The Concept of Operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign
#PUBLICATION NOTE
This edition of The Concept of Operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: The Concept of Operations for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
#INTRODUCTION NOTE
This is a telegram to Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, and others drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei, China on the 10th of October, 1948. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.
The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was a gigantic campaign fought by the North-Eastern People's Liberation Army in the western part of Liaoning Province and in the Shenyang-Changchun area between the 12th of September and 2nd of November, 1948. On the eve of the campaign, the total strength of the Nationalist forces in north-eastern China consisted of four armies, made up of 14 corps, or 44 divisions. These forces had shortened their lines and dug themselves in at three sectors isolated from each other: Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou. With the aim of completely wiping out the enemy troops in the North-East and quickly liberating the whole of the North-East, the People's Liberation Army in this region, supported by the broad masses of the local people, began the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign in September 1948 with a main force of 12 columns, one artillery column, and regional armed forces, altogether totaling 53 divisions or over 700'000 troops. Jinzhou, on the Beijing-Liaoning Railway, was the strategic link between north-eastern and northern China. The enemy forces garrisoning the Jinzhou sector consisted of eight divisions, with more than 100'000 troops under Fan Hanjie, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Nationalist Party's North-Eastern «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters. The capture of Jinzhou was the key to the success of the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign. Acting on the orders of Comrade Mao Zedong, the North-Eastern People's Liberation Army used one column and seven independent divisions to continue the siege operations against Changchun; six columns, one artillery column, and one tank battalion to surround and attack Jinzhou; and two columns, placed in the Tashan-Gaoqiao sector south-west of Jinzhou, along with three columns in the Heishan-Dauhushan-Zhangwu sector to intercept any reinforcements the enemy might send from Jinxi and Huludao and from Shenyang to relieve Jinzhou. The fighting in the Jinzhou area started on the 12th of September. Just as the people's army was mopping up the enemy in the outskirts of Jinzhou after taking Yixian, Jiang Jieshi hurriedly flew to the North-East to take personal charge of the operations and urgently summoned five enemy divisions from the Northern China «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters on the Beijing-Liaoning Railway and two divisions from Shandong Province to join the four divisions in Jinxi; all these 11 divisions began a furious attack on the people's positions at Tashan on the 10th of October, but could not break through. Meanwhile, the Nationalist Ninth Army under Liao Yaoxiang, with 11 divisions and three cavalry brigades, which had sallied out from Shenyang to rescue Jinzhou, was intercepted by the people's army north-east of Heishan and Dahushan. The people's army began the assault on Jinzhou on the 14th of October and, after 31 hours of fierce fighting, completely wiped out the defending enemy forces, capturing Fan Hanjie, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the North-Eastern «Bandit Suppression» Headquarters, Lu Junquan, Commander of the Sixth Army, and more than 100'000 troops under their command. The liberation of Jinzhou impelled part of the enemy forces at Changchun to revolt against the Nationalist Party and the rest to surrender. The complete collapse of the Nationalist troops in the North-East then became a foregone conclusion. But Jiang Jieshi, still dreaming of recapturing Jinzhou and of reopening the line of communications between north-eastern and northern China, gave strict orders to the army under Liao Yaoxiang to continue its advance toward Jinzhou. After taking Jinzhou, the People's Liberation Army immediately swung back to the north-east and closed in on Liao's army from the north and south of Heishan and Dahushan. On the 26th of October, the People's Liberation Army succeeded in surrounding the enemy in the Heishan-Dahushan-Xinmin sector and, after stiff fighting lasting two days and one night, completely wiped them out, capturing army commander Liao Yaoxiang, corps commanders Li Tao, Xiang Fengwu, and Zheng Tingji, and more than 100'000 troops. The people's army vigorously followed up this victory and liberated Shenyang and Yingkou on the 2nd of November, wiping out over 149'000 enemy troops. The whole of the North-East was thus liberated. A total of more than 470'000 enemy troops were wiped out in the campaign.
The concept of operations put forward by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was fully carried out later, in spite of Lin Biao's opposition to it and his Right-wing conservatism during the campaign. The results of the campaign were as follows:
- The destruction of 470'000 enemy troops, plus the victories in other theatres during that period, made the qualitatively superior People's Liberation Army superior to the Nationalist army in numbers as well.
- The entire territory of north-eastern China was liberated, and the conditions were created for the liberation of Beijing, Tianjin, and all of North China.
- The people's army gained experience in fighting large-scale campaigns of annihilation.
- As a result of the liberation of north-eastern China, a strategically secure rear area with a fair industrial basis was won for the War of Liberation, and the Party and the people obtained favourable conditions for gradually turning to economic rehabilitation.
The Liaoxi-Shenyang Campaign was the first of the three greatest campaigns of decisive significance in the Chinese People's War of Liberation. The other two were the Huai-Hai and the Beijing-Tianjin Campaigns. In these three great campaigns, which lasted four months and 19 days, 144 divisions (brigades) of the enemy's regular troops and 29 divisions of its irregular troops, or more than 1'540'000 troops in all, were wiped out. During this period, the People's Liberation Army also launched offensives on other fronts, destroying large numbers of the enemy. In the first two years of the war, the People's Liberation Army had wiped out an average of about eight enemy brigades per month. Now, the number of enemy troops destroyed by the People's Liberation Army no longer averaged eight brigades per month, but 38 brigades. These three major campaigns virtually annihilated the crack troops on which the Nationalist Party relied for waging the counter-revolutionary civil war and greatly sped up victory in the War of Liberation all over the country.
#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!
#THE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE LIAOXI-SHENYANG CAMPAIGN
#SECOND TELEGRAM FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA TO LIN BIAO, LUO RONGHUAN, AND OTHERS
#Mao Zedong
#10th of October, 1948
#★
#1
From the day you start attacking Jinzhou, there will be a period when the tactical situation will be very tense. We hope that you will inform us by radio every two or three days of the enemy's situation (the strength of the resistance by their forces defending Jinzhou, the progress of their reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi and from Shenyang, and the probable course of action of their troops in Changchun) and of our own situation (the progress of our attack on the city and the casualties sustained in attacking the city and holding off enemy reinforcements).
#2
It is highly possible that, as you have said, the tactical situation during this period will develop most favourably, that is, that you will be able to wipe out, not only the enemy's forces defending Jinzhou, but also a part of their reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi and some or most of their forces fleeing from Changchun. If the enemy's reinforcements from Shenyang advance to the area north of the Daling River just after you have taken Jinzhou and when you are thus able to shift your forces to encircle them, then it will be possible to wipe out these reinforcements as well. The key to all this lies in striving to capture Jinzhou in about a week.
#3
Decide on the disposition of your troops for checking the enemy reinforcements according to your progress in attacking Jinzhou and their progress in advancing both from the east and from the west. In case the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather slowly (as may happen if, during your attack on Jinzhou, the enemy besieged in Changchun breaks out, but is caught and crushed by our 12th Column and other forces, in which case the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang may be so bewildered as to advance rather slowly or halt or turn back to rescue the Changchun forces) while the enemy reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi advance rather quickly, you should be ready to throw in your general reserves to help the Fourth and 11th Columns wipe out part of the latter reinforcements and, first of all, to check their advance. If the enemy reinforcements from Huludao and Jinxi are being tied down and checked by our Fourth and 11th Columns and other forces and therefore advance rather slowly or halt, if the enemy forces in Changchun do not break out, if the enemy reinforcements from Shenyang advance rather quickly, and if most of the Jinzhou enemy forces have been wiped out and the capture of the city is imminent, then you should let the enemy forces from Shenyang advance deep into the area north of the Daling River, so that you can make a timely shift of your forces to encircle them and wipe them out at your convenience.
#4
You must centre your attention on the operations in Jinzhou and strive to capture this city as quickly as possible. Even if none of the other objectives is attained and Jinzhou alone is captured, you will have won the initiative, which in itself will be a great victory. It is hoped that you will give due attention to all the above points. Especially during the first few days of the battle for Jinzhou, the enemy reinforcements from both the east and the west will not make any major moves, and you should concentrate all your energies on the operations on the Jinzhou front.