad masses of taxpayers and the reactionary rulers. In the wake of the contradiction between imperialism and China's national industry comes the failure of the Chinese industrialists to obtain concessions from the imperialists, which sharpens the contradiction between the Chinese bourgeoisie and the Chinese working class, with the Chinese capitalists trying to find a way out by frantically exploiting the workers, and with the workers resisting. In the wake of imperialist commercial aggression, Chinese merchant-capitalist extortions, heavier government taxation, and so on, comes the deepening of the contradiction between the feudal class and the peasantry, that is, exploitation through rent and usury is aggravated and the hatred of the peasants for the feudal lords grows. Because of the pressure of foreign commodities, the exhaustion of the purchasing power of the worker and peasant masses,, and the increase in government taxation, more and more dealers in Chinese-made commodities and independent producers are being driven into bankruptcy. Because the reactionary government, though short of provisions and funds, endlessly expands its armies and thus constantly extends the warfare, the masses of soldiers are in a constant state of privation. Because of the growth in government taxation, the rise in rent and interest demanded by the feudal lords, and the daily spread of the disasters of war, there are famine and banditry everywhere and the peasant masses and the urban poor can hardly keep alive. Because the schools have no money, many students fear that their education may be interrupted; because production is backward, many graduates have no hope of employment. Once we understand all these contradictions, we shall see in what a desperate situation, in what a chaotic state, China finds itself. We shall also see that the high tide of revolution against the imperialists, the warlords, and the feudal lords is inevitable, and will come very soon. All China is littered with dry sticks which will soon be aflame. The saying, «A single spark can start a prairie fire», is an apt description of how the current situation will develop. We need only look at the strikes by the workers, the uprisings by the peasants, the mutinies of soldiers, and the strikes of students, which are developing in many places, to see that it cannot be long before a «spark» kindles «a prairie fire».

The gist of the above was already contained in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee on the 5th of April, 1929, which reads in part:

The Central Committee's letter makes too pessimistic an appraisal of the objective situation and our subjective forces. The Nationalist Party's three «suppression» campaigns against the Jinggang Mountains was the high water mark reached by the counter-revolutionary tide. But there it stopped, and since then the counter-revolutionary tide has gradually receded while the revolutionary tide has gradually risen. Although our Party's fighting capacity and organizational strength have been weakened to the extent described by the Central Committee, they will be rapidly restored, and the passivity among comrades in the Party will quickly disappear as the counter-revolutionary tide gradually ebbs. The masses will certainly come over to us. The Nationalist Party's policy of massacre only serves to «drive the fish into deep waters», as the saying goes, and reformism no longer has any mass appeal. It is certain that the masses will soon shed their illusions about the Nationalist Party. In the emerging situation, no other political party will be able to compete with the Communist Party in winning over the masses. The political line and the organizational line laid down by the Party's Sixth National Congress are correct, that is, the revolution at the present stage is democratic and not socialist, and the present task of the Party in the big cities is to win over the masses and not to stage immediate armed uprisings. Nevertheless, the revolution will develop swiftly, and we should take a positive attitude in our propaganda and preparations for armed uprisings. In the present chaotic situation, we can lead the masses only by positive slogans and a positive attitude. Only by taking such an attitude can the Party recover its fighting capacity. [...] Proletarian leadership is the sole key to victory in the revolution. Building a proletarian foundation for the Party and setting up Party branches in industrial enterprises in key districts are important organizational tasks for the Party at present; but, at the same time, the major prerequisites for helping the struggle in the cities and hastening the rise of the revolutionary tide are specifically the development of the struggle in the countryside, the establishment of council power in small areas, and the creation and expansion of the Red Army. Therefore, it would be wrong to abandon the struggle in the cities and to sink into rural guerrillaism, but, in our opinion, it would also be wrong for any of our Party members to fear the growth of peasant strength lest it should outstrip the workers' strength and harm the revolution. For, in the revolution in semi-colonial China, the peasant struggle must always fail if it does not have the leadership of the workers, but the revolution is never harmed if the peasant struggle outstrips the forces of the workers. The Sixth Congress has pointed out the mistake of neglecting the peasant revolution. In this letter from the Central Committee, the idea «develop a vast struggle everywhere in the rural areas» represents the only correct view.⁶

The letter also contained the following reply on the question of the Red Army's operational tactics:

To preserve the Red Army and mobilize the masses, the Central Committee asks us to divide our forces into very small units and disperse them over the countryside and to withdraw Zhu De and Mao Zedong from the army, so concealing the major targets. This is an unrealistic view. In the winter of 1927-28, we did plan to disperse our forces over the countryside, with each company or battalion operating on its own and adopting guerrilla tactics in order to mobilize the masses while trying not to present a target for the enemy; we have tried this out many times, but have failed every time. The reasons are:

• Firstly, most of the fighters in the main force of the Red Army come from other areas and have a background different from that of the local Red Guards.
• Secondly, division into small units results in weak leadership and organization and inability to cope with adverse circumstances, which easily leads to defeat.
• Thirdly, the units are liable to be crushed by the enemy one by one.
• Fourthly, the more adverse the circumstances, the greater the need for concentrating our forces and for the directors to be resolute in struggle, because only thus can we have internal unity against the enemy. Only in favourable circumstances is it advisable to divide our forces for guerrilla operations, and it is only then that the directors need not stay with the ranks all the time, as they must in adverse circumstances.⁶

The weakness of this passage is that the reasons adduced against the division of forces were of a negative character, which was far from adequate. The positive reason for concentrating our forces is that only concentration will enable us to wipe out comparatively large enemy units and occupy towns. Only after we have wiped out comparatively large enemy units and occupied towns can we mobilize the masses on a broad scale and set up political power extending over a number of adjoining counties. Only thus can we make a widespread impact (what we call «extending our political influence»), and contribute effectively to speeding the day of the revolutionary high tide. For instance, both the regime we set up in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area the year before last and the one we set up in western Fujian last year⁷ were the product of this policy of concentrating our troops. This is a general principle. But are there not times when our forces should be divided up? Yes, there are. The letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee says of guerrilla tactics for the Red Army, including the division of forces within a short radius:

The tactics we have derived from the struggle of the past three years are indeed different from any other tactics, ancient or modern, Chinese or foreign. With our tactics, the masses can be mobilized for struggle on an ever-broadening scale, and no enemy, however powerful, can cope with us. Ours are guerrilla tactics. They consist mainly of the following points:

• Divide our forces to mobilize the masses, concentrate our forces to deal with the enemy.
• The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue.
• To extend stable base areas, employ the policy of advancing in waves; when pursued by a powerful enemy, employ the policy of circling around.
• **Mobilize the largest numbers of the masses in the shortest possible time and by the best possible methods.

These tactics are just like casting a net; at any moment, we should be able to cast it or draw it in. We cast it wide to win over the masses and draw it in to deal with the enemy. Such are the tactics we have used for the past three years.⁶

Here, «to cast the net wide» means to divide our forces within a short radius. For example, when we first captured the county town of Yongxin in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, we divided the forces of the 29th and 31st Regiments within the boundaries of Yongxin County. Again, when we captured Yongxin for the third time, we once more divided our forces by dispatching the 28th Regiment to the border of Anfu County, the 29th to Lianhua, and the 31st to the border of Ji'an County. And, again, we divided our forces in the counties of southern Jiangxi last April and May, and in the counties of western Fujian last July. These are all appropriate examples. As to dividing our forces over a wide radius, it is possible only on the two conditions that circumstances are comparatively favourable and the leading bodies fairly strong. For the purpose of dividing up our forces is to put us in a better position for winning over the masses, for deepening the agrarian revolution and establishing political power, and for expanding the Red Army and the local armed units. It is better not to divide our forces when this purpose cannot be attained or the division of our forces would lead to defeat and to the weakening of the Red Army, as happened in August two years ago, when our forces were divided on the Hunan-Jiangxi border for an attack on Chenzhou. But there is no doubt that, given the two above-mentioned conditions, we should divide our forces, because division is then more advantageous than concentration. As for dividing our forces in order to preserve our real strength and avoid the concentration of targets under grave circumstances, I am in principle opposed to this, as explained in the letter from the Front Committee to the Central Committee quote above. Apart from this, will there be times when the division of forces to carry out the work is necessary, because the economic situation does not permit concentration? Perhaps there will be. But I cannot draw definite conclusions about it, since we have no concrete experience of such circumstances.

The Central Committee's February letter was not in the right spirit and had a bad effect on a number of Party comrades in the Fourth Army — including even you, to some extent. At that time, the Central Committee also issued a circular stating that war would not necessarily break out between Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi warlords. Since then, however, the appraisals and directives of the Central Committee have in the main been correct. It has already issued another circular correcting the one containing the wrong appraisal. (In fact, only part of the original circular was wrong.) Although it has not made any correction of the letter to the Red Army, its subsequent directives have not been couched in the same pessimistic tone, and its views on the Red Army's operations now coincide with ours. Yet the bad effect which this letter had on some comrades persists. Although the Front Committee's letter replying to the Central Committee was distributed within the Party at the same time as the Central Committee's letter, it does not appear to have had any great influence on these comrades, because the Central Committee's letter met their taste exactly. The many correct directives issued later by the Central Committee have, on the other hand, either been ignored by these comrades or have not been able to wash away their earlier impression. Therefore, I feel that it is still necessary to give some explanation.

The plan to take Jiangxi Province within a year was also proposed last April by the Front Committee to the Central Committee, and a decision to that effect was later made at Yudu. The following reasons were given in the letter to the Central Committee:

The armies of Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi warlords are approaching each other in the vicinity of Jiujiang, and a big battle is imminent. The resumption of mass struggle, coupled with the spread of contradictions among the ruling reactionaries, makes it probable that there will soon be a high tide of revolution. As for how our work should be arranged under these circumstances, we feel that, so far as the southern provinces are concerned, the armed forces of the compradors and feudal lords in Guangdong and Hunan Provinces are too strong, and that, in Hunan, moreover, we have lost almost all our mass following, inside as well as outside the Party, because of the Party's adventurist mistakes. In the three provinces of Fujian, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang, however, the situation is different. First, militarily, the enemy is weakest there. In Zhejiang, there is only a small provincial force under Jiang Bocheng. In Fujian, although there are five groups of enemy troops totaling 14 regiments in all, Guo Fengming's troops have already been smashed; the troops under Chen Guohui and Lu Xingbang are bandits of small fighting capacity; the two brigades of marines stationed along the coast have never seen action and their fighting capacity is undoubtedly not high; Zhang Zhen alone can put up some sort of a fight, but, according to an analysis made by the Fujian Provincial Committee, even he has only two relatively strong regiments. In addition, Fujian is now in a state of complete chaos, confusion, and disunity. In Jiangxi, there are 16 regiments under the two commands of Zhu Peide and Xiong Shihui; they are stronger than the armed forces of either Fujian or Zhejiang, but far inferior to those of Hunan. Secondly, fewer adventurist mistakes have been made in these three provinces. We are not clear about the situation in Zhejiang, but the Party's organizational and mass basis is somewhat better in Jiangxi and Fujian than in Hunan. Take Jiangxi, for example. In northern Jiangxi, we still have some basis in De'an, Xiushui, and Tonggu; in western Jiangxi, the Party and the Red Guards still have some strength in Ninggang, Yongxin, Lianhua, and Suichuan; in southern Jiangxi, the prospects are still brighter, as the Second and Fourth Regiments of the Red Army are steadily growing in strength in the counties of Ji'an, Yongfeng, and Xingguo; and, what is more, the Red Army under Fang Zhimin has by no means been wiped out. All this places us in a position to close in on Nanchang. We hereby recommend to the Central Committee that, during the period of prolonged warfare among the Nationalist warlords, we should contend with Jiang Jieshi and the Guangxi clique for Jiangxi Province and also for western Fujian and western Zhejiang. In these three provinces, we should enlarge the Red Army and create an independent regime of the masses, with a time limit of one year for accomplishing this plan.

During this one year, we must lay the foundations for the struggle of the proletariat in Shanghai, Wuxi, Ningpo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and other places, so that they can lead the peasant struggles in Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Fujian. The Jiangxi Provincial Committee must be soundly established, and efforts must be made to build a basis among the workers in Nanchang, Jiujiang, Ji'an, and on the Nanchang-Jiujiang Railway.⁶

This proposal to contend for Jiangxi erred only in setting a time limit of one year. It was based not only on conditions within the province itself, but also on the prospect that a nationwide high tide of revolution would soon arise. For unless we had been convinced that there would soon be a high tide of revolution, we could not possibly have concluded that we could take Jiangxi in a year. The only weakness in the proposal was that it set a time limit of one year, which it should not have done, and so gave a flavour of impetuosity to the word «soon» in the statement, «there will soon be a high tide of revolution». Your failure to believe in taking Jiangxi in one year results, however, from your overestimation of the objective forces and underestimation of the subjective forces. That is why you do not believe in the rapid arrival of a revolutionary high tide, and why you reach this conclusion. As to the subjective and objective conditions in Jiangxi, they well deserve our attention. Besides the subjective conditions described in the letter to the Central Committee, three objective conditions can now be clearly pointed out. First, the economy of Jiangxi is mainly feudal (it consists of exploitation through ground rent), the merchant-capitalist class is relatively weak, and the armed forces of the feudal lords are weaker than in any other southern province. Secondly, Jiangxi has no provincial troops of its own and has always been garrisoned by troops from other provinces. Sent there for the «suppression of Communists» or «suppression of bandits», these troops are unfamiliar with local conditions, their interests are much less directly involved than if they were local troops, and they usually lack enthusiasm. And thirdly, unlike Guangdong, which is close to Xianggang and under British control in almost every respect, Jiangxi is comparatively remote from imperialist influence. Once we have grasped these three points, we can understand why rural uprisings are more widespread and the Red Army and guerrilla units more numerous in Jiangxi than in any other province.

I have more or less finished what I want to say to you. I have been long-winded, and perhaps have said too much. But I feel that our discussion of the problem has been beneficial. If indeed the issue that we have been discussing is resolved correctly, it will have a very substantial impact on the actions of the Red Army. That is why I have been very glad to write this piece.

Two last points must still be clarified.

Firstly, how, then, should we interpret the word «soon» in the statement, «there will soon be a high tide of revolution»? This is a common question among comrades. Marxists are not fortune-tellers. They should, and indeed can, only indicate the general direction of future developments and changes; they should not and cannot fix the day and the hour in a mechanistic way. But, when I say that there will soon be a high tide of revolution in China, I am emphatically not speaking of something which in the words of some people «is possibly coming», something illusory, unattainable, and devoid of significance for action. It is like a ship far out at sea, whose masthead can already be seen from the shore; it is like the morning sun in the East, whose shimmering rays are visible from a high mountaintop; it is like a child about to be born moving restlessly in the womb.

Secondly, when I say that you want to use the method of roving rebel bands to extend political influence, I do not mean that you take a purely military standpoint or adhere to the ideology of roving rebel bands. Manifestly, you adhere to neither, for these two kinds of ideas are devoid of any concept of winning over the masses, and you, on the contrary, have proposed to «go all out to mobilize the masses». Not only have you advocated this, but you have been carrying it out in practice. What I disapprove of is your lack of an incisive concept for building political power. Consequently, the task of winning over the masses and promoting a revolutionary high tide can definitely not be successfully accomplished as you have imagined. The main purpose of my letter is to make this point.

Please correct me where I am wrong.

#Mao Zedong

#Shanghang, Gutian