The Concept of Operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Concept of Operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions: The Concept of Operations for the Liaohsi-Shenyang Campaign, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and others drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei, China on the 7th of September, 1948. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the North-Eastern People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between the 12th of September and 2nd of November, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Nationalist forces in north-eastern China consisted of four armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other: Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the North-East and quickly liberating the whole of the North-East, the People's Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns, one artillery column, and regional armed forces, altogether totaling 53 divisions or over 700'000 troops. Jinzhou, on the Beijing-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between north-eastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Jinzhou sector consisted of eight divisions, with more than 100'000 troops under Fan Hanjie, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Party's North-Eastern «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters. The capture of Jinzhou was the key to the success of the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign. Acting on the orders of Comrade Mao Zedong, the North-Eastern People's Liberation Army used one column and seven independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun; six columns, one artillery column, and one tank battalion to surround and attack Jinzhou; and two columns, placed in the Tashan-Gaoqiao sector south-west of Jinzhou, along with three columns in the Heishan-Dauhushan-Zhangwu sector to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Jinxi and Huludao and from Shenyang to relieve Jinzhou. The fighting in the Jinzhou area started on the 12th of September. Just as the people's army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Jinzhou after taking Yixian, Jiang Jieshi hurriedly flew to the North-East to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned five enemy divisions from the Northern China «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters on the Beijing-Liaoning Railway and two divisions from Shandong Province to join the four divisions in Jinxi; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on the people's positions at Tashan on the 10th of October, but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Ninth Army under Liao Yaoxiang, with 11 divisions and three cavalry brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Jinzhou, was intercepted by the people's army north-east of Heishan and Dahushan. The people's army began the assault on Jinzhou on the 14th of October and, after 31 hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing Fan Hanjie, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North-Eastern «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters, Lu Junquan, Commander of the Sixth Army, and more than 100'000 troops under their command. The liberation of Jinzhou impelled part of the enemy forces at Changchun to revolt against the Nationalist Party and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Nationalist troops in the North-East then became a foregone conclusion. But Jiang Jieshi, still dreaming of recapturing Jinzhou and of reopening the line of communications between north-eastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yaoxiang to continue its advance toward Jinzhou. After taking Jinzhou, the People's Liberation Army immediately swung back to the north-east and closed in on Liao's army from the north and south of Heishan and Dahushan. On the 26th of October, the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan-Dahushan-Xinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yaoxiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Xiang Fengwu, and Zheng Tingji, and more than 100'000 troops. The people's army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkou on the 2nd of November, wiping out over 149'000 enemy troops. The whole of the North-East was thus liberated. A total of more than 470'000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.

The concept of operations put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was fully carried out later, in spite of Lin Biao's opposition to it and his Right-wing conservatism during the campaign. The results of the campaign were as follows:

• The destruction of 470'000 enemy troops, plus the victories in other theatres during that period, made the qualitatively superior People's Liberation Army superior to the Nationalist army in numbers as well.
• The entire territory of north-eastern China was liberated, and the conditions were created for the liberation of Beijing, Tianjin, and all of North China.
• The people's army gained experience in fighting large-scale campaigns of annihilation.
• As a result of the liberation of north-eastern China, a strategically secure rear area with a fair industrial basis was won for the War of Liberation, and the Party and the people obtained favourable conditions for gradually turning to economic rehabilitation.

The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was the first of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The other two were the Huai-Hai and the Beijing-Tianjin Campaigns. In these three great campaigns, which lasted four months and 19 days, 144 divisions (brigades) of the enemy's regular troops and 29 divisions of its irregular troops, or more than 1'540'000 troops in all, were wiped out. During this period, the People's Liberation Army also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying large numbers of the enemy. In the first two years of the war, the People's Liberation Army had wiped out an average of about eight enemy brigades per month. Now, the number of enemy troops destroyed by the People's Liberation Army no longer averaged eight brigades per month, but 38 brigades. These three major campaigns virtually annihilated the crack troops on which the Nationalist Party relied for waging the counter-revolutionary civil war and greatly sped up victory in the War of Liberation all over the country.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOXI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN

#FIRST TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO LIN BIAO, LUO RONGHUAN, AND OTHERS

#Mao Zedong

#7th of September, 1948

#★

We are prepared to bring about the fundamental overthrow of the Nationalist Party of China in about five years, counting from July 1946. This is possible. Our objective can be attained, provided we destroy about 100 brigades of Nationalist regular troops every year, or some 500 brigades over the five years. In the past two years, our army has annihilated a total of 191 brigades of enemy regulars, an average of 95 1/2 brigades a year, or nearly eight brigades a month. In the next three years, it is required that our army should wipe out 300 or more brigades of enemy regulars. Between July this year and June next year, we expect to destroy some 115 brigades of enemy regulars. This total is apportioned among our various field armies and armies.¹ The Eastern China Field Army is required to wipe out about 40 brigades (including the seven already wiped out in July) and capture Jinan and a number of big, middle, and small cities in northern Jiangsu, eastern Henan, and northern Anhui. The Central Plains Field Army is required to wipe out about 14 brigades (including the two brigades wiped out in July) and capture a number of cities in the provinces of Hubei, Henan, and Anhui. The North-Western Field Army is required to wipe out about 12 brigades (including the 1 1/2 brigades wiped out in August). The army in northern China commanded by Xu Xiangqian and Zhou Shidi is required to wipe out about 14 brigades under Yan Xishan (including the eight brigades annihilated in July) and capture Taiyuan. You are required, in coordination with the two armies commanded by Luo Ruiqing and Yang Chengwu, to wipe out about 35 brigades of the two army groups under Wei Lihuang and Fu Zuoyi (including one brigade wiped out by Yang Chengwu in July) and capture all the cities along the Beijing-Liaoning, Beijing-Suiyuan, Beijing-Chengde, and Beijing-Baoding Railways, except Beijing, Tianjin, and Shenyang. The decisive factors for the achievement of this objective are the proper disposition and command of troops in campaigns and a proper balance between fighting and rest. If, in the two months of September and October, or a little longer, you can wipe out the enemy along the line from Jinzhou to Tangshan and take Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan, you will have achieved the task of wiping out some 18 enemy brigades. In order to wipe them out, you must now prepare to employ your main force on this line, leaving the enemy forces at Changchun and Shenyang alone. When you are attacking Jinzhou, be prepared also to wipe out the enemy forces that may come to its rescue from Changchun and Shenyang. Because the enemy forces in and near Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan are isolated from each other, success in attacking and wiping them out is pretty certain, and there is also a fair hope of success in capturing Jinzhou and in attacking enemy reinforcements. If, however, you were to dispose your main force at Xinmin and its northern environs in preparation for attacking the enemy forces which might come out from Changchun and Shenyang, then the enemy might not dare come out at all, because you would be too great a menace. On the one hand, the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang might not come out. And, on the other hand, because the forces you dispatch towards Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan would be too small, the enemy in and near these three cities (comprising 18 brigades) would probably fall back on Jinzhou and Tangshan, and you would find it rather difficult and yet necessary to attack them, wasting time and energy and thus perhaps landing yourselves in a passive position. For these reasons, it will be better to leave the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang alone and focus your attention on the enemy at Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan. Another point: you must prepare to fight three big campaigns in the ten months from September to next June and to spend about two months on each campaign, making a total of about six months and leaving four months for rest. During the Jinzhou-Shanhaiguan-Tangshan campaign (the first big campaign), if the enemy at Changchun and Shenyang sallies forth in full strength to rescue Jinzhou (because your main force will be disposed, not at Xinmin, but around Jinzhou, Wei Lihuang will be emboldened to come to the rescue), then, without leaving the Jinzhou-Shanhaiguan-Tangshan line, you can follow up immediately with large-scale annihilating attacks on the enemy reinforcements and strive to wipe out all Wei Lihuang's troops on the spot. This would be the ideal situation. Hence, you should pay attention to the following:

• Be firmly determined to attack and capture Jinzhou, Shanhaiguan, and Tangshan, and to take control of the entire line.
• Be firmly determined to fight a battle of annihilation on a scale larger than you have ever fought before, that is, dare to fight all Wei Lihuang's army when it comes to the rescue.
• In keeping with these two resolves, reconsider your plan of operations, make arrangements to meet the military requirements of your whole force (food, ammunition, recruits, and so on) and to handle captives.

Please consider the above and telegraph your reply.