On Protracted War

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of On Protracted War has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• On Protracted War, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Volume 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• On Protracted War, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Volume 6, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 2004.
• The Relationship Between the War of Resistance and Foreign Aid, in Mao Zedong on Diplomacy, First English Edition, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1998.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a series of lectures delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong at the Association for the Study of the War of Resistance Against Japan in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China between the 26th of May and 3rd of June, 1938. It was first published in the Jiefang, Number 43/44 (1st of July, 1938).

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#PREFACE TO THE 1939 ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION

#Mao Zedong

#20th of January, 1939

#★

Friends in Shanghai are translating my On Protracted War into English, news that certainly pleases me, because China's great War of Resistance is a matter of concern, not only to China and Asia, but also to the whole world. The peoples of democratic countries, such as Britain, the United States, and France, including progressives in all walks of life, have every sympathy for China's War of Resistance and oppose the Japanese imperialists' invasion of China; only some Far Right cabals oppose China's fighting the war. Some of these Far Right elements are just obstinate by nature, having taken the side of the Japanese warlords from the very beginning; others are too pessimistic to support China, misunderstanding the inexorable law that governs China's War of Resistance, a law under which Japan is doomed to lose and China is bound to win after an arduous course. There are probably many such people. It is, of course, my hope that my book may clarify the truth of this matter for them. As for the majority, who sympathize with China's War of Resistance, perhaps some of them are still similarly unclear about the true state of the war, and, although they sympathize with us, they will pessimistic. Such pessimism mingled with sympathy particularly calls for our careful explanation. This little book of mine, written in May 1938, is meant to last for a long time, as its arguments cover the whole span of the Sino-Japanese War. As for the credibility of the arguments in the book, they have been proved true by all our past experiences during the War of Resistance, and will be proved to be so again by future experience. Since the fall of Wuhan and Guangzhou, the war has been proceeding toward a new stage — favourable to China, but not to Japan — a stage that can be regarded as a stalemate between the enemy and us. A new situation is about to appear, in which the enemy is forced to end their strategic offensive and switch to strategic consolidation, while we, having persisted in resistance and grown in strength, conclude our strategic retreat (that is, of the main force, not the guerrillas) and move to a strategic parity. In this new stage, our one and only task is to prepare for our counter-offensive, a time-consuming preparation perhaps, but to this we are to devote all our courage and energy, for we will and assuredly can throw the Japanese imperialists out of China. In the great War of Resistance, China must fundamentally rely on itself to defeat the enemy, and there is no doubt that the forces in China, now that they are called into action, will not only become invincible, but also subdue the enemy and drive them away. In the meantime, however, we need the assistance of foreign aid. Our enemy is the whole world's enemy, China's War of Resistance is the whole world's war of resistance. The view of an isolated war has been proved wrong by history. There are still some people in democratic countries, such as Britain and the United States, who hold an isolationist view. They don't know that Britain, the United States, and other countries would not be able to rest in peace if China were defeated. Their wrong view is most inappropriate. At present, the hard truth is that aiding China means aiding themselves. So, I hope that this book will evoke some sympathy in English-speaking countries, for both the interests of China and the interests of the whole world. China is waging the war with much difficulty, yet the flames of war are threatening these world powers, so not a single country is able to stand clear of them. We agree to President Roosevelt's call to safeguard democracy, but firmly oppose Chamberlain's policy of concessions to the fascist countries of the West. Toward Japan, too, Chamberlain has so far shown a cowardly attitude. I hope that the citizens of Britain and the United States will stir themselves and urge their governments to adopt a new policy against the war of aggression, for the sake of both China and their own countries.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#ON PROTRACTED WAR

#LECTURES DELIVERED AT THE ASSOCIATION FOR THE STUDY OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

#Mao Zedong

#26th of May to 3rd of June, 1938

#★

#1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

It will soon be the 7th of July, the first anniversary of the great War of Resistance Against Japan. Rallying in unity, persevering in resistance, and persevering in the united front, the forces of the whole nation have been valiantly fighting the enemy for almost a year. The people of the whole world are attentively following this war, which has no precedent in the history of the East, and which will go down as a great war in world history, too. All Chinese suffering from the disasters of the war and fighting for the survival of their nation daily yearn for victory. But what actually will be the course of the war? Can we win? Can we win quickly? Many people are talking about a protracted war, but why is it a protracted war? How to carry on a protracted war? Many people are talking about final victory, but why will final victory be ours? How shall we strive for final victory? Not everyone has found answers to these questions; in fact, to this day, most people have not done so. Therefore, the defeatist exponents of the theory of national subjugation have come forward to tell people that China will be subjugated, that final victory will not be China's. On the other hand, some impetuous friends have come forward to tell people that China will win very quickly without having to exert any great effort. But are these views correct? We have said all along they are not. However, most people have not yet grasped what we have been saying. This is partly because we did not do enough propaganda and explanatory work, and partly because the development of objective events had not yet fully and clearly revealed their inherent nature and their features to the people, who were thus not in a position to foresee the overall trend and the outcome and hence to decide on a complete set of policies and tactics. Now, things are better; the experience of ten months of war has been quite sufficient to explode the utterly baseless theory of national subjugation and to dissuade our impetuous friends from their theory of quick victory. In these circumstances, many people are asking for a comprehensive explanation. All the more so with regard to protracted war, not only because of the opposing theories of national subjugation and quick victory, but also because of the shallow understanding of its nature. «Our 400'000'000 people have been making a concerted effort since the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and the final victory will belong to China.» This formula has a wide currency. It is a correct formula, but needs to be given more content. Our perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front has been possible because of many factors. Internally, they comprise all the political parties in the country from the Communist Party to the Nationalist Party, all the people from the workers and peasants to the bourgeoisie, and all the armed forces from the regular forces to the guerrillas; internationally, they range from the country of socialism to justice-loving people in all countries; in the camp of the enemy, they range from those people in Japan who are against the war to those Japanese soldiers at the front who are against the war. In short, all these forces have contributed in varying degrees to our War of Resistance. Everyone with a conscience should salute them. We Communists, together with all the other anti-Japanese political parties and the whole people, have no other course than to strive to unite all forces for the defeat of the diabolical Japanese aggressors. This has been our consistent endeavour in the past and at present. The 1st of July this year will be the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China. This is also the date of the first anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan. A serious study of protracted war is necessary in order to enable every Communist to play a better and greater part in the War of Resistance. Therefore, my lectures will be devoted to such a study, as a contribution to these two great anniversaries. I shall try to speak on all the problems relevant to the protracted war, but I cannot possibly go into everything in one series of lectures.

All the experience of the ten months of war proves the error both of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation and of the theory of China's quick victory. The former gives rise to the tendency to compromise and the latter to the tendency to underestimate the enemy. Both approaches to the problem are subjective and one-sided, or, in a word, unscientific.

Before the War of Resistance, there was a great deal of talk about national subjugation. Some said: «China is inferior in arms and is bound to lose in a war.» Others said: «If China offers armed resistance, it is sure to become another Ethiopia.» Since the beginning of the war, open talk of national subjugation has disappeared, but secret talk, and quite a lot of it, too, still continues. For instance, from time to time, an atmosphere of compromise arises, and the advocates of compromise argue that «the continuance of the war spells subjugation».¹ In a letter from Hunan, a student has written:

In the countryside, everything seems difficult. Doing propaganda work on my own, I have to talk to people when and where I find them. The people I have talked to are by no means ignoramuses; they all have some understanding of what is going on and are very interested in what I have to say. But when I run into my own relatives, they always say: «China cannot win; it is doomed.» They make one sick! Fortunately, they do not go around spreading their views, otherwise things would really be bad. The peasants would naturally put more stock in what they say.

Such exponents of the theory of China's inevitable subjugation form the social basis of the tendency to compromise. They are to be found everywhere in China, and therefore the problem of compromise is liable to crop up within the anti-Japanese front at any time and will probably remain with us right until the end of the war. Now that Xuzhou has fallen and Wuhan is in danger, it will not be unprofitable, I think, to knock the bottom out of the theory of national subjugation.

During these ten months of war, all kinds of views which are indicative of impetuosity have also appeared. For instance, at the outset of the war, many people were groundlessly optimistic, underestimating Japan and even believing that the Japanese could not get as far as Shanxi. Some belittled the strategic role of guerrilla warfare in the War of Resistance and doubted the proposition: «With regard to the whole, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary; with regard to the parts, guerrilla warfare is primary and mobile warfare supplementary.» They disagreed with the Eighth Route Army's strategy: «Guerrilla warfare is fundamental, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions», which they regarded as a «mechanical» approach.² During the Battle of Shanghai, some people said: «If we can fight for just three months, the international situation is bound to change, the Council Union is bound to send troops, and the war will be over.» They pinned their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance chiefly on foreign aid.³ After the Tai'erzhuang victory,⁴ some people maintained that the Xuzhou Campaign should be fought as a «quasi-decisive campaign» and that the policy of protracted war should be changed. They said such things as, «This campaign marks the last desperate struggle of the enemy» or, «If we win, the Japanese warlords will be demoralized and able only to await their Day of Judgement.»⁵ The victory at Pingxingguan turned some people's heads, and further victory at Tai'erzhuang has turned more people's heads. Doubts have arisen as to whether the enemy will attack Wuhan. Many people think «probably not», and many others «definitely not». Such doubts may affect all major issues. For instance, is our anti-Japanese strength already sufficient? Some people may answer affirmatively, for our present strength is already sufficient to check the enemy's advance, so why increase it? Or, for instance, is the slogan, «Consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front!», still correct? Some people may answer negatively, for the united front in its present state is already strong enough to repulse the enemy, so why consolidate and expand it? Or, for instance, should our efforts in diplomacy and international propaganda be intensified? Here again, the answer may be in the negative. Or, for instance, should we proceed in earnest to reform the army system and the system of government, develop the mass movement, enforce education for national defence, suppress traitors and Trotskijites, develop war industries, and improve the people's livelihood? Or, for instance, are the slogans calling for the defence of Wuhan, Guangzhou, and the North-West and for the vigorous development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear still correct? The answers might all be in the negative. There are even some people who, the moment a slightly favourable turn occurs in the war situation, are prepared to intensify the «friction» between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, diverting attention from external to internal matters. This almost invariably occurs whenever a comparatively big battle is won or the enemy's advance comes to a temporary halt. All the above can be termed political and military shortsightedness. Such talk, however plausible, is actually specious and groundless. To sweep away such verbiage should help the victorious prosecution of the War of Resistance.

The question now is: Will China be subjugated? The answer is: No, it will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is: No, it cannot win quickly, and the War of Resistance will be a protracted war.

As early as two years ago, we broadly indicated the main arguments on these questions. On the 16th of July, 1936, five months before the Xi'an Incident and 12 months before the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, in an interview with the American correspondent, Mr. Edgar Snow, I made a general estimate of the situation with regard to war between China and Japan and advanced various principles for winning victory. The following excerpts may serve as a reminder:

QUESTION: Under what conditions can the Chinese people defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?

ANSWER: Three conditions will guarantee our success:

• Firstly, the achievement of China's Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• Secondly, the formation of a worldwide anti-Japanese united front.
• Thirdly, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism.

**Of these, the central necessity is the unity of the Chinese people themselves.

QUESTION: How long do you think such a war would last?

ANSWER: That depends on the strength of the Chinese united front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese united front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from those governments which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but, in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world. The Communist Party of China, the Council Government, the Red Army, and the Chinese people are ready to unite with any power to shorten the duration of this war, but if none joins us, we are determined to carry on alone.

QUESTION: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

ANSWER: Two questions are involved here — the policy of the foreign powers, and the strategy of China's armies.

Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed, and it is well known. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making economic, political, or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the advance of Japan, are only indulging in utopian fancy. Nanjing has in the past adopted erroneous policies based on this strategy, and we have only to look at the map of East Asia to see the results of it.

But we know well enough that not only northern China, but the lower Yangzi River Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental programme. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese navy aspires to blockade the China seas and to seize the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In the event of war, Japan will try to make them its strategic bases, cutting off Britain, France, and the United States from China, and monopolizing the seas of the southern Pacific Ocean. These moves are included in Japan's plans of naval strategy, copies of which we have seen. And such naval strategy will be coordinated with Japan's land strategy.

China will, of course, be in an extremely difficult position at such a time. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that they can overcome these difficulties. Only the rich in China's seaports are defeatists. They are afraid that they will lose their property.

So, as China considers questions of economy, sources of war materiel, and so on, these questions of the Japanese naval blockade, the cessation of commerce, and so on must inevitably come up for answer by the foreign powers. If Japan is to be allowed to isolate China as easily as it did Manchuria, if the powers are to do nothing more than they did there, then naturally Japan's task will tend to be minimized.

Ideally, of course, our military strategy should be the strategy of the «inner front». That is, if the foreign nations, if Britain, the United States, France, and the Council Union resist the Japanese blockade, they will arrange themselves in the strategy of the «outer front». China would then fight in the milieu of Japanese imperialism, while the other countries opposed Japan on the periphery. In such a situation, the possible «encirclement and suppression» of Japan's imperial war machine in a brief period would be manifest.

Many people think that it would be impossible for China to continue its fight against Japan once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast and enforced a blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it, we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army. In certain periods, our forces have been exceeded numerically some 10 or 20 times by the Nationalist troops, which were also superior to us in equipment. Their economic resources many times surpassed ours, and they received material assistance from the outside. Why, then, has the Red Army scored success after success against the White troops, and not only survived, but increased its power until today?

The explanation is that the Red Army and the Council Government had created among all people within their areas a rock-like solidarity, because everyone in the council areas was ready to fight for their government against the oppressors, because everyone was voluntarily and consciously fighting for their own interests and what they believed to be right. Secondly, in the struggle of the councils, the people were led by people of ability, strength, and determination, equipped with deep understanding of the strategic political, economic, and military needs of their position. The Red Army won its many victories — beginning with only a few dozen rifles in the hands of determined revolutionaries — because its solid mass basis attracted friends among the civilian population and even among the White troops. The enemy was infinitely our superior militarily, but politically they were immobilized.

In the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilized in its struggle against the Nationalist Party. China is a very big nation, and it cannot be said to have been conquered until every inch of it is under the sword of the invader. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as 100'000'000 or even 200'000'000 inhabitants, we will still be far from defeated. We shall still have left a great force to fight against the Japanese warlords, who will also have to fight a heavy and constant rear-guard action throughout the entire war.

As for munitions, the Japanese cannot seize our arsenals in the interior, which are sufficient to equip Chinese armies for many years, nor can they prevent us from capturing great amounts of arms and ammunition from their own hands. By the latter method, the Red Army has equipped its present forces from the Nationalist forces; for nine years, they have been our «quartermasters». What infinitely greater possibilities would open up for the utilization of such tactics as won our arms for us if the whole Chinese people were united against Japan!

Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China's economy also presents advantages in a war against Japan's highly centralized and highly concentrated economy. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Moreover, it is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China; China's North-West, South-West, and West cannot be blockaded by Japan, which is continentally still a naval power.

Thus, once more, the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization and unification of the entire Chinese people and the construction of a united front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party ever since 1932.

[...]

QUESTION: In case the Sino-Japanese War extends over a very long period and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist government agree to make a peace recognizing Japanese control over Manchuria?

ANSWER: Impossible! The Chinese Communists, like the Chinese people, will not permit Japan to retain one inch of Chinese territory!

[...]

QUESTION: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy to be followed in this «war of liberation»?

ANSWER: The strategy should be that of mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale mobile war rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines, and heavy fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the theatre in which the war will take place, and this dictates a mobile war.

This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare, and important reliance must be placed on guerrilla tactics. Positional warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and ultimately of secondary strategic importance.

Geographically, the theatre of war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a slow-moving war machine like Japan's cautiously feeling its way in front of fierce rear-guard actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defence of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Ethiopians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually break the morale, fighting spirit, and military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

The mistake of the Ethiopians, quite aside from the internal political weakness of their position, was that they attempted to hold a deep front, enabling the fascists to bombard, gas, and strike with their technically stronger military machines at heavy immobile concentrations, exposing themselves to vital organic injury.

Besides the regular Chinese troops, we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy 24 hours a day and worry them to death.

It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communication, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, war machines, and so on. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on the basis of positional warfare, using fortifications, deep entrenchment, and so on, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign aid. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China, and the morale of its forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human resources in the Chinese people will still be pouring troops ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal wave of Japanese imperialism has wracked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance.

All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.

Japanese officers and soldiers captured and disarmed by us will be welcomed and will be well treated. They will not be killed. They will be treated in a fraternal way. Every method will be adopted to make the Japanese proletarian soldiers, with whom we have no quarrel, stand up and oppose their own fascist oppressors. Our slogan will be: «Unite and oppose our common oppressors, the fascist leaders!» Anti-fascist Japanese troops are our friends, and there is no conflict in our aims.⁶

The above views have been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

As far back as the 25th of August, 1937, less than two months after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China clearly pointed out in its Resolution on the Present Situation and the Party's Tasks:

The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Marco Polo Bridge and their occupation of Beijing and Tianjin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have «no desire to aggravate the situation» is only a smokescreen for further attacks.

The resistance at Marco Polo Bridge on the 7th of July marked the starting point of China's national War of Resistance.

Thus, a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage, the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance.

The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won.

The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such reverses. The loss of Beijing and Tianjin is the gravest lesson since the loss of the four north-eastern provinces. Therefore, it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.

— Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Resolution on the Present Situation and the Party's Tasks (25th of August, 1937)

The above thesis, too, has been proved correct in the light of the experience of the ten months of war and will also be borne out in the future.

Epistemologically speaking, the source of all erroneous views on war lies in idealist and mechanical tendencies on the question. People with such tendencies are subjective and one-sided in their approach to problems. They either indulge in groundless and purely subjective talk, or, basing themselves upon a single aspect or a temporary manifestation, magnify it with similar subjectivity into the whole of the problem, and talk about it with a show of earnestness. This is the theoretical source of erroneous viewpoints. But there are two categories of erroneous views, one comprising fundamental, and therefore consistent, errors, which are hard to correct, and the other comprising accidental, and therefore temporary, errors, which are easy to correct. Since both are wrong, both need to be corrected. Therefore, only by opposing idealist and mechanical tendencies and taking an objective and all-sided view in making a study of war can we draw correct conclusions on the question of war.

#2. THE BASIS OF THE PROBLEM

Why is the War of Resistance Against Japan a protracted war? Why will the final victory be China's? What is the basis for these statements?

The war between China and Japan is not just any war, it is specifically a war of life and death between semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and imperialist Japan, fought in the 1930s. Herein lies the basis of the whole problem. The two sides in the war have many contrasting features, which will be considered in turn below.

#2.1. THE JAPANESE SIDE

First, Japan is a powerful imperialist country, which ranks first in the East in military, economic, and political-organizational power, and is one of the five or six foremost imperialist countries of the world. These are the fundamental factors in Japan's war of aggression. The inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China are due to Japan's imperialist system and its great military, economic, and political-organizational power. Secondly, however, the imperialist character of Japan's social economy determines the imperialist character of its war, a war that is retrogressive and barbarous. In the 1930s, the internal and external contradictions of Japanese imperialism have driven it not only to embark on an adventurist war unparalleled in scale, but also to approach its final collapse. In terms of social development, Japan is no longer a thriving country; the war will not lead to the prosperity sought by its ruling classes, but to the very reverse, the doom of Japanese imperialism. This is what we mean by the retrogressive nature of Japan's war. It is this reactionary quality, coupled with the military-feudal character of Japanese imperialism, that gives rise to the peculiar barbarity of Japan's war. All of which will awaken to the utmost the class antagonisms within Japan, the antagonism between the Japanese and the Chinese nations, and the antagonism between Japan and most other countries of the world. The reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war constitutes the primary reason for its inevitable defeat. Thirdly, Japan's war is conducted on the basis of its great military, economic, and political-organizational power, but, at the same time, it rests on an inadequate natural endowment. Japan's military, economic, and political-organizational power is great, but quantitatively inadequate. Japan is a comparatively small country, deficient in human resources and in military, financial, and material resources, and it cannot stand a long war. Japan's rulers are endeavouring to resolve this difficulty through war, but again they will get the very reverse of what they desire; that is to say, the war they have launched to resolve this difficulty will eventually aggravate it and even exhaust Japan's original resources. Fourthly and lastly, while Japan can get international support from the fascist countries, the international opposition it is bound to encounter will be greater than its international support. This opposition will gradually grow and eventually not only cancel out the support, but even bear down upon Japan itself. Such is the law that an unjust cause finds meagre support, and such is the consequence of the very nature of Japan's war. To sum up, Japan's advantage lies in its great capacity to wage war, and its disadvantages lie in the reactionary and barbarous nature of its war, in the inadequacy of its human and material resources, and in its meagre international support. These are the characteristics on the Japanese side.

#2.2. THE CHINESE SIDE

First, we are a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. The Opium War,⁷ the Taiping Revolution,⁸ the Reform Movement of 1898,⁹ the Revolution of 1911,¹⁰ and the Northern Expedition¹¹ — the revolutionary or reform movements which aimed at extricating China from its semi-colonial and semi-feudal state — all met with serious setbacks, and China remains a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. We are still a weak country and manifestly inferior to the enemy in military, economic, and political-organizational power. Here again, one can find the basis for the inevitability of the war and the impossibility of quick victory for China. Secondly, however, China's liberation movement, with its cumulative development over the last 100 years, is now different from that of any previous period. Although the domestic and foreign forces opposing it have caused it serious setbacks, at the same time, they have tempered the Chinese people. Although China today is not so strong as Japan militarily, economically, politically, and culturally, there are still factors in China more progressive than in any other period of its history. The Communist Party of China and the army under its leadership represent these progressive factors. It is on the basis of this progress that China's present war of liberation can be protracted and can achieve final victory. By contrast with Japanese imperialism, which is declining, China is a country rising like the morning sun. China's war is progressive, hence its just character. Because it is a just war, it is capable of mobilizing the nation to unity, of evoking the sympathy of the people in Japan, and of winning the support of most countries in the world. Thirdly, and again by contrast with Japan, China is a very big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and plenty of soldiers, and is capable of sustaining a long war. Fourthly and lastly, there is broad international support for China stemming from the progressive and just character of its war, which is again exactly the reverse of the meagre support for Japan's unjust cause, which is retrogressive and barbarous. To sum up, China's disadvantage lies in its military weakness, and its advantages lie in the progressive and just character of its war, its great size, and its abundant international support. These are China's characteristics.

#★ ★ ★

Thus, it can be seen that Japan has great military, economic, and political-organizational power, but that its war is reactionary and barbarous, its human and material resources are inadequate, and it is in an unfavourable position internationally. China, on the contrary, has less military, economic, and political-organizational power, but it is in its era of progress, its war is progressive and just, it is moreover a big country, a factor which enables it to sustain a protracted war, and it will be supported by most countries. The above are the fundamental, mutually contradictory characteristics of the Sino-Japanese War. They have determined and are determining all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of the two sides; they have determined and are determining the protracted character of the war and its outcome, namely, that the final victory will go to China and not to Japan. The war is a contest between these characteristics. They will change in the course of the war, each according to its own nature; and, from this, everything else will follow. These characteristics exist objectively and are not invented to deceive people; they constitute all the fundamental elements of the war, and are not incomplete fragments; they permeate all major and minor problems on both sides and all stages of the war, and they are not matters of no consequence. If anyone forgets these characteristics in studying the Sino-Japanese War, they will surely go wrong; and even though some of their ideas win credence for a time and may seem right, they will inevitably be proved wrong by the course of the war. On the basis of these characteristics, we shall now proceed to explain the problems to be dealt with.

#3. REFUTATION OF THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION

The theorists of national subjugation, who see nothing but the contrast between the enemy's strength and our weakness, used to say, «Resistance will mean subjugation», and now they are saying: «The continuance of the war spells subjugation.» We shall not be able to convince them merely by stating that Japan, though strong, is small, while China, though weak, is large. They can adduce historical instances, such as the destruction of the Song Dynasty by the Yuan and the destruction of the Ming Dynasty by the Qing, to prove that a small but strong country can vanquish a large but weak one, and, moreover, that a backward country can vanquish an advanced one. If we say these events occurred long ago and do not prove the point, they can cite the British subjugation of India to prove that a small but strong capitalist country can vanquish a large but weak and backward country. Therefore, we have to produce other grounds before we can silence and convince all the subjugationists, and supply everyone engaged in propaganda with adequate arguments to persuade those who are still confused or irresolute and so strengthen their faith in the War of Resistance.

What, then, are the grounds we should advance? The characteristics of the epoch. These characteristics are concretely reflected in Japan's retrogression and paucity of support and in China's progress and abundance of support.

Our war is not just any war, it is specifically a war between China and Japan fought in the 1930s. Our enemy, Japan, is first of all a moribund imperialist power; it is already in its era of decline, and is not only different from Britain at the time of the subjugation of India, when British capitalism was still in the era of its ascendancy, but also different from what it itself was at the time of the First World War 20 years ago. The present war was launched on the eve of the general collapse of world imperialism and, above all, of the fascist countries; that is the very reason the enemy has launched this adventurist war, which is in the nature of a last desperate struggle. Therefore, it is an inescapable certainty that it will not be China, but the ruling circles of Japanese imperialism, which will be destroyed as a result of the war. Moreover, Japan has undertaken this war at a time when many countries have been or are about to be embroiled in war, when we are all fighting or preparing to fight against barbarous aggression, and China's fortunes are linked with those of most of the countries and peoples of the world. This is the root cause of the opposition Japan has awakened and will increasingly awaken among those countries and peoples.

What about China? The China of today cannot be compared with the China of any other historical period. It is a semi-colony and a semi-feudal society, and it is consequently considered a weak country. But, at the same time, China is historically in its era of progress; this is the primary reason for its ability to defeat Japan. When we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is progressive, we do not mean progressive in the ordinary or general sense, nor do we mean progressive in the sense that the Ethiopian war against Italy, or the Taiping Revolution or the Revolution of 1911 were progressive, we mean progressive in the sense that China is progressive today. In what way is the China of today progressive? It is progressive because it is no longer a completely feudal country and because we already have some capitalism in China, we have a bourgeoisie and a proletariat, we have vast numbers of people who have awakened or are awakening, we have a Communist Party, we have a politically progressive army — the Chinese Red Army led by the Communist Party — and we have the tradition and the experience of many decades of revolution, and especially the experience of the 17 years since the founding of the Communist Party of China. This experience has schooled the people and the political parties of China and forms the very basis for the present unity against Japan. If it is said that, without the experience of 1905, the victory of 1917 would have been impossible in Russia, then we can also say that, without the experience of the last 17 years, it would be impossible to win our War of Resistance. Such is the internal situation.

In the existing international situation, China is not isolated in the war, and this fact, too, is without precedent in history. In the past, China's wars, and India's too, were wars fought in isolation. It is only today that we meet with worldwide popular movements, extraordinary in breadth and depth, which have arisen or are arising and which are supporting China. The Russian Revolution of 1917 also received international support, and thus the Russian workers and peasants won; but that support was not so broad in scale and deep in nature as ours today. The popular movements in the world today are developing on a scale and with a depth that are unprecedented. The existence of the Council Union is a particularly vital factor in present-day international politics, and the Council Union will certainly support China with the greatest enthusiasm; there was nothing like this 20 years ago. All these factors have created and are creating important conditions indispensable to China's final victory. Large-scale direct assistance is as yet lacking and will come only in the future, but China is progressive and is a big country, and these are the factors enabling it to protract the war and to promote as well as await international help.

There is the additional factor that, while Japan is a small country with a small territory, few resources, a small population, and a limited number of soldiers, China is a big country with vast territory, rich resources, a large population, and plenty of soldiers, so that, besides the contrast between strength and weakness, there is the contrast between a small country, retrogression, and meagre support and a big country, progress, and abundant support. This is the reason why China will never be subjugated. It follows from the contrast between strength and weakness that Japan can ride roughshod over China for a certain time and to a certain extent, that China must unavoidably travel a hard stretch of road, and that the War of Resistance will be a protracted war and not a war of quick decision; nevertheless, it follows from the other contrast — a small country, retrogression, and meagre support versus a big country, progress, and abundant support — that Japan cannot ride roughshod over China indefinitely, but is sure to meet final defeat, while China can never be subjugated, but is sure to win final victory.

Why was Ethiopia vanquished? First, it was not only weak, but also small. Second, it was not as progressive as China; it was an old country passing from the slave to the serf system, a country without any capitalism or bourgeois political parties, let alone a Communist Party, and with no army such as the Chinese army, the Nationalist Central Army, let alone one like the Eighth Route Army. Third, it was unable to hold out and wait for international assistance and had to fight its war in isolation. Fourth, and most important of all, there were mistakes in the direction of its war against Italy. Therefore, Ethiopia was subjugated. But there is still quite extensive guerrilla warfare in Ethiopia, which, if persisted in, will enable the Ethiopians to recover their country when the world situation changes.

If the subjugationists quote the history of the failure of liberation movements in modern China to prove their assertions first that «resistance will mean subjugation», and then that «the continuance of the war spells subjugation», here again our answer is: «Times are different.» China itself, the internal situation in Japan, and the international environment are all different now. It is a serious matter that Japan is stronger than before, while China, in its unchanged semi-colonial and semi-feudal position, is still fairly weak. It is also a fact that, for the time being, Japan can still control its people at home and exploit international contradictions in order to invade China. But, during a long war, these things are bound to change in the opposite direction. Such changes are not yet accomplished facts, but they will become so in future. The subjugationists dismiss this point. As for China, we already have new people, a new political party, a new army, and a new policy of resistance to Japan, a situation very different from that of over a decade ago, and, what is more, all these will inevitably make further progress. It is true that historically the liberation movements met with repeated setbacks with the result that China could not accumulate greater strength for the present War of Resistance — this is a very painful historical lesson, and never again should we destroy any of our revolutionary forces. Yet, even on the present basis, by exerting great efforts, we can certainly forge ahead gradually and increase the strength of our resistance. All such efforts should converge on the great Anti-Japanese National United Front. As for international support, though direct and large-scale assistance is not yet in sight, it is in the making, the international situation being fundamentally different from before. The countless failures in the liberation movement of modern China had their subjective and objective causes, but the situation today is entirely different. Today, although there are many difficulties which make the War of Resistance arduous — such as the enemy's strength and our weakness, and the fact that their difficulties are just starting, while our own progress is far from sufficient — nevertheless many favourable conditions exist for defeating the enemy; we need only add our subjective efforts, and we shall be able to overcome the difficulties and win through to victory. These are favourable conditions such as never existed before in any period of our history, and that is why the War of Resistance Against Japan, unlike the liberation movements of the past, will not end in failure.

#4. COMPROMISE OR RESISTANCE? CORRUPTION OR PROGRESS?

It has been fully explained above that the theory of national subjugation is groundless. But there are many people who do not subscribe to this theory; they are honest patriots, who are nevertheless deeply worried about the present situation. Two things are worrying them, fear of a compromise with Japan and doubts about the possibility of political progress. These two vexing questions are being widely discussed and no key has been found to their solution. Let us now examine them.

As previously explained, the question of compromise has its social roots, and, as long as these roots exist, the question is bound to arise. But compromise will not avail. To prove the point, again we need only look for substantiation to Japan, China, and the international situation. First take Japan. At the very beginning of the War of Resistance, we estimated that the time would come when an atmosphere conducive to compromise would arise, in other words, that, after occupying northern China, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, Japan would probably resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate. True enough, it did resort to the scheme, but the crisis soon passed, one reason being that the enemy everywhere pursued a barbarous policy and practised naked plunder. Had China capitulated, every Chinese would have become a slave without a country. The enemy's predatory policy, the policy of subjugating China, has two aspects, the material and the spiritual, both of which are being applied universally to all Chinese, not only to the people of the lower strata, but also to members of the upper strata; of course, the latter are treated a little more politely, but the difference is only one of degree, not of principle. In the main, the enemy is transplanting into the interior of China the same old measures they adopted in the three north-eastern provinces. Materially, they are robbing the common people even of their food and clothing, making them cry out in hunger and cold; they are plundering the means of production, thus ruining and enslaving China's national industries. Spiritually, they are working to destroy the national consciousness of the Chinese people. Under the flag of the «Rising Sun», all Chinese are forced to be docile subjects, beasts of burden forbidden to show the slightest trace of Chinese national spirit. This barbarous enemy policy will be carried deeper into the interior of China. Japan with its voracious appetite is unwilling to stop the war. As was inevitable, the policy set forth in the Japanese cabinet's statement of the 16th of January, 1938¹² is still being obstinately carried out, which has enraged all strata of the Chinese people. This rage is engendered by the reactionary and barbarous character of Japan's war — «there is no escape from fate», and hence an absolute hostility has crystallized. It is to be expected that, on some future occasion, the enemy will once again resort to the scheme of inducing China to capitulate and that certain subjugationists will again crawl out and most probably collude with certain foreign elements (to be found in Britain, the United States, and France, and especially among the upper strata in Britain) as partners in crime. But the general trend of events will not permit capitulation; the obstinate and peculiarly barbarous character of Japan's war has decided this aspect of the question.

Second, let us take China. There are three factors contributing to China's perseverance in the War of Resistance. In the first place, the Communist Party, which is the reliable force leading the people to resist Japan. Next, the Nationalist Party, which depends on Britain and the United States and hence will not capitulate to Japan unless they tell it to. Finally, the other political parties and groups, most of which oppose compromise and support the War of Resistance. With unity among these three, whoever compromises will be standing with the traitors, and anybody will have the right to punish them. All those unwilling to be traitors have no choice but to unite and carry on the War of Resistance to the end; therefore, compromise can hardly succeed.

Third, take the international aspect. Except for Japan's allies and certain elements in the upper strata of other capitalist countries, the whole world is in favour of resistance, and not of compromise by China. This factor reinforces China's hopes. Today the people throughout the country cherish the hope that international forces will gradually give China increasing help. It is not a vain hope; the existence of the Council Union in particular encourages China in her War of Resistance. The Union of Socialist Council Republics [USCR], now strong as never before, has always shared China's joys and sorrows. In accordance with Leninism, and in direct contrast to all the members of the upper strata in the capitalist countries, who seek nothing but profits, the Council Union considers it its duty to help all weak nations and all revolutionary wars. That China is not fighting its war in isolation has its basis, not only in international support in general, but in Soviet support in particular. China and the Council Union are in close geographical proximity, which aggravates Japan's crisis and facilitates China's War of Resistance. Geographical proximity to Japan increases the difficulties of China's resistance. On this point, it is different from the American War of Independence against Britain. Proximity to the Council Union, on the other hand, is a favourable condition for the War of Resistance compared to the American War of Independence. We should not neglect this point.

Hence, we may conclude that the danger of compromise exists, but can be overcome. Even if the enemy can modify their policy to some extent, they cannot alter it fundamentally. In China, the social roots of compromise are present, but the opponents of compromise are in the majority. Internationally, also, some forces favour compromise, but the main forces favour resistance. The combination of these three factors makes it possible to overcome the danger of compromise and persist to the end in the War of Resistance.

Let us now answer the second question. Political progress at home and perseverance in the War of Resistance are inseparable. The greater the political progress, the more we can persevere in the war, and the more we persevere in the war, the greater the political progress. But, fundamentally, everything depends on our perseverance in the War of Resistance. The unhealthy phenomena in various fields under the Nationalist regime are very serious, and the accumulation of these undesirable factors over the years has caused great anxiety and vexation among the broad ranks of our patriots. But there is no ground for pessimism, since experience in the War of Resistance has already proved that the Chinese people have made as much progress in the last ten months as in many years in the past. Although the cumulative effects of long years of corruption are seriously retarding the growth of the people's strength to resist Japan, thus reducing the extent of our victories and causing us losses in the war, yet the overall situation in China, in Japan and in the world is such that the Chinese people cannot but make progress. This progress will be slow, because of the factor of corruption, which impedes progress. Progress and the slow pace of progress are two characteristics of the present situation, and the second ill accords with the urgent needs of the war, which is a source of great concern to patriots. But we are in the midst of a revolutionary war, and war will certainly be able to overcome the phenomenon of corruption. Revolutionary war is an antitoxin, which not only eliminates the enemy's poison, but also purges us of our own filth. Every just, revolutionary war is endowed with tremendous power, which can transform many things or clear the way for their transformation. The Sino-Japanese War will transform both China and Japan; provided China perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front, the old Japan will surely be transformed into a new Japan and the old China into a new China, and people and everything else in both China and Japan will be transformed during and after the war. It is proper for us to regard the anti-Japanese war and our national reconstruction as interconnected. To say that Japan can also be transformed is to say that the war of aggression by its rulers will end in defeat and may lead to a revolution by the Japanese people. The day of triumph of the Japanese people's revolution will be the day Japan is transformed. All this is closely linked with China's War of Resistance and is a prospect we should take into account. To repeat: Only through war can everything be transformed, and everyone should have resolute faith in this fact and make resolute efforts inspired by this faith.

#5. THE THEORY OF NATIONAL SUBJUGATION IS WRONG, AND THE THEORY OF QUICK VICTORY IS LIKEWISE WRONG

In our comparative study of the enemy and ourselves with respect to the fundamental contradictory characteristics, such as relative strength, relative size, progress or reaction, and the relative extent of support, we have already refuted the theory of national subjugation, and we have explained why compromise is unlikely and why political progress is possible. The subjugationists stress the contradiction between strength and weakness and puff it up until it becomes the basis of their whole argument on the question, neglecting all the other contradictions. Their preoccupation with the contrast in strength shows their one-sidedness, and their exaggeration of this one side of the matter into the whole shows their subjectivism. Thus, if one looks at the matter as a whole, it will be seen that they have no ground to stand on and are wrong. As for those who are neither subjugationists nor confirmed pessimists, but who are in a pessimistic frame of mind for the moment simply because they are confused by the disparity between our strength and that of the enemy at a given time and in certain respects or by the corruption in the country, we should point out to them that their approach also tends to be one-sided and subjective. But, in their case, correction is relatively easy; once they are alerted, they will understand, for they are patriots and their error is only momentary.

The exponents of quick victory are likewise wrong. Either they completely forget the contradiction between strength and weakness, remembering only the other contradictions, or they exaggerate China's advantages beyond all semblance of reality and beyond recognition, or they presumptuously take the balance of forces at one time and place for the whole situation, as in the old saying: «A leaf before the eye shuts out Mount Tai.» In a word, they lack the courage to admit that the enemy is strong while we are weak. They often deny this point and consequently deny one aspect of the truth. Nor do they have the courage to admit the limitations of our advantages, and thus they deny another aspect of the truth. The result is that they make mistakes, big and small, and here again it is subjectivism and one-sidedness that are doing the mischief. These friends have their hearts in the right place, and they, too, are patriots. But while «the ‹excellencies'› aspirations are indeed lofty», their views are wrong, and to act according to them we certainly be to run into a brick wall. For if appraisal does not conform to reality, action cannot attain its objective; and to act notwithstanding would mean the army's defeat and the nation's subjugation, so that the result would be the same as with the defeatists. Hence this theory of quick victory will not do either.

Do we deny the danger of national subjugation? No, we do not. We recognize that China faces two possible prospects, liberation or subjugation, and that the two are in violent conflict. Our task is to achieve liberation and to avert subjugation. The conditions for liberation are China's progress, which is fundamental, the enemy's difficulties, and international support. We differ from the subjugationists. Taking an objective and all-sided view, we recognize the two possibilities of national subjugation and liberation, stress that liberation is the dominant possibility, point out the conditions for its achievement, and strive to secure them. The subjugationists, on the other hand, taking a subjective and one-sided view, recognize only one possibility, that of subjugation; they do not admit the possibility of liberation, and still less point out the conditions necessary for liberation or strive to secure them. Moreover, while acknowledging the tendeng to compromise and the corruption, we see other tendencies and phenomena which, we indicate, will gradually prevail and are already in violent conflict with the former; in addition, we point out the conditions necessary for the healthy tendencies and phenomena to prevail, and we strive to overcome the tendency to compromise and to change the state of corruption. Therefore, contrary to the pessimists, we are not at all downhearted.

Not that we would not like a quick victory; everybody would be in favour of driving the «devils» out overnight. But we point out that, in the absence of certain definite conditions, quick victory is something that exists only in one's mind and not in objective reality, and that it is a mere illusion, a false theory. Accordingly, having made an objective and comprehensive appraisal of all the circumstances concerning both the enemy and ourselves, we point out that the only way to final victory is the strategy of protracted war, and we reject the groundless theory of quick victory. We maintain that we must strive to secure all the conditions indispensable to final victory, and the more fully and the earlier these conditions are secured, the surer we shall be of victory and the earlier we shall win it. We believe that only in this way can the course of the war be shortened, and we reject the theory of quick victory, which is just idle talk and an effort to get things on the cheap.

#6. WHY A PROTRACTED WAR?

Let us now examine the problem of protracted war. A correct answer to the question, «Why a protracted war?», can be arrived at only on the basis of all the fundamental contrasts between China and Japan. For instance, if we say merely that the enemy is a strong imperialist power while we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, we are in danger of falling into the theory of national subjugation. For neither in theory nor in practice can a struggle become protracted by simply pitting the weak against the strong. Nor can it become protracted by simply pitting the big against the small, the progressive against the reactionary, or abundant support against meagre support. The annexation of a small country by a big one or of a big country by a small one is a common occurrence. It often happens that a progressive country which is not strong is destroyed by a big, reactionary country, and the same holds for everything that is progressive but not strong. Abundant or meagre support is an important, but a subsidiary factor, and the degree of its effect depends upon the fundamental factors on both sides. The saying, «Heaven helps those who help themselves», is a scientific truth. Therefore, when we say that the War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, our conclusion is derived from the interrelations of all the factors at work on both sides. The enemy is strong and we are weak, and the danger of subjugation is there. But, in other respects, the enemy has shortcomings and we have advantages. The enemy's advantage can be reduced and their shortcomings aggravated by our efforts. On the other hand, our advantages can be enhanced and our shortcoming remedied by our efforts. Hence, we can win final victory and avert subjugation, while the enemy will ultimately be defeated and will be unable to avert the collapse of their whole imperialist system.

Since the enemy has advantages only in one respect, but shortcomings in all others, and we have shortcomings in only one respect, but advantages in all others, why has this produced not a balance, but, on the contrary, a superior position for them and an inferior position for us at the present time? Quite clearly, we cannot consider the question in such a formal way. The fact is that the disparity between the enemy's strength and our own is now so great that the enemy's shortcomings have not developed, and for the time being can not develop, to a degree sufficient to offset their strength, while our advantages have not developed, and for the time being cannot develop, to a degree sufficient to compensate for our weakness. Therefore, there can as yet be no balance, only imbalance.

Although our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and the united front have somewhat changed the enemy's strength and superiority as against our weakness and inferiority, there has as yet been no basic change. Hence, during a certain stage of the war, to a certain degree, the enemy will be victorious and we shall suffer defeat. But why is it that, in this stage, the enemy's victories and our defeats are definitely restricted in degree and cannot be transcended by complete victory or complete defeat? The reason is that, first, from the very beginning, the enemy's strength and our weakness have been relative and not absolute, and that, second, our efforts in persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front have further accentuated this relativeness. In comparison with the original situation, the enemy is still strong, but unfavourable factors have reduced their strength, although not yet to a degree sufficient to destroy their superiority, and, similarly, we are still weak, but favourable factors have compensated for our weakness, although not yet to a degree sufficient to transform our inferiority. Thus, it turns out that the enemy is relatively strong and we are relatively weak, that the enemy is in a relatively superior and we are in a relatively inferior position. On both sides, strength and weakness, superiority and inferiority, have never been absolute. Therefore, the victories and defeats of both sides have been limited to a certain stage and a certain degree, giving rise to a situation of protracted war. Besides, our efforts in persevering in resistance to Japan and in the united front during the war have brought about further changes in the original balance of forces between us and the enemy, which have created or are creating relative strength and weakness and relative superiority and inferiority. Therefore, in this stage, the enemy's victory and our defeat are definitely restricted in degree, and hence the war becomes protracted.

But circumstances are continually changing. In the course of the war, provided we employ correct military and political tactics, make no mistakes of principle, and exert our best efforts, the enemy's disadvantages and China's advantages will both grow as the war is drawn out, with the inevitable result that there will be a continual change in the difference in comparative strength and hence in the relative position of the two sides. When a new stage is reached, a great change will take place in the balance of forces, resulting in the enemy's defeat and our victory.

At present, the enemy can still manage to exploit their strength, and our War of Resistance has not yet fundamentally weakened them. The insufficiency in their human and material resources is not yet such as to prevent their offensive; on the contrary, they can still sustain their offensive to a certain extent. The reactionary and barbarous nature of their war, a factor which intensifies both class antagonisms within Japan and the resistance of the Chinese nation, has not yet brought about a situation which radically impedes their advance. The enemy's international isolation is increasing, but is not yet complete. In many countries which have indicated that they will help us, the capitalists dealing in munitions and war materials and bent solely on profit are still furnishing Japan with large quantities of war supplies,¹³ and their governments¹⁴ are still reluctant to join the Council Union in practical sanctions against Japan. From all this it follows that our War of Resistance cannot be won quickly and can only be a protracted war. As for China, although there has been some improvement with regard to its weakness in the military, economic, political, and cultural spheres in the ten months of resistance, it is still a long way from what is required to prevent the enemy's offensive and prepare our counter-offensive. Moreover, quantitatively speaking, we have had to sustain certain losses. Although all the factors favourable to us are having a positive effect, it will not be sufficient to halt the enemy's offensive and to prepare for our counter-offensive unless we make an immense effort. Neither the abolition of corruption and the acceleration of progress at home, nor the curbing of the pro-Japanese forces and the expansion of the anti-Japanese forces abroad, are yet accomplished facts. From all this, it follows that our war cannot be won quickly, but can only be a protracted war.

#7. THE THREE STAGES OF THE PROTRACTED WAR

Since the Sino-Japanese War is a protracted one and final victory will belong to China, it can reasonably be assumed that this protracted war will pass through three stages. The first stage covers the period of the enemy's strategic offensive and our strategic defensive. The second stage will be the period of the enemy's strategic consolidation and our preparation for the counter-offensive. The third stage will be the period of our strategic counter-offensive and the enemy's strategic retreat. It is impossible to predict the concrete situation in the three stages, but certain main trends in the war may be pointed out in the light of present conditions. The objective course of events will be exceedingly rich and varied, with many twists and turns, and nobody can cast a horoscope for the Sino-Japanese War; nevertheless, it is necessary for the strategic direction of the war to make a rough sketch of its trends. Although our sketch may not be in full accord with the subsequent facts and will be amended by them, it is still necessary to make it in order to give firm and purposeful strategic direction to the protracted war.

The first stage has not yet ended. The enemy's design is to occupy Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou and link up these three points. To accomplish this aim, the enemy will have to use at least 50 divisions, or about 1'500'000 soldiers, spend from one and a half to two years, and expend more than JPY 10'000'000'000. In penetrating so deeply, they will encounter immense difficulties, with consequences disastrous beyond imagination. As for attempting to occupy the entire length of the Guangzhou-Hankou Railway and the Xi'an-Lanzhou Highway, they will have to fight perilous battles and even so may not fully accomplish their design. But, in drawing up our operational plan, we should base ourselves on the assumption that the enemy may occupy the three points and even certain additional areas, as well as link them up, and we should make dispositions for a protracted war, so that, even if they do so, we shall be able to cope with them. In this stage, the form of fighting we should adopt is primarily mobile warfare, supplemented by guerrilla and positional warfare. Through the subjective errors of the Nationalist military authorities, positional warfare was assigned the primary role in the first phase of this stage, but it is nevertheless supplementary from the point of view of the stage as a whole. In this stage, China has already built up a broad united front and achieved unprecedented unity. Although the enemy has used and will continue to use lowly and shameless means to induce China to capitulate in the attempt to realize their plan for a quick decision and to conquer the whole country without much effort, they have failed so far, nor are they likely to succeed in the future. In this stage, in spite of considerable losses, China will make considerable progress, which will become the main basis for its continued resistance in the second stage. In the present stage, the Council Union has already given substantial aid to China, although such aid may still not be very large in quantity or direct. On the enemy side, there are already signs of flagging morale, and their army's momentum of attack is less in the middle phase of this stage than it was in the initial phase, and it will diminish still further in the concluding phase. Signs of exhaustion are beginning to appear in their finances and economy, war-weariness is beginning to set in among their people and troops, and, within the clique at the helm of the war, «war frustrations» are beginning to manifest themselves and pessimism about the prospects of the war is growing.

The second stage may be termed one of strategic stalemate. At the tail end of the first stage, the enemy will be forced to fix certain terminal points to their strategic offensive owing to their shortage of troops and our firm resistance, and, upon reaching them, they will stop their strategic offensive and enter the stage of safeguarding their occupied areas. In the second stage, the enemy will attempt to safeguard the occupied areas and to make them their own by the fraudulent method of setting up puppet governments, while plundering the Chinese people to the limit; but, again, they will be confronted with stubborn guerrilla warfare. Taking advantage of the fact that the enemy's rear is unguarded, our guerrilla warfare will develop extensively in the first stage, and many base areas will be established, seriously threatening the enemy's consolidation of the occupied areas, and so, in the second stage, there will still be widespread fighting. In this stage, our form of fighting will be primarily guerrilla warfare, supplemented by mobile warfare. China will still retain a large regular army, but it will find it difficult to launch the strategic counter-offensive immediately, because, on the one hand, the enemy will adopt a strategically defensive position in the big cities and along the main lines of communication under their occupation, and, on the other hand, China will not yet be adequately equipped technically. Except for the troops engaged in frontal defence against the enemy, our forces will be switched in large numbers to the enemy's rear in comparatively dispersed dispositions, and, basing themselves on all the areas not actually occupied by the enemy and coordinating with the people's local armed forces, they will launch extensive, fierce guerrilla warfare against enemy-occupied areas, keeping the enemy on the move as far as possible in order to destroy them in mobile warfare, as is now being done in Shanxi Province. The fighting in the second stage will be ruthless, and the country will suffer serious devastation. But the guerrilla warfare will be successful, and, if it is well conducted, the enemy may be able to retain only about 1/3 of their occupied territory, with the remaining 2/3 in our hands, and this will constitute a great defeat for the enemy and a great victory for China. By then, the enemy-occupied territory as a whole will fall into three categories: first, the enemy base areas; second, our base areas for guerrilla warfare; and, third, the guerrilla areas contested by both sides. The duration of this stage will depend on the degree of change in the balance of forces between us and the enemy and on the changes in the international situation; generally speaking, we should be prepared to see this stage last a comparatively long time and to weather its hardships. It will be a very painful period for China; the two big problems will be economic difficulties and the disruptive activities of the traitors. The enemy will go all out to wreck China's united front, and the traitor organizations in all the occupied areas will merge into a so-called «unified government». Owing to the loss of big cities and the hardships of war, vacillating elements within our ranks will clamour for compromise, and pessimism will grow to a serious extent. Our tasks will then be to mobilize the whole people to unite as one and carry on the war with unflinching perseverance, to broaden and consolidate the united front, sweep away all pessimism and ideas of compromise, promote the will to hard struggle, and apply new wartime policies, and so to weather the hardships. In the second stage, we will have to call upon the whole country resolutely to maintain a united government, we will have to oppose splits and systematically improve fighting techniques, reform the armed forces, mobilize the entire people, and prepare for the counter-offensive. The international situation will become still more unfavourable to Japan and the main international forces will incline towards giving more help to China, even though there may be talk of «realism» of the Chamberlain type, which accommodates itself to faits accomplis. Japan's threat to South-East Asia and Siberia will become greater, and there may even be another war. As regards Japan, scores of its divisions will be inextricably bogged down in China. Widespread guerrilla warfare and the people's anti-Japanese movement will wear down this big Japanese force, greatly reducing it and also disintegrating its morale by stimulating the growth of homesickness, war-weariness, and even anti-war sentiment. Though it would be wrong to say that Japan will achieve no results at all in its plunder of China, yet, being short of capital and harassed by guerrilla warfare, it cannot possibly achieve rapid or substantial results. This second stage will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most trying period, but also the pivotal one. Whether China becomes an independent country or is reduced to a colony will be determined, not by the retention or loss of the big cities in the first stage, but by the extent to which the whole nation exerts itself in the second. If we can persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war, China will in that stage gain the power to change from weakness to strength. It will be the second act in the three-act drama of China's War of Resistance. And, through the efforts of the entire cast, it will become possible to perform a most brilliant last act.

The third stage will be the stage of the counter-offensive to recover our lost territories. Their recovery will depend mainly upon the strength which China has built up in the preceding stage and which will continue to grow in the third stage. But China's strength alone will not be sufficient, and we shall also have to rely on the support of international forces and on the changes that will take place inside Japan, or otherwise we shall not be able to win; this adds to China's tasks in international propaganda and diplomacy. These tasks will not be fully accomplished within a short time, for the vast occupied areas can only be recovered through bloody fighting. In the third stage, our war will no longer be one of strategic defensive, but will turn into a strategic counter-offensive manifesting itself in strategic offensives; and it will no longer be fought on strategically interior lines, but will shift gradually to strategically exterior lines. Not until we fight our way to the Yalu River can this war be considered over. If a revolutionary war breaks out in Korea or other places, China will certainly offer its assistance, but that will be considered a separate war. The third stage will be the last in the protracted war, and when we talk of persevering in the war to the end, we mean going all the way through this stage. Our primary form of fighting will still be mobile warfare, but positional warfare will rise to importance. While positional defence cannot be regarded as important in the first stage, because of the prevailing circumstances, positional attack will become quite important in the third stage, because of the changed conditions and the requirements of the task. In the third stage, guerrilla warfare will again provide strategic support by supplementing mobile and positional warfare, but it will not be the primary form as in the second stage.

It is thus obvious that the war is protracted and consequently ruthless in nature. The enemy will not be able to gobble up the whole of China, but will be able to occupy many places for a considerable time. China will not be able to oust the Japanese quickly, but the greater part of its territory will remain in its hands. Ultimately, the enemy will lose and we will win, but we shall have a hard stretch of road to travel.

The Chinese people will become tempered in the course of this long and ruthless war. The political parties taking part in the war will also be steeled and tested. There should be only cooperation and no friction between them, for friction leads to destruction. The united front must be persevered in; only by persevering in the united front can we persevere in the war; and only by persevering in the united front and in the war can we win final victory. Only thus can all difficulties be overcome. After traveling the hard stretch of road, we shall reach the highway to victory. This is the natural logic of the war.

In the three stages, the changes in relative strength will proceed along the following lines. In the first stage, the enemy is superior and we are inferior in strength. With regard to our inferiority, we must reckon on changes of two different kinds from the eve of the War of Resistance to the end of this stage. The first kind is a change for the worse. China's original inferiority will be aggravated by war losses, namely, decreases in territory, population, economic strength, military strength, and cultural institutions. Toward the end of the first stage, the decrease will probably be considerable, especially on the economic side. This point will be exploited by some people as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. But the second kind of change, the change for the better, must also be noted. It includes the experience gained in the war, the progress made by the armed forces, the political progress, the mobilization of the people, the development of culture in a new direction, the emergence of guerrilla warfare, the increase in international support, and so on. What is on the downgrade in the first stage is the old quantity and the old quality, the manifestations being mainly quantitative. What is on the upgrade is the new quantity and the new quality, the manifestations being mainly qualitative. It is the second kind of change that provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory.

In the first stage, changes of two kinds are also occurring on the enemy's side. The first kind is a change for the worse, and manifests itself in hundreds of thousands of casualties, the drain on arms and ammunition, deterioration of troop morale, popular discontent at home, shrinkage of trade, the expenditure of over JPY 10'000'000'000, condemnation by world opinion, and so on. This trend also provides a basis for our ability to fight a protracted war and win final victory. But we must likewise reckon with the second kind of change on the enemy's side, a change for the better, that is, their expansion in territory, population, and resources. This, too, is a basis for the protracted nature of our War of Resistance and the impossibility of quick victory, but, at the same time, certain people will use it as a basis for their theories of national subjugation and of compromise. However, we must take into account the transitory and partial character of this change for the better on the enemy's side. Japan is an imperialist power heading for collapse, and its occupation of China's territory is temporary. The stubborn resistance by China's main forces and the vigorous growth of guerrilla warfare in China will restrict its actual occupation to narrow zones. Moreover, its occupation of Chinese territory has created and intensified contradictions between Japan and other foreign countries. Besides, generally speaking, such occupation involves a considerable period in which Japan will make capital outlays without drawing any profits, as is shown by the experience in the three north-eastern provinces. All of which again gives us a basis for demolishing the theories of national subjugation and of compromise and for establishing the theories of protracted war and of final victory.

In the second stage, the above changes on both sides will continue to develop. While the situation cannot be predicted in detail, on the whole, Japan will continue on the downgrade and China on the upgrade.¹⁵ For example, Japan's military and financial resources will be seriously drained by China's guerrilla warfare, popular discontent will grow in Japan, the morale of its troops will deteriorate further, and it will become more isolated internationally. As for China, it will make further progress in the political, military, and cultural spheres and in the mobilization of the people; guerrilla warfare will develop further; there will be some new economic growth on the basis of the small industries and the widespread agriculture in the interior; international support will gradually increase; and the whole picture will be quite different from what it is now. This second stage may last quite a long time, during which there will be a great reversal in the balance of forces, with China gradually rising and Japan gradually declining. China will emerge from its inferior position, and Japan will lose its superior position; first, the two countries will become evenly matched, and, then, their relative positions will be reversed. Thereupon, China will in general have completed its preparations for the strategic counter-offensive and will enter the stage of the counter-offensive and the expulsion of the enemy. It should be reiterated that the change from inferiority to superiority and the completion of preparations for the counter-offensive will involve three things, namely, an increase in China's own strength, an increase in Japan's difficulties, and an increase in international support; it is the combination of all these forces that will bring about China's superiority and the completion of its preparations for the counter-offensive.

Because of the unevenness in China's political and economic development, the strategic counter-offensive of the third stage will not present a uniform and even picture throughout the country in its initial phase, but will be regional in character, rising here and subsiding there. During this stage, the enemy will not relax their divisive tricks to break China's united front, hence the task of maintaining internal unity in China will become still more important, and we shall have to ensure that the strategic counter-offensive does not collapse halfway through internal dissension. In this period, the international situation will become very favourable to China. China's task will be to take advantage of it in order to attain complete liberation and establish an independent democratic State, which, at the same time, will mean helping the world anti-fascist movement.

China moving from inferiority to parity and then to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to parity and then to inferiority; China moving from the defensive to stalemate and then to the counter-offensive, Japan moving from the offensive to the safeguarding of its gains and then to retreat — such will be the course of the Sino-Japanese War and its inevitable trend.

Hence, the questions and the conclusions are as follows: Will China be subjugated? The answer is: No, it will not be subjugated, but will win final victory. Can China win quickly? The answer is: No, it cannot win quickly, and the war must be a protracted one. Are these conclusions correct? I think they are.

At this point, the exponents of national subjugation and of compromise will again rush in and say: «To move from inferiority to parity, China needs a military and economic power equal to Japan's, and to move from parity to superiority, it will need a military and economic power greater than Japan's. But this is impossible, hence the above conclusions are not correct.»

This is the so-called theory that «weapons decide everything»,¹⁶ which constitutes a mechanical approach to the question of war and a subjective and one-sided view. Our view is opposed to this; we see not only weapons, but also people. Weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and morale. Military and economic power is necessarily wielded by people. If the great majority of the Chinese, of the Japanese, and of the people of other countries are on the side of our War of Resistance Against Japan, how can Japan's military and economic power, wielded as it is by a small minority through coercion, count as superiority? And if not, then does not China, though wielding relatively inferior military and economic power, become the superior? There is no doubt that China will gradually grow in military and economic power, provided it perseveres in the War of Resistance and in the united front. As for our enemy, weakened as they will be by the long war and by internal and external contradictions, their military and economic power is bound to change in the reverse direction. In these circumstances, is there any reason why China cannot become the superior? And that is not all. Although we cannot as yet count the military and economic power of other countries as being openly and to any great extent on our side, is there any reason why we will not be able to do so in the future? If Japan's enemy is not just China, if, in the future, one or more other countries make open use of their considerable military and economic power defensively or offensively against Japan and openly help us, then will not our superiority be still greater? Japan is a small country, its war is reactionary and barbarous, and it will become more and more isolated internationally; China is a large country, its war is progressive and just, and it will enjoy more and more support internationally. Is there any reason why the long-term development of these factors should not definitely change the relative position between the enemy and ourselves?

The exponents of quick victory, however, do not realize that war is a contest of strength, and that, before a certain change has taken place in the relative strength of the belligerents, there is no basis for trying to fight strategically decisive battles and shorten the road to liberation. Were their ideas to be put into practice, we should inevitably run our heads into a brick wall. Or perhaps they are just talking for their own pleasure without really intending to put their ideas into practice. In the end, reality will come and pour a bucket of cold water over these chatterers, showing them up as mere windbags who want to get things on the cheap, to have gains without pains. We have had this kind of idle chatter before and we have it now, though not very much so far; but there may be more as the war develops into the stage of stalemate and then of counter-offensive. But in the meantime, if China's losses in the first stage are fairly heavy and the second stage drags on very long, the theories of national subjugation and of compromise will gain great currency. Therefore, our fire should be directed mainly against them and only secondarily against the idle chatter about quick victory.

That the war will be protracted is certain, but nobody can predict exactly how many months or years it will last, as this depends entirely upon the degree of the change in the balance of forces. All those who wish to shorten the war have no alternative but to work hard to increase our own strength and reduce that of the enemy. Specifically, the only way is to strive to win more battles and wear down the enemy's forces, develop guerrilla warfare to reduce enemy-occupied territory to a minimum, consolidate and expand the united front to rally the forces of the whole nation, build up new armies and develop new war industries, promote political, economic, and cultural progress, mobilize the workers, peasants, businesspeople, intellectuals, and other sections of the people, disintegrate the enemy forces and win over their soldiers, carry on international propaganda to secure foreign support, and win the support of the Japanese people and other oppressed peoples. Only by doing all this can we reduce the duration of the war. There is no magic shortcut.

#8. A WAR OF JIGSAW PATTERN

We can say with certainty that the protracted War of Resistance Against Japan will write a splendid page unique in the war history of humanity. One of the special features of this war is the interlocking «jigsaw» pattern, which arises from such contradictory factors as the barbarity of Japan and its shortage of troops, on the one hand, and the progressiveness of China and the extensiveness of its territory, on the other. There have been other wars of jigsaw pattern in history, the three years' civil war in Russia after the November Revolution being a case in point. But what distinguishes this war in China is its especially protracted and extensive character, which will set a record in history. Its jigsaw pattern manifests itself as follows.

#8.1. INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR LINES

The anti-Japanese war as a whole is being fought on interior lines; but, as far as the relation between the main forces and the guerrilla units is concerned, the former are on the interior lines while the latter are on the exterior lines, presenting a remarkable spectacle of pincers around the enemy. The same can be said of the relationship between the various guerrilla areas. From its own viewpoint, each guerrilla area is on interior lines and the other areas are on exterior lines; together, they form many battle fronts, which hold the enemy in pincers. In the first stage of the war, the regular army operating strategically on interior lines is withdrawing, but the guerrilla units operating strategically on exterior lines will advance with great strides over wide areas to the rear of the enemy — they will advance even more fiercely in the second stage — thereby presenting a remarkable picture of both withdrawal and advance.

#8.2. POSSESSION AND NON-POSSESSION OF THE REAR AREA

The main forces, which extend the front lines to the outer limits of the enemy's occupied areas, are operating from the rear area of the country as a whole. The guerrilla units, which extend the battle lines into the enemy rear, are separated from the rear area of the country as a whole. But each guerrilla area has a small rear of its own, upon which it relies to establish its fluid battle lines. The case is different with the guerrilla detachments which are dispatched by a guerrilla area for short-term operations in the rear of the enemy in the same area; such detachments have no rear, nor do they have a battle line. «Operating without a rear area» is a special feature of revolutionary war in the new era, wherever a vast territory, a progressive people, and an advanced political party and army are to be found; there is nothing to fear, but much to gain from it, and far from having doubts about it, we should promote it.

#8.3. ENCIRCLEMENT AND COUNTER-ENCIRCLEMENT

Taking the war as a whole, there is no doubt that we are strategically encircled by the enemy, because they are on the strategic offensive and operating on exterior lines, while we are on the strategic defensive and operating on interior lines. This is the first form of enemy encirclement. We on our part can encircle one or more of the enemy columns advancing on us along separate routes, because we apply the policy of fighting campaigns and battles from tactically exterior lines by using numerically preponderant forces against these enemy columns advancing on us from strategically exterior lines. This is the first form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Next, if we consider the guerrilla base areas in the enemy's rear, each area taken singly is surrounded by the enemy on all sides, like the Wu Mountains, or on three sides, like the north-western Shanxi area. This is the second form of enemy encirclement. However, if one considers all the guerrilla base areas together and in their relation to the positions of the regular forces, one can see that we in turn surround a great many enemy forces. In Shanxi Province, for instance, we have surrounded the Datong-Puzhou Railway on three sides (the east and west flanks and the southern end) and the city of Taiyuan on all sides; and there are many similar instances in Hebei and Shandong Provinces. This is the second form of our counter-encirclement of the enemy. Thus there are two forms of encirclement by the enemy forces and two forms of encirclement by our own — rather like a game of weiqi.¹⁷ Campaigns and battles fought by the two sides resemble the capturing of each other's pieces, and the establishment of enemy strongholds (such as Taiyuan) and our guerrilla base areas (such as the Wu Mountains) resembles moves to dominate spaces on the board. Weiqi is, however, mechanical in the sense that the spaces cannot be destroyed, whereas war is dialectical in the sense that the spaces in war can be destroyed. If the game of weiqi is extended to include the world, there is yet a third form of encirclement as between us and the enemy, namely, the interrelation between the front of aggression and the front of peace. The enemy encircles China, the Council Union, France, and Czechoslovakia with their front of aggression, while we counter-encircle Germany, Japan, and Italy with our front of peace. But our encirclement, like the hand of Buddha, will turn into the Mountain of Five Elements lying athwart the Universe, and the modern Sun Wukongs¹⁸ — the fascist aggressors — will finally be buried underneath it, never to rise again. Therefore, if, on the international plane, we can create an anti-Japanese front in the Pacific region, with China as one strategic unit, with the Council Union and other countries which may join it as other strategic units, and with the Japanese people's movement as still another strategic unit, and thus form a gigantic net from which the fascist Sun Wukongs can find no escape, then that will be our enemy's doomsday. Indeed, the day when this gigantic net is formed will undoubtedly be the day of the complete overthrow of Japanese imperialism. We are not jesting; this is the inevitable trend of the war.

#8.4. BIG AREAS AND LITTLE AREAS

There is a possibility that the enemy will occupy the greater part of Chinese territory south of the Great Wall, and only the smaller part will be kept intact. That is one aspect of the situation. But within this greater part, which does not include the three north-eastern provinces, the enemy can actually hold only the big cities, the main lines of communication, and some of the plains — which may rank first in importance, but will probably constitute only the smaller part of the occupied territory in size and population, while the greater part will be taken up by the guerrilla areas that will grow up everywhere. That is another aspect of the situation. If we go beyond the provinces south of the Great Wall and include Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet, then the unoccupied area will constitute the greater part of China's territory, and the enemy-occupied area will become the smaller part, even with the three north-eastern provinces. That is yet another aspect of the situation. The area kept intact, which constitutes the main rear area of the whole country and the location of the centre of direction, is undoubtedly important, and we should devote great efforts to developing it, not only politically, militarily, and economically, but, what is also important, culturally. The enemy has transformed our former cultural centres into culturally backward areas, and we on our part must transform the former culturally backward areas into cultural centres. At the same time, the work of developing extensive guerrilla areas behind the enemy lines is also extremely important, and we should attend to every aspect of this work, including the cultural. All in all, big pieces of China's territory, namely, the rural areas, will be transformed into regions of progress and light, while the small pieces, namely, the enemy-occupied areas and especially the big cities, will temporarily become regions of backwardness and darkness.

#★ ★ ★

Thus, it can be seen that the protracted and far-flung War of Resistance Against Japan is a war of a jigsaw pattern militarily, politically, economically, and culturally. It is a marvelous spectacle in the annals of war, a heroic undertaking by the Chinese nation, a magnificent and earth-shaking feat. This war will not only affect China and Japan, strongly impelling both to advance, but will also affect the whole world, impelling all nations, especially the oppressed nations, such as India, to march forward. All Chinese should consciously throw themselves into this war of a jigsaw pattern, for this is the form of war by which the Chinese nation is liberating itself, the special form of war of liberation waged by a big semi-colonial country in the 1930s and '40s.

#9. FIGHTING FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

The protracted nature of China's anti-Japanese war is inseparably connected with the fight for perpetual peace in China and the whole world. Never has there been a historical period such as the present in which war is so close to perpetual peace. The life of humanity over several hundreds of thousands of years has already passed through two eras — the era of the peaceful life of humanity and the era of the warlike life of humanity. The first of these eras occupied the longest historical period. In this era, humanity's production was extremely poor, and the only thing was to wage war against nature; wars between groups of human beings were unnecessary and impossible. The second era extends roughly from the last period of clan society to the present day. Because of the development of production and the appearance of social division, the era of the warlike life of humanity arrived. For several thousand years, since the emergence of classes, the life of humanity has been full of wars; each nation has fought countless wars, either internally or with other nations. In the imperialist epoch of capitalist society, wars are waged on a particularly extensive scale and with a peculiar ruthlessness. The imperialist First World War of 20 years ago was the first of its kind in history, but not the last. Only the war which has now begun comes close to being the final war, that is, comes close to the perpetual peace of humanity. By now, 1/3 of the world's population has entered the war. Look! Italy, then Japan; Ethiopia, then Spain, then China. The population of the countries at war now amounts to almost 600'000'000, or nearly 1/3 of the total population of the world. The characteristics of the present war are its uninterruptedness and its proximity to perpetual peace. Why is it uninterrupted? After attacking Ethiopia, Italy attacked Spain, and Germany joined in; then Japan attacked China. What will come next? Undoubtedly, Hitler will fight the Great Powers. «Fascism is war»¹⁹ — this is perfectly true. Although one cannot say that, once victory has been decided in the war between anti-fascism and fascism, there will be no more wars, and certainly wars will continue to be fought afterward, there will be no interruption in the development of the present war into a world war; humanity will not be able to avoid the calamity of war. Why then do we say the present war is near to perpetual peace? The present war is the result of the development of the general crisis of world capitalism which began with the First World War; this general crisis is driving the capitalist countries into a new war and, above all, driving the fascist countries into new war adventures. This war, we can foresee, will not save capitalism, but will hasten its collapse. It will be greater in scale and more ruthless than the war of 20 years ago, all nations will inevitably be drawn in, it will drag on for a very long time, and humanity will suffer greatly. This war will settle all old accounts. But, owing to the existence of the Council Union and the growing political consciousness of the people of the world, great revolutionary wars will undoubtedly emerge from this war to oppose all counter-revolutionary wars, thus giving this war the character of a struggle for perpetual peace. Even if later there should be another period of war, perpetual world peace will not be far off. Once humanity has eliminated capitalism, it will attain the era of perpetual peace, and there will be no more need for war. Neither armies, nor warships, nor military aircraft, nor poison gas will then be needed. Thereafter and for all time, humanity will never again know war. This will be the third era in the life of humanity, an era of peaceful life that will forever be without war. The revolutionary wars which have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and Japan, two countries which have a combined population of over 500'000'000, will take an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the liberation of the Chinese nation. The liberated New China of the future will be inseparable from the liberated new world of the future. Hence, our War of Resistance Against Japan takes on the character of a struggle for perpetual peace.

History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars, we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, the First World War is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore, the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, whenever possible. Japan's war is an unjust war that impedes progress, and the peoples of the world, including the Japanese people, should oppose it and are opposing it. In our country, the people and the government, the Communist Party and the Nationalist Party, the main forces and the guerrilla detachments have all raised the banner of righteousness in the national revolutionary war against aggression. Our war is sacred and just, it is progressive, and its aim is peace. The aim is peace, not just in one country, but throughout the world, not just temporary, but perpetual peace. To achieve this aim, we must wage a life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any sacrifice, persevere to the end, and never stop short of the goal. However great the sacrifice and however long the time needed to attain it, a new world of perpetual peace and brightness already lies clearly before us. Our faith in waging this war is based upon the new China and the new world of perpetual peace and brightness for which we are striving. Fascism and imperialism wish to perpetuate war, but we wish to put an end to it in the not too distant future. The great majority of humanity should exert their utmost efforts for this purpose. The 450'000'000 people of China constitute 1/4 of the world's population, and if, by their concerted efforts and their perseverance in the War of Resistance and in the united front, they overthrow Japanese imperialism and create a new China of freedom and equality, they will most certainly be making a tremendous contribution to the struggle for perpetual world peace. This is no vain hope, for the whole world is approaching this point in the course of its socio-economic development, and, provided that the majority of humanity work together, our goal will surely be attained in several decades.

#10. PEOPLE'S DYNAMIC ROLE IN WAR

We have so far explained why the war is a protracted war and why the final victory will be China's, and in the main dealt with what protracted war is and what it is not. Now we shall turn to the question of what to do and what not to do. How to conduct protracted war and how to win the final victory? These are the questions answered below. We shall therefore successively discuss the following problems: people's dynamic role in war, war and politics, political mobilization for the War of Resistance, the object of war, offence within defence, lightning battles within a protracted war, exterior lines within interior lines, initiative, flexibility, planning, mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, positional warfare, war of annihilation, war of attrition, the possibilities of exploiting the enemy's mistakes, the question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war, and the army and the people as the foundation of victory. Let us start with the problem of people's dynamic role.

When we say that we are opposed to a subjective approach to problems, we mean that we must oppose ideas which are not based upon or do not correspond to objective facts, because such ideas are fanciful and fallacious and will lead to failure if acted on. But whatever is done has to be done by human beings; protracted war and final victory will not come about without human action. For such action to be effective, there must be people who derive ideas, principles, or views from the objective facts, and put forward plans, directives, policies, strategies, and tactics. Ideas and so on are subjective, while deeds or actions are the subjective translated into the objective, but both represent the dynamic role peculiar to human beings. We term this kind of dynamic role «people's conscious dynamic role», and it is a characteristic that distinguishes human beings from all other beings. All ideas based upon and corresponding to objective facts are correct ideas, and all deeds or actions based upon correct ideas are correct actions. We must give full scope to these ideas and actions, to this dynamic role. The anti-Japanese war is being waged to drive out imperialism and transform the old China into a new China; this can be achieved only when the whole Chinese people are mobilized and full scope is given to their conscious dynamic role in resisting Japan. If we just sit by and take no action, only subjugation awaits us, and there will be neither protracted war nor final victory.

It is a human characteristic to exercise a conscious dynamic role. People strongly display this characteristic in war. Conscious activity is displayed by human beings in all of their actions, but nowhere so strongly as in war. True, victory or defeat in war is decided by the military, political, economic, and geographical conditions on both sides, the nature of the war each side is waging, and the international support each enjoys, but it is not decided by these alone; in themselves, all these provide only the possibility of victory or defeat, but do not decide the issue. To decide the issue, subjective effort must be added, namely, the directing and waging of war, people's conscious dynamic role in war.

In seeking victory, those who direct a war cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the objective conditions; within these limitations, however, they can and must play a dynamic role in striving for victory. The stage of action for commanders in a war must be built upon objective possibilities, but, on that stage, they can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Given the objective material foundations, the commanders in the anti-Japanese war should display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national enemy, transform the present situation, in which our country and society are suffering from aggression and oppression, and create a new China of freedom and equality; here is where our subjective faculties for directing war can and must be exercised. We do not want any of our commanders in the war to detach themself from the objective conditions and become a blundering hothead, but we decidedly want every commander to become a general who is both bold and wise. Our commanders should have not only the boldness to overwhelm the enemy, but also the ability to remain masters of the situation throughout the changes and vicissitudes of the entire war. Swimming in the ocean of war, they must not flounder, but make sure of reaching the opposite shore with measured strokes. Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing war, constitute the art of swimming in the ocean of war.

#11. WAR AND POLITICS

«War is the continuation of politics.» In this sense, war is politics and war itself is a political action; since ancient times, there has never been a war that did not have a political character. The anti-Japanese war is a revolutionary war waged by the whole nation, and victory is inseparable from the political aim of the war — to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality — inseparable from the general policy of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front, from the mobilization of the entire people, and from the political principles of the unity between officers and soldiers, the unity between army and people, and the disintegration of the enemy forces, and inseparable from the effective application of united front policy, from mobilization on the cultural front, and from the efforts to win international support and the support of the people inside Japan. In a word, war cannot for a single moment be separated from politics. Any tendency among the anti-Japanese armed forces to belittle politics by isolating war from it and advocating the idea of war as an absolute is wrong and should be corrected.

But war has its own particular characteristics, and, in this sense, it cannot be equated with politics in general. «War is the continuation of politics by other [...] means.»²⁰ It is something that is used to achieve political ends. When politics develops to a certain stage, beyond which it cannot proceed by the usual means, war breaks out to sweep the obstacles from the way. For instance, the semi-independent status of China is an obstacle to the political growth of Japanese imperialism, hence Japan has unleashed a war of aggression to sweep away that obstacle. What about China? Imperialist oppression has long been an obstacle to China's bourgeois-democratic revolution, hence many wars of liberation have been waged in the effort to sweep it away. Japan is now using war for the purpose of oppressing China and completely blocking the advance of the Chinese revolution, and therefore China is compelled to wage the War of Resistance in its determination to sweep away this obstacle. When the obstacle is removed, our political aim will be attained and the war concluded. But if the obstacle is not completely swept away, the war will have to continue until the aim is fully accomplished. Thus, anyone who seeks a compromise before the task of the anti-Japanese war is fulfilled is bound to fail, because, even if a compromise were to occur for one reason or another, the war would break out again, since the broad masses of the people would certainly not submit, but would continue the war until its political objective was achieved. It can therefore be said that politics is war without bloodshed, while war is politics with bloodshed.

From the particular characteristics of war, there arise a particular set of organizations, a particular series of methods, and a particular kind of process. The organizations are the armed forces and everything that goes with them. The methods are the strategy and tactics for directing war. The process is the particular form of social activity, in which the opposing armed forces attack each other or defend themselves against one another, employing strategy and tactics favourable to themselves and unfavourable to the enemy. Hence, war experience is a particular kind of experience. All who take part in war must rid themselves of their customary ways and accustom themselves to war before they can win victory.

#12. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION FOR THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

A national-revolutionary war as great as ours cannot be won without extensive and thoroughgoing political mobilization. Before the anti-Japanese war, there was no political mobilization for resistance to Japan, and this was a great drawback, as a result of which China has already lost a move to the enemy. After the war began, political mobilization was very far from extensive, let alone thoroughgoing. It was the enemy's gunfire and the bombs dropped by enemy aeroplanes that brought news of the war to the great majority of the people. That was also a kind of mobilization, but it was done for us by the enemy, we did not do it ourselves. Even now, the people in the remoter regions beyond the noise of the guns are carrying on quietly as usual. This situation must change, or otherwise we cannot win in our life-and-death struggle. We must never lose another move to the enemy; on the contrary, we must make full use of this move, political mobilization, to get the better of them. This move is crucial; it is indeed of primary importance, while our inferiority in weapons and other things is only secondary. The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming every difficulty in the war. To win victory, we must persevere in the War of Resistance, in the united front, and in the protracted war. But all these are inseparable from the mobilization of the common people. To wish for victory and yet neglect political mobilization is like wishing to «go south by driving the chariot north», and the result would inevitably be to forfeit victory.

What does political mobilization mean? First, it means telling the army and the people about the political aim of the war. It is necessary for all soldiers and civilians to see why the war must be fought and how it concerns them. The political aim of the war is «to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality»; we must proclaim this aim to everybody, to all soldiers and civilians, before we can create an anti-Japanese upsurge and unite hundreds of millions as one to contribute their all to the war. Secondly, it is not enough merely to explain the aim to them; the steps and policies for its attainment must also be given, that is, there must be a political programme. We already have the Ten-Point Programme for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation and also the Programme of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction; we should popularize both of them in the army and among the people and mobilize everyone to carry them out. Without a clear-cut, concrete political programme, it is impossible to mobilize all the armed forces and the whole people to carry the war against Japan through to the end. Thirdly, how should we mobilize them? By word of mouth, by leaflets and bulletins, by newspapers, books, and pamphlets, through plays and films, through schools, through the mass organizations, and through our cadres. What has been done so far in the Nationalist areas is only a drop in the ocean, and, moreover, it has been done in a manner ill-suited to the people's tastes and in a spirit uncongenial to them; this must be drastically changed. Fourthly, to mobilize once is not enough; political mobilization for the War of Resistance must be continuous. Our job is not to recite our political programme to the people, for nobody will listen to such recitations; we must link the political mobilization for the war with developments in the war and with the life of the soldiers and the people, and make it a continuous movement. This is a matter of immense importance, on which our victory in the war primarily depends.

#13. THE OBJECTIVE OF WAR

Here, we are not dealing with the political aim of war; the political aim of the War of Resistance Against Japan has been defined above as «to drive out Japanese imperialism and build a new China of freedom and equality». Here, we are dealing with the elementary objective of war, war as «politics with bloodshed», as mutual slaughter by opposing armies. The object of war is specifically «to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy» (to destroy the enemy means to disarm them or «deprive them of the power to resist», and does not mean to destroy every member of their forces physically). In ancient warfare, the spear and the shield were used, the spear to attack and destroy the enemy, and the shield to defend and preserve oneself. To the present day, all weapons are still an extension of the spear and the shield. The bomber, the machine gun, the long-range gun, and poison gas are developments of the spear, while the air-raid shelter, the steel helmet, the concrete fortification, and the gas mask are developments of the shield. The tank is a new weapon combining the functions of both spear and shield. Attack is the chief means of destroying the enemy, but defence cannot be dispensed with. In attack, the immediate objective is to destroy the enemy, but, at the same time, it is self-preservation, because, if the enemy is not destroyed, you will be destroyed. In defence, the immediate objective is to preserve yourself, but, at the same time, defence is a means of supplementing attack or preparing to go over to the attack. Retreat is in the category of defence and is a continuation of defence, while pursuit is a continuation of attack. It should be pointed out that destruction of the enemy is the primary objective of war and self-preservation the secondary, because only by destroying the enemy in large numbers can one effectively preserve oneself. Therefore, attack, the chief means of destroying the enemy, is primary, while defence, a supplementary means of destroying the enemy and a means of self-preservation, is secondary. In actual warfare, the chief role is played by defence much of the time and by attack for the rest of the time, but, if war is taken as a whole, attack remains primary.

How do we justify the encouragement of heroic sacrifice in war? Does it not contradict «self-preservation»? No, it does not; sacrifice and self-preservation are both opposite and complementary to each other. War is politics with bloodshed and exacts a price, sometimes an extremely high price. Partial and temporary sacrifice (non-preservation) is incurred for the sake of general and permanent preservation. This is precisely why we say that attack, which is fundamentally a means of destroying the enemy, also has the function of self-preservation. It is also the reason why defence must be accompanied by attack and should not be defence pure and simple.

The objective of war, namely, the preservation of oneself and the destruction of the enemy, is the essence of war and the basis of all war activities, an essence which pervades all war activities, from the technical to the strategic. The object of war is the underlying principle of war, and no technical, tactical, or strategic concepts or principles can in any way depart from it. What, for instance, is meant by the principle of «taking cover and making full use of firepower» in shooting? The purpose of the former is self-preservation, of the latter the destruction of the enemy. The former gives rise to such techniques as making use of the terrain and its features, advancing in spurts, and spreading out in dispersed formation. The latter gives rise to other techniques, such as clearing the field of fire and organizing a firenet. As for the assault force, the containing force and the reserve force in a tactical operation, the first is for annihilating the enemy, the second for preserving oneself, and the third is for either purpose according to circumstances — either for annihilating the enemy (in which case it reinforces the assault force or serves as a pursuit force), or for self-preservation (in which case it reinforces the containing force or serves as a covering force). Thus, no technical, tactical, or strategical principles or operations can in any way depart from the objective of war, and this objective pervades the whole of a war and runs through it from beginning to end.

In directing the anti-Japanese war, directors at the various levels must lose sight neither of the contrast between the fundamental factors on each side nor of the objective of this war. In the course of military operations, these contrasting fundamental factors unfold themselves in the struggle by each side to preserve itself and destroy the other. In our war, we strive in every engagement to win a victory, big or small, and to disarm a part of the enemy and destroy a part of their troops and materiel. We must accumulate the results of these partial destructions of the enemy into major strategic victories and so achieve the final political aim of expelling the enemy, protecting the homeland, and building a new China.

#14. OFFENCE WITHIN DEFENCE, LIGHTNING BATTLES WITHIN A PROTRACTED WAR, EXTERIOR LINES WITHIN INTERIOR LINES

Now, let us examine the specific strategy of the War of Resistance Against Japan. We have already said that our strategy for resisting Japan is that of protracted war, and indeed this is perfectly right. But this strategy is general, not specific. Specifically, how should the protracted war be conducted? We shall now discuss this question. Our answer is as follows. In the first and second stages of the war, that is, in the stages of the enemy's offensive and preservation of their gains, we should conduct tactical offensives within the strategic defensive, lightning campaigns and battles within the strategically protracted war, and campaigns and battles on exterior lines within strategically interior lines. In the third stage, we should launch the strategic counter-offensive.

Since Japan is a strong imperialist power and we are a weak semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, it has adopted the policy of the strategic offensive, while we are on the strategic defensive. Japan is trying to execute the strategy of a lightning war; we should consciously execute the strategy of protracted war. Japan is using dozens of army divisions of fairly high combat effectiveness (now numbering 30) and part of its navy to encircle and blockade China from both land and sea, and is using its air force to bomb China. Its army has already established a long front stretching from Baotou to Hangzhou, and its navy has reached Fujian and Guangdong; thus, exterior-line operations have taken shape on a vast scale. On the other hand, we are in the position of operating on interior lines. All this is due to the fact that the enemy is strong while we are weak. This is one aspect of the situation.

But there is another and exactly opposite aspect. Japan, though strong, does not have enough soldiers. China, though weak, has a vast territory, a large population, and plenty of soldiers. Two important consequences follow. First, the enemy, employing their small forces against a vast country, can only occupy some big cities and main lines of communication and part of the plains. Thus, there are extensive areas in the territory under their occupation which they have had to leave ungarrisoned, and which provide a vast arena for our guerrilla warfare. Taking China as a whole, even if the enemy manages to occupy the line connecting Guangzhou, Wuhan, and Lanzhou and its adjacent areas, they can hardly seize the regions beyond, and this gives China a general rear and vital bases from which to carry on the protracted war to final victory. Secondly, in pitting their small forces against large forces, the enemy is encircled by our large forces. The enemy is attacking us along several routes, strategically they are on exterior lines while we are on interior lines, strategically they are on the offensive while we are on the defensive; all this looks very much to our disadvantage. However, we can make use of our two advantages, namely, our vast territory and large forces, and, instead of stubborn positional warfare, carry on flexible mobile warfare, employing several divisions against one enemy division, several tens of thousands of our soldiers against 10'000 of theirs, several columns against one of their columns, and suddenly encircling and attacking a single column from the exterior lines of the battlefield. In this way, while the enemy is on exterior lines and on the offensive in strategic operations, they will be forced to fight on interior lines and on the defensive in campaigns and battles. And for us, interior lines and the defensive in strategic operations will be transformed into exterior lines and the offensive in campaigns and battles. This is the way to deal with one or indeed with any advancing enemy column. Both the consequences discussed above follow from the fact that the enemy is small while we are big. Moreover, the enemy forces, though small, are strong (in arms and in training), while our forces, though large, are weak (in arms and in training but not in morale), and, in campaigns and battles, therefore, we should not only employ large forces against small and operate from exterior against interior lines, but also follow the policy of seeking quick decisions. In general, to achieve quick decision, we should attack a moving and not a stationary enemy. We should concentrate a big force undercover beforehand alongside the route which the enemy is sure to take, and, while they are on the move, advance suddenly to encircle and attack them before they know what is happening, before they have a chance to deploy their troops, use their heavy weapons, and bring their advanced weapons into play. In general, within half a day, one day, or a day and a night, we should thus quickly conclude the battle. If we fight well, we may destroy the entire enemy force or the greater part or some part of it, and, even if we do not fight so well, we may still inflict heavy casualties. This applies to any and every one of our battles. If each month we could win one sizable victory like that at Pingxingguan or Tai'erzhuang, not to speak of more, it would greatly demoralize the enemy, stimulate the morale of our own forces, and evoke international support. Thus, our strategically protracted war is translated in the field into lightning battles. The enemy's strategically lightning war is bound to change into protracted war after they are defeated in many campaigns and battles.

In a word, the above operational principle for fighting campaigns and battles is one of «lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines». It is the opposite of our strategic principle of «protracted defensive warfare on interior lines», and yet it is the indispensable principle for carrying out this strategy. If we should use «protracted defensive warfare on interior lines» as the principle for campaigns and battles, too, as we did at the beginning of the War of Resistance, it would be totally unsuited to the circumstances in which the enemy is small while we are big and the enemy is strong while we are weak; in that case, we could never achieve our strategic objective of a protracted war and we would be defeated by the enemy. That is why we have always advocated the organization of the forces of the entire country into a number of large field armies, each counterposed to one of the enemy's field armies, but having two, three, or four times its strength, and so keeping the enemy engaged in extensive theatres of war in accordance with the principle outlined above. This principle of «lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines» can and must be applied in guerrilla as well as in regular warfare. After the loss of Nanjing, we learned the lessons of the first period of fighting and have started to adopt the general principle for fighting and the method for organizing field armies described above. It is just that they have not yet been used skilfully. But the campaigns of southern Shandong and southern Shanxi achieved notable results and demonstrate that this principle is the only correct principle. It is applicable not only to any one stage of the war, but to its entire course. In the stage of strategic counter-offensive, when we are better equipped technically and are no longer in the position of the weak fighting the strong, we shall be able to capture prisoners and loot on a large scale all the more effectively if we continue to employ superior numbers in lightning offensive battles from exterior lines. For instance, if we employ two, three, or four mechanized divisions against one mechanized enemy division, we can be all the more certain of destroying it. It is common sense that several strong people can easily beat one.

If we resolutely apply «lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines» on a battlefield, we shall not only change the balance of forces on that battlefield, but also gradually change the general situation. On the battlefield we shall be on the offensive and the enemy on the defensive, we shall be employing superior numbers on exterior lines and the enemy inferior numbers on interior lines, and we shall seek quick decisions, while the enemy, try as they may, will not be able to protract the fighting in the expectation of reinforcements; for all these reasons, the enemy's position will change from strong to weak, from superior to inferior, while that of our forces will change from weak to strong, from inferior to superior. After many such battles have been victoriously fought, the general situation between us and the enemy will change. That is to say, through the accumulation of victories on many battlefields by lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines, we shall gradually strengthen ourselves and weaken the enemy, which will necessarily affect the general balance of forces and bring about changes in it. When that happens, these changes, together with other factors on our side and together with the changes inside the enemy camp and a favourable international situation, will turn the overall situation between us and the enemy first into one of parity and then into one of superiority for us. That will be the time for us to launch the counter-offensive and drive the enemy out of the country.

War is a contest of strength, but the original pattern of strength changes in the course of war. Here, the decisive factor is subjective effort — winning more victories and committing fewer errors. The objective factors provide the possibility for such change, but, in order to turn this possibility into actuality, both correct policy and subjective effort are essential. It is then that the subjective plays the decisive role.

#15. INITIATIVE, FLEXIBILITY, AND PLANNING

In lightning offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines, as discussed above, the crucial point is the «offensive»; «exterior lines» refers to the sphere of the offensive and «lightning» to its duration. Hence the name «lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines». It is the best principle for waging a protracted war and it is also the principle for what is known as mobile warfare. But it cannot be put into effect without initiative, flexibility, and planning. Let us now study these three questions.

#15.1. INITIATIVE

We have already discussed people's conscious dynamic role, so why do we talk about the initiative again? By conscious dynamic role, we mean conscious action and effort, a characteristic distinguishing human beings from other beings, and this human characteristic manifests itself most strongly in war; all this has been discussed already. The initiative here means an army's freedom of action as distinguished from an enforced loss of freedom. Freedom of action is the very life of an army, and, once it is lost, the army is close to defeat or destruction. The disarming of a soldier is the result of their losing freedom of action through being forced into a passive position. The same is true of the defeat of an army. For this reason, both sides in war do all they can to gain the initiative and avoid passivity. It may be said that the lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines which we advocate and the flexibility and planning necessary for its execution are designed to gain the initiative and thus force the enemy into a passive position and achieve the object of preserving ourselves and destroying the enemy. But initiative or passivity is inseparable from superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war. Consequently, it is also inseparable from the correctness or incorrectness of the subjective direction of war. In addition, there is the question of exploiting the enemy's misconceptions and unpreparedness in order to gain the initiative and force the enemy into passivity. These points are analysed below.

Initiative is inseparable from superiority in capacity to wage war, while passivity is inseparable from inferiority in capacity to wage war. Such superiority or inferiority is the objective basis of initiative or passivity. It is natural that the strategic initiative can be better maintained and exercised through a strategic offensive, but to maintain the initiative always and everywhere, that is, to have the absolute initiative, is possible only when there is absolute superiority matched against absolute inferiority. When a strong, healthy person wrestles with a disabled person, they have the absolute initiative. If Japan were not riddled with insoluble contradictions, if, for instance, it could throw in a huge force of several million or 10'000'000 soldiers all at once, if its financial resources were several times what they are, if it had no opposition from its own people or from other countries, and if it did not pursue the barbarous policies which awaken the desperate resistance of the Chinese people, then it would be able to maintain absolute superiority and have the absolute initiative always and everywhere. In history, such absolute superiority rarely appears in the early stages of a war or a campaign, but is to be found toward its end. For instance, on the eve of Germany's capitulation in the First World War, the Entente countries became absolutely superior and Germany absolutely inferior, so that Germany was defeated and the Entente countries were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a war. Again, on the eve of the Chinese victory at Tai'erzhuang, the isolated Japanese forces there were reduced after bitter fighting to absolute inferiority, while our forces achieved absolute superiority, so that the enemy was defeated and we were victorious; this is an example of absolute superiority and inferiority toward the end of a campaign. A war or campaign may also end in a situation of relative superiority or of parity, in which case there is compromise in the war or stalemate in the campaign. But, in most cases, it is absolute superiority and inferiority that decide victory and defeat. All this holds for the end of a war or a campaign, and not for the beginning. The outcome of the Sino-Japanese War, it can be predicted, will be that Japan will become absolutely inferior and be defeated and that China will become absolutely superior and gain victory. But, at present, superiority or inferiority is not absolute on either side, but is relative. With the advantages of its military, economic, and political-organizational power, Japan enjoys superiority over us with our military, economic, and political-organizational weakness, which creates the basis for its initiative. But since quantitatively its military and other power is not great and it has many other disadvantages, its superiority is reduced by its own contradictions. Upon its invasion of China, its superiority has been reduced still further, because it has come up against our vast territory, large population, great numbers of troops, and resolute nationwide resistance. Hence, Japan's general position has become one of only relative superiority, and its ability to exercise and maintain the initiative, which is thereby restricted, has likewise become relative. As for China, though placed in a somewhat passive position strategically because of its inferior strength, it is nevertheless quantitatively superior in territory, population, and troops, and also superior in the morale of its people and army and their patriotic hatred of the enemy; this superiority, together with other advantages, reduces the extent of its inferiority in military, economic, and other power, and changes it into a relative strategic inferiority. This also reduces the degree of China's passivity, so that its strategic position is one of only relative passivity. Any passivity, however, is a disadvantage, and one must strive hard to shake it off. Militarily, the way to do so is resolutely to wage lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines, to launch guerrilla warfare in the rear of the enemy, and so to secure overwhelming local superiority and initiative in many campaigns of mobile and guerrilla warfare. Through such local superiority and local initiative in many campaigns, we can gradually create strategic superiority and strategic initiative and extricate ourselves from strategic inferiority and passivity. Such is the interrelation between initiative and passivity, between superiority and inferiority.

From this, we can also understand the relationship between initiative or passivity and the subjective directing of war. As already explained, it is possible to escape from our position of relative strategic inferiority and passivity, and the method is to create local superiority and initiative in many campaigns, so depriving the enemy of local superiority and initiative and plunging them into inferiority and passivity. These local successes will add up to strategic superiority and initiative for us and strategic inferiority and passivity for the enemy. Such a change depends upon correct subjective direction. Why? Because, while we seek superiority and the initiative, so does the enemy; viewed from this angle, war is a contest in subjective ability between the commanders of the opposing armies in their struggle for superiority and for the initiative on the basis of material conditions, such as military forces and financial resources. Out of the contest, there emerge a victor and a vanquished; leaving aside the contrast in objective material conditions, the victor will necessarily owe their success to correct subjective direction and the vanquished their defeat to wrong subjective direction. We admit that the phenomenon of war is more elusive and is characterized by greater uncertainty than any other social phenomenon, in other words, that it is more a matter of «probability». Yet war is in no way supernatural, but a mundane process governed by necessity. That is why Sun Wu's axiom, «Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat»,²¹ remains a scientific truth. Mistakes arise from ignorance about the enemy and about ourselves, and, moreover, the peculiar nature of war makes it impossible in many cases to have full knowledge about both sides; hence the uncertainty about military conditions and operations, and hence mistakes and defeats. But, whatever the situation and the moves in a war, one can know their general aspects and essential points. It is possible for a commander to reduce errors and give generally correct direction, first through all kinds of reconnaissance and then through intelligent inference and judgement. Armed with the weapon of «generally correct direction», we can win more battles and transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into initiative. This is how initiative or passivity is related to the correct or incorrect subjective direction of a war.

The thesis that incorrect subjective direction can change superiority and initiative into inferiority and passivity, and that correct subjective direction can effect a reverse change, becomes all the more convincing when we look at the record of defeats suffered by big and powerful armies and of victories won by small and weak armies. There are many such instances in Chinese and foreign history. Examples in China are the Battle of Chengpu between the States of Jin and Chu,²² the Battle of Chenggao between the States of Chu and Han,²³ the battle in which Han Xin defeated the Zhao armies,²⁴ the Battle of Kunyang between the States of Xin and Han,²⁵ the Battle of Guandu between Yuan Shao and Cao Cao,²⁶ the Battle of Chibi between the States of Wu and Wei,²⁷ the Battle of Yiling between the States of Wu and Shu,²⁸ the Battle of Feishui between the States of Qin and Jin,²⁹ and so on. Among examples to be found abroad are most of Napoleon's campaigns, Hindenburg's East Prussia Campaign, and the civil war in the Council Union after the November Revolution. In all these instances, victory was won by small forces over big and by inferior over superior forces. In every case, the weaker force, pitting local superiority and initiative against the enemy's local inferiority and passivity, first inflicted one sharp defeat on the enemy and then turned on the rest of their forces and smashed them one by one, thus transforming the overall situation into one of superiority and initiative. The reverse was the case with the enemy who originally had superiority and held the initiative; owing to subjective errors and internal contradictions, it sometimes happened that they completely lost an excellent or fairly good position in which they enjoyed superiority and initiative, and became a general without an army or a king without a kingdom. Thus, it can be seen that, although superiority or inferiority in the capacity to wage war is the objective basis determining initiative or passivity, it is not in itself actual initiative or passivity; it is only through a struggle, a contest of ability, that actual initiative or passivity can emerge. In the struggle, correct subjective direction can transform inferiority into superiority and passivity into initiative, and incorrect subjective direction can do the opposite. The facts that the Ox-Devil King could not defeat Sun Wukong, and that every ruling dynasty was defeated by revolutionary armies show that mere superiority in certain respects does not guarantee the initiative, much less the final victory. The inferior side can wrest the initiative and victory from the superior side by securing certain conditions through active subjective endeavour in accordance with the actual circumstances.

To have misconceptions and to be caught unawares may mean to lose superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately creating misconceptions for the enemy and then springing surprise attacks upon them are two ways — indeed two important means — of achieving superiority and seizing the initiative. What are misconceptions? «To see every bush and tree on Mount Bagong as an enemy soldier»³⁰ is an example of misconception. And «making a feint to the East but attacking in the West» is a way of creating misconceptions among the enemy. When the mass support is sufficiently good to block the leakage of news, it is often possible by various ruses to succeed in leading the enemy into a morass of wrong judgements and actions, so that they lose their superiority and the initiative. The saying, «There can never be too much deception in war», means precisely this. What does «being caught unawares» mean? It means being unprepared. Without preparedness, superiority is not real superiority, and there can be no initiative either. Having grasped this point, a force which is inferior but prepared can often defeat a superior enemy by surprise attack. We say an enemy on the move is easy to attack precisely because they are then off guard, that is, unprepared. These two points — creating misconceptions among the enemy and springing surprise attacks on them — mean transferring the uncertainties of war to the enemy while securing the greatest possible certainty for ourselves and thereby gaining superiority, the initiative, and victory. Excellent organization of the masses is the prerequisite for attaining all this. Therefore, it is extremely important to mobilize all the people who are opposed to the enemy, to arm themselves to the last person, make widespread raids on the enemy, and also prevent the leakage of news and provide a screen for our own forces; in this way, the enemy will be kept in the dark about where and when our forces will attack, and an objective basis will be created for misconceptions and unpreparedness on his part. It was largely owing to the organized, armed masses of the people that the weak and small force of the Chinese Red Army was able to win many battles in the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War. Logically, a national war should win broader mass support than an agrarian revolutionary war; however, as a result of past mistakes,³¹ the people are in an unorganized state, cannot be promptly drawn in to serve the cause, and are sometimes even made use of by the enemy. The resolute rallying of the people on a broad scale under the general orientation of persevering in the War of Resistance and in the united front is the only way to secure inexhaustible resources to meet all the requirements of the war. Moreover, it will definitely play a big part in carrying out our tactics of defeating the enemy by misleading them and catching them unawares. We are not Duke Xiang of Song and have no use for his asinine ethics.³² In order to achieve victory, we must, as far as possible, make the enemy blind and deaf by sealing their eyes and ears and drive their commanders to distraction by creating confusion in their minds. The above concerns the way in which the initiative or passivity is related to the subjective direction of the war. Such subjective direction is indispensable for defeating Japan.

By and large, Japan has held the initiative in the stage of its offensive by reason of its military power and its exploitation of our subjective errors, past and present. But its initiative is beginning to wane to some extent, because of its many inherent disadvantages and of the subjective errors it, too, has committed in the course of the war (of which more later) and also because of our many advantages and of the fact that some (only some) of our subjective errors have begun to be corrected. The enemy's defeat at Tai'erzhuang and their predicament in Shanxi prove this clearly. The widespread development of guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear has placed their garrisons in the occupied areas in a completely passive position. Although they are still on the offensive strategically and still hold the initiative, their initiative will end when their strategic offensive ends. The first reason why the enemy will not be able to maintain the initiative is that their shortage of troops renders it impossible for them to carry on the offensive indefinitely. Our offensive warfare in campaigns and our guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines, together with other factors, constitute the second reason why they will have to cease their offensive at a certain limit and will not be able to keep their initiative. The existence of the Council Union and changes in the international situation constitute the third reason. Thus, it can be seen that the enemy's initiative is limited and can be shattered. In the first period of the war, we were in a passive position; inappropriate positional warfare and the fact that the masses of the people were not mobilized were important subjective reasons for this. But, since beginning to adopt the general orientation toward mobile warfare in the second period, we have made some progress. Unfortunately, however, it is still only an extremely small portion of the masses of the people that has been mobilized. If, in future military operations, China can keep up offensive warfare by its main forces in campaigns and battles, vigorously develop guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, and mobilize the people on a broad scale politically, we can gradually build up a position of strategic initiative.

#15.2. FLEXIBILITY

What is flexibility? It is the concrete realization of the initiative in military operations; it is the flexible employment of armed forces. The flexible employment of armed forces is the central task in directing a war, a task most difficult to perform well. In addition to organizing and educating the army and the people, the business of war consists in the employment of troops in combat, and all these things are done to win the fight. Of course it is difficult to organize an army, and so on, but it is even more difficult to employ it, particularly when the weak are fighting the strong. To do so requires subjective ability of a very high order and requires the overcoming of the confusion, obscurity, and uncertainty peculiar to war and the discovery of order, clarity, and certainty in it; only thus can flexibility in command be realized.

The fundamental principle of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan is lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines. There are various tactics or methods for giving effect to this principle, such as dispersion and concentration of forces, diverging advance and converging attack, the offensive and the defensive, assault and containment, encirclement and outflanking, advance and retreat. It is easy to understand these tactics, but not at all easy to employ and vary them flexibly. Here, the three crucial links are the time, the place, and the troops. No victory can be won unless the time, the place, and the troops are well chosen. For example, in attacking an enemy force on the move, if we strike too early, we expose ourselves and give the enemy a chance to prepare, and if we strike too late, the enemy may have encamped and concentrated their forces, presenting us with a hard nut to crack. This is the question of the time. If we select a point of assault on the left flank which actually turns out to be the enemy's weak point, victory will be easy; but if we select the right flank and hit a snag, nothing will be achieved. This is the question of the place. If a particular unit of our forces is employed for a particular task, victory may be easy; but if another unit is employed for the same task, it may be hard to achieve results. This is the question of the troops. We should know not only how to employ tactics, but how to vary them. For flexibility of command, the important task is to make changes such as from the offensive to the defensive or from the defensive to the offensive, from advance to retreat or from retreat to advance, from containment to assault or from assault to containment, from encirclement to outflanking or from outflanking to encirclement, and to make such changes properly and in good time according to the circumstances of the troops and terrain on both sides. This is true of command in campaigns and strategic command as well as of command in battles.

The ancients said: «Ingenuity in varying tactics depends on mother wit»; this «ingenuity», which is what we mean by flexibility, is the contribution of the intelligent commander. Flexibility does not mean recklessness; recklessness must be rejected. Flexibility consists in the intelligent commander's ability to take timely and appropriate measures on the basis of objective conditions after «judging the hour and sizing up the situation» (the «situation» includes the enemy's situation, our situation, and the terrain), and this flexibility is «ingenuity in varying tactics». On the basis of this ingenuity, we can win more victories in lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines, change the balance of forces in our favour, gain the initiative over the enemy, and overwhelm and crush them, so that the final victory will be ours.

#15.3. PLANNING

Because of the uncertainty peculiar to war, it is much more difficult to prosecute war according to plan than is the case with other activities. Yet, since «preparedness ensures success and unpreparedness spells failure», there can be no victory in war without advance planning and preparations. There is no absolute certainty in war, and yet it is not without some degree of relative certainty. We are comparatively certain about our own situation. We are very uncertain about the enemy's, but here, too, there are signs for us to read, clues to follow, and sequences of phenomena to ponder. These form what we call a degree of relative certainty, which provides an objective basis for planning in war. Modern technical developments (telegraphy, radio, aeroplanes, motor vehicles, railways, steamships, and so on) have added to the possibilities of planning in war. However, complete or stable planning is difficult, because there is only very limited and transient certainty in war; such planning must change with the movement (flow or change) of the war and vary in degree according to the scale of the war. Tactical plans, such as plans for attack or defence by small formations or units, often have to be changed several times a day. A plan of campaign, that is, of action by large formations, can generally stand until the conclusion of the campaign, in the course of which, however, it is often changed partially or sometimes even wholly. A strategic plan based on the overall situation of both belligerents is still more stable, but it, too, is applicable only in a given strategic stage and has to be changed when the war moves toward a new stage. The making and changing of tactical, campaign, and strategic plans in accordance with scope and circumstance is a key factor in directing a war; it is the concrete expression of flexibility in war, in other words, it is also ingenuity in varying one's tactics, and victory in war cannot depart from this. Commanders at all levels in the anti-Japanese war should take note.

Because of the fluidity of war, some people categorically deny that war plans or policies can be relatively stable, describing such plans or policies as «mechanical». This view is wrong. In the preceding section, we fully recognized that, because the circumstances of war are only relatively certain and the flow (movement or change) of war is rapid, war plans or policies can be only relatively stable and have to be changed or revised in good time in accordance with changing circumstances and the flow of the war; otherwise, we would become mechanists. But one must not deny the need for war plans or policies that are relatively stable over given periods; to negate this is to negate everything, including the war itself as well as the negator themself. As both military conditions and operations are relatively stable, we must grant the relative stability of the war plans and policies resulting from them. For example, since both the circumstances of the war in northern China and the dispersed nature of the Eighth Route Army's operations are relatively stable for a particular stage, it is absolutely necessary during this stage to acknowledge the relative stability of the Eighth Route Army's strategic principle of operation, namely: «Guerrilla warfare is fundamental, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions.» The period of validity of a plan for a campaign is shorter than that of a strategic plan, and for a tactical plan it is shorter still, but each is stable over a given period. Anyone denying this point would have no way of handling warfare and would become a relativist in war with no settled views, for whom one course is just as wrong or just as right as another. No one denies that even a plan valid for a given period is fluid; otherwise, one plan would never be abandoned in favour of another. But it is fluid within limits, fluid within the bounds of the various war operations undertaken for carrying it out, but not fluid as to its essence; in other words, it is quantitatively but not qualitatively fluid. Within such a given period of time, this essence is definitely not fluid, which is what we mean by relative stability within a given period. In the great river of absolute fluidity throughout the war, there is relative stability at each particular stretch — such is our fundamental view regarding war plans or policies.

#★ ★ ★

Having dealt with protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy and with lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, and also with the initiative, flexibility, and planning, we can now sum up briefly. The anti-Japanese war must have a plan. War plans, which are the concrete application of strategy and tactics, must be flexible, so that they can be adapted to the circumstances of the war. We should always seek to transform our inferiority into superiority and our passivity into the initiative, so as to change the situation as between the enemy and ourselves. All these find expression in lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles and protracted defensive warfare on interior lines in strategy.

#16. MOBILE WARFARE, GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND POSITIONAL WARFARE

A war will take the form of mobile warfare when its content is lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles within the framework of the strategy of interior lines, protracted war, and defence. Mobile warfare is the form in which regular armies wage lightning offensive campaigns and battles on exterior lines along extensive fronts and over big areas of operation. At the same time, it includes «mobile defence», which is conducted when necessary to facilitate such offensive battles; it also includes positional attack and positional defence in a supplementary role. Its characteristics are regular armies, superiority of forces in campaigns and battles, the offensive, and fluidity.

China has a vast territory and an immense number of soldiers, but its troops are inadequately equipped and trained; the enemy's forces, on the other hand, are inadequate in number, but better equipped and trained. In this situation, there is no doubt that we must adopt offensive mobile warfare as our primary form of warfare, supplementing it by others and integrating them all into mobile warfare. We must oppose «only retreat, never advance», which is flightism, and at the same time oppose «only advance, never retreat», which is desperate recklessness.

One of the characteristics of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits, but requires a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. However, it has nothing in common with flightism of the Han Fuqu brand.³³ The primary requirement of war is to destroy the enemy, and the other requirement is self-preservation. The object of self-preservation is to destroy the enemy, and to destroy the enemy is in turn the most effective means of self-preservation. Hence, mobile warfare is in no way an excuse for people like Han Fuqu and can never mean moving only backward, and never forward; that kind of «moving», which negates the fundamental offensive character of mobile warfare, would, in practice, «move» China out of existence despite its vastness, even if we «moved» all the way to Kamcatka.

However, the other view, which we call the desperate recklessness of «only advance, never retreat», is also wrong. The mobile warfare we advocate, the content of which is lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines in campaigns and battles, includes positional warfare in a supplementary role, «mobile defence», and retreat, without all of which mobile warfare cannot be fully carried out. Desperate recklessness is military shortsightedness, originating often from fear of losing territory. A person who acts with desperate recklessness does not know that one characteristic of mobile warfare is fluidity, which not only permits, but requires, a field army to advance and to withdraw in great strides. On the positive side, in order to draw the enemy into a fight unfavourable to them, but favourable to us, it is usually necessary that they should be on the move and that we should have a number of advantages, such as favourable terrain, a vulnerable enemy, a local population that can prevent the leakage of information, and the enemy's fatigue and unpreparedness. This requires that the enemy should advance, and we should not grudge a temporary loss of part of our territory. For the temporary loss of part of our territory is the price we pay for the permanent preservation of all our territory, including the recovery of lost territory. On the negative side, whenever we are forced into a disadvantageous position which fundamentally endangers the preservation of our forces, we should have the courage to retreat, so as to preserve our forces and hit the enemy when new opportunities arise. In their ignorance of this principle, the advocates of desperate action will contest a city or a piece of ground, even when the position is obviously and definitely unfavourable; as a result, they not only lose the city or ground, but fail to preserve their forces. We have always advocated the policy of «luring the enemy in deep», precisely because it is the most effective military policy for a weak army strategically on the defensive to employ against a strong army.

Among the forms of warfare in the anti-Japanese war, mobile warfare comes first and guerrilla warfare second. When we say that, in the entire war, mobile warfare is primary and guerrilla warfare supplementary, we mean that the outcome of the war depends mainly on regular warfare, especially in its mobile form, and that guerrilla warfare cannot shoulder the main responsibility in deciding the outcome. It does not follow, however, that the role of guerrilla warfare is unimportant in the strategy of the war. Its role in the strategy of the war as a whole is second only to that of mobile warfare, for, without its support, we cannot defeat the enemy. In saying this, we also have in mind the strategic task of developing guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare. Guerrilla warfare will not remain the same throughout this long and cruel war, but will rise to a higher level and develop into mobile warfare. Thus, the strategic role of guerrilla warfare is twofold, to support regular warfare and to transform itself into regular warfare. Considering the unprecedented extent and duration of guerrilla warfare in China's War of Resistance, it is all the more important not to underestimate its strategic role. Guerrilla warfare in China, therefore, has not only its tactical but also its peculiar strategic problems. I have already discussed this in Problems of Guerrilla War Against Japan. As indicated above, the forms of warfare in the three strategic stages of the War of Resistance are as follows. In the first stage, mobile warfare is primary, while guerrilla and positional warfare are supplementary. In the second stage, guerrilla warfare will advance to the first place and will be supplemented by mobile and positional warfare. In the third stage, mobile warfare will again become the primary form and will be supplemented by positional and guerrilla warfare. But the mobile warfare of the third stage will no longer be undertaken solely by the original regular forces; a part, possibly quite an important part, will be undertaken by forces which were originally guerrillas, but which will have progressed from guerrilla to mobile warfare. From the viewpoint of all three stages in China's War of Resistance Against Japan, guerrilla warfare is definitely indispensable. Our guerrilla war will present a great drama unparalleled in the annals of war. For this reason, out of the millions of China's regular troops, it is absolutely necessary to assign at least several hundred thousand to disperse through all enemy-occupied areas, mobilize the masses to arm themselves, and wage guerrilla warfare in coordination with the masses. The regular forces so assigned should shoulder this sacred task conscientiously, and they should not think their status lowered because they fight fewer big battles and for the time being do not appear as national heroes. Any such thinking is wrong. Guerrilla warfare does not bring as quick results or as great renown as regular warfare, but «a long road tests a horse's strength and a long task proves a person's heart», and, in the course of this long and cruel war, guerrilla warfare will demonstrate its immense power; it is indeed no ordinary undertaking. Moreover, such regular forces can conduct guerrilla warfare when dispersed and mobile warfare when concentrated, as the Eighth Route Army has been doing. The principle of the Eighth Route Army is: «Guerrilla warfare is fundamental, but lose no chance for mobile warfare under favourable conditions.» This principle is perfectly correct; the views of its opponents are wrong. After the enemy's occupation of Linfen, the military authorities ordered that the entire army in Shanxi should «engage in guerrilla warfare in units of brigades». This is an arrangement with strategic vision.

At China's present technical level, positional warfare, defensive or offensive, is generally impracticable, and this is where our weakness manifests itself. Moreover, the enemy is also exploiting the vastness of our territory to bypass our fortified positions. Hence, positional warfare cannot be an important, still less the main, means for us. But, in the first and second stages of the war, it is possible and essential, within the scope of mobile warfare, to employ localized positional warfare in a supplementary role in campaigns. Semi-positional «mobile defence» is a still more essential part of mobile warfare undertaken for the purpose of resisting the enemy at every step, thereby depleting their forces and gaining extra time. China must strive to increase its supplies of modern weapons, so that it can fully carry out the tasks of positional attack in the stage of the strategic counter-offensive. In this third stage, positional warfare will undoubtedly play a greater role, for then the enemy will be holding fast to their positions, and we shall not be able to recover our lost territory unless we launch powerful positional attacks in support of mobile warfare. Nevertheless, in the third stage, too, we must exert our every effort to make mobile warfare the primary form of warfare. For the art of directing war and the active role of people are largely nullified in positional warfare, such as that fought in Western Europe in the second half of the First World War. This is an adverse consequence of modern technology. It is only natural that the war should be taken «out of the trenches», since the war is being fought in the vast expanses of China and since our side will remain poorly equipped technically for quite a long time. Even during the third stage, when China's technical position will be better, it will hardly surpass its enemy in that respect, and so will have to concentrate on highly mobile warfare, without which it cannot achieve final victory. Hence, throughout the War of Resistance, China will not adopt positional warfare as primary; the primary or important forms are mobile warfare and guerrilla warfare. These two forms of warfare will afford full play to the art of directing war and to the active role of people — what a piece of good fortune out of our misfortune!

#17. WAR OF ATTRITION AND WAR OF ANNIHILATION

This is a question concerning the essence of the war. As we have said before, the essence, or the objective, of war is to preserve oneself and destroy the enemy. Since there are three forms of warfare, mobile, positional, and guerrilla, for achieving this objective, and since they differ in degrees of effectiveness, there arises the broad distinction between war of attrition and war of annihilation.

To begin with, we may say that the anti-Japanese war is at once a war of attrition and a war of annihilation. Why? Because the enemy is still exploiting their strength and retains strategic superiority and strategic initiative, and, therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot effectively and speedily reduce their strength and break their superiority and initiative. We still have our weakness and have not yet rid ourselves of strategic inferiority and passivity; therefore, unless we fight campaigns and battles of annihilation, we cannot win time to improve our internal and international situation and alter our unfavourable position. Hence, campaigns of annihilation are the means of attaining the objective of strategic attrition. In this sense, war of annihilation is war of attrition. It is chiefly by using the method of attrition through annihilation that China can wage protracted war.

But the objective of strategic attrition may also be achieved by campaigns of attrition. Generally speaking, mobile warfare performs the task of annihilation, positional warfare performs the task of attrition, and guerrilla warfare performs both simultaneously; the three forms of warfare are thus distinguished from one another. In this sense war of annihilation is different from war of attrition. Campaigns of attrition are supplementary but necessary in protracted war.

Speaking theoretically and in terms of China's needs, in order to achieve the strategic objective of greatly depleting the enemy's forces, China in its defensive stage should not only exploit the function of annihilation, which is fulfilled primarily by mobile warfare and partially by guerrilla warfare, but also exploit the function of attrition, which is fulfilled primarily by positional warfare (which itself is supplementary) and partially by guerrilla warfare. In the stage of stalemate, we should continue to exploit the functions of annihilation and attrition fulfilled by guerrilla and mobile warfare for further large-scale depletion of the enemy's forces. All this is aimed at protracting the war, gradually changing the general balance of forces, and preparing the conditions for our counter-offensive. During the strategic counter-offensive, we should continue to employ the method of attrition through annihilation, so as finally to expel the enemy.

But, as a matter of fact, it was our experience in the last ten months that many, or even most, of the mobile warfare campaigns became campaigns of attrition, and guerrilla warfare did not adequately fulfil its proper function of annihilation in certain areas. The positive aspect is that at least we depleted the enemy's forces, which is important both for the protracted warfare and for our final victory, and did not shed our blood in vain. But the drawbacks are, first, that we did not sufficiently deplete the enemy, and, second, that we were unable to avoid rather heavy losses and captured little war loot. Although we should recognize the objective cause of this situation, namely, the disparity between us and the enemy in technical equipment and in the training of troops, in any case, it is necessary, both theoretically and practically, to urge that our main forces should fight vigorous battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable. And, although our guerrilla units have to wage battles of pure attrition in performing specific tasks such as sabotage and harassment, it is necessary to advocate and vigorously carry out campaigns and battles of annihilation whenever circumstances are favourable, so as greatly to deplete the enemy's forces and greatly replenish our own.

The «exterior lines», the «lightning», and the «offensive» in lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines and the «mobility» in mobile warfare find their main operational expression in the use of encircling and outflanking tactics; hence the necessity for concentrating superior forces. Therefore, concentration of forces and the use of encircling and outflanking tactics are the prerequisites for mobile warfare, that is, for lightning offensive warfare on exterior lines. All this is aimed at annihilating the enemy forces.

The strength of the Japanese army lies not only in its weapons, but also in the training of its officers and soldiers — its degree of organization, its self-confidence arising from never having been defeated, its superstitious belief in the Mikado and in supernatural beings, its arrogance, its contempt for the Chinese people, and other such characteristics, all of which stem from long years of indoctrination by the Japanese warlords and from the Japanese national tradition. This is the chief reason why we have taken very few prisoners, although we have killed and wounded a great many enemy troops. It is a point that has been underestimated by many people in the past. To destroy these enemy characteristics will be a long process. The first thing to do is to give the matter serious attention, and then patiently and systematically to work at it in the political field and in the fields of international propaganda and the Japanese people's movement; in the military sphere, war of annihilation is of course one of the means. In these enemy characteristics, pessimists may find a basis for the theory of national subjugation, and passively minded military people a basis for opposition to war of annihilation. We, on the contrary, maintain that these strong points of the Japanese army can be destroyed and that their destruction has already begun. The chief method of destroying them is to win over the Japanese soldiers politically. We should understand, rather than hurt, their pride and channel it in the proper direction and, by treating prisoners of war leniently and applying people's diplomacy, lead the Japanese soldiers to see the anti-popular character of the aggression committed by the Japanese rulers. On the other hand, we should demonstrate to the Japanese soldiers the indomitable spirit and the heroic, stubborn fighting capacity of the Chinese army and the Chinese people, that is, we should deal them blows in battles of annihilation. Our experience in the last ten months of military operations shows that it is possible to annihilate enemy forces — witness the Pingxingguan and Tai'erzhuang campaigns. The Japanese army's morale is beginning to sag, its soldiers do not understand the aim of the war, they are engulfed by the Chinese armies and by the Chinese people, in assault they show far less courage than the Chinese soldiers, and so on; all these are objective factors favourable to waging battles of annihilation, and they will, moreover, steadily develop as the war becomes protracted. From the viewpoint of destroying the enemy's overweening arrogance through battles of annihilation, such battles are one of the prerequisites for shortening the war and accelerating the emancipation of the Japanese soldiers and the Japanese people. Cats make friends with cats, and nowhere in the world do cats make friends with mice.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that, for the present, we are inferior to the enemy in technical equipment and in troop training. Therefore, it is often difficult to achieve the maximum in annihilation, such as capturing the whole or the greater part of an enemy force, especially when fighting on the plains. In this connection, the excessive demands of the theorists of quick victory are wrong. What should be demanded of our forces in the anti-Japanese war is that they should fight battles of annihilation as far as possible. In favourable circumstances, we should concentrate superior forces in every battle and employ encircling and outflanking tactics — encircle part if not all of the enemy forces, capture part if not all of the encircled forces, and inflict heavy casualties on part of the encircled forces if we cannot capture them. In circumstances which are unfavourable for battles of annihilation, we should fight battles of attrition. In favourable circumstances, we should employ the principle of concentration of forces, and in unfavourable circumstances that of their dispersion. As for the relationship of command in campaigns, we should apply the principle of centralized command in the former and that of decentralized command in the latter. These are the fundamental principles of field operations for the War of Resistance Against Japan.

#18. THE POSSIBILITIES OF EXPLOITING THE ENEMY'S MISTAKES

The enemy command itself provides a basis for the possibility of defeating Japan. History has never known an infallible general, and the enemy makes mistakes, just as we ourselves can hardly avoid making them; hence, the possibility exists of exploiting the enemy's errors. In the ten months of their war of aggression, the enemy has already made many mistakes in strategy and tactics. There are five major ones:

• First, piecemeal reinforcement. This is due to the enemy's underestimation of China and also to their shortage of troops. The enemy has always looked down on us. After grabbing the four north-eastern provinces at small cost, they occupied eastern Hebei and northern Chaha'er, all by way of strategic reconnaissance. The conclusion the enemy came to was that the Chinese nation is a heap of loose sand. Thus, thinking that China would crumble at a single blow, they mapped out a plan of «quick decision», attempting with very small forces to send us scampering in panic. They did not expect to find such great unity and such immense powers of resistance as China has shown during the past ten months, forgetting as they did that China is already in an era of progress and already has an advanced political party, an advanced army, and an advanced people. Meeting with setbacks, the enemy then increased their forces piecemeal from about a dozen to 30 divisions. If they want to advance, they will have to augment their forces still further. But, because of Japan's antagonism with the Council Union and its inherent shortage of troops and finances, there are inevitable limits to the maximum number of troops it can throw in and to the furthest extent of its advance.
• Second, absence of a main direction of attack. Before the Tai'erzhuang Campaign, the enemy had divided their forces more or less evenly between northern and central China and had again divided them inside each of these areas. In northern China, for instance, they divided their forces among the Tianjin-Pukou, the Beijing-Hankou, and the Datong-Puzhou Railways, and, along each of these lines, they suffered some casualties and left some garrisons in the places occupied, after which they lacked the forces for further advances. After the Tai'erzhuang defeat, from which they learned a lesson, the enemy concentrated their main forces in the direction of Xuzhou, and so temporarily corrected this mistake.
• Third, lack of strategic coordination. On the whole, coordination exists within the groups of enemy forces in northern China and in central China, but there is glaring lack of coordination between the two. When their forces on the southern section of the Tianjin-Pukou Railway attacked Xiaobengbu, those on the northern section made no move, and when their forces on the northern section attacked Tai'erzhuang, those on the southern section made no move. After the enemy came to grief at both places, the Japanese Minister of War arrived on an inspection tour and the chief of general staff turned up to take charge, and, for the moment, it seemed, there was coordination. The feudal class, the bourgeoisie, and the warlords of Japan have very serious internal contradictions, which are growing, and the lack of military coordination is one of the concrete manifestations of this fact.
• Fourth, failure to grasp strategic opportunities. This failure was conspicuously shown in the enemy's halt after the occupation of Nanjing and Taiyuan, chiefly because of their shortage of troops and their lack of a strategic pursuit force.
• Fifth, encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers. Before the Tai'erzhuang Campaign, in the campaigns of Shanghai, Nanjing, Cangzhou, Baoding, Nankou, Xinkou, and Linfen, many Chinese troops were routed, but few were taken prisoner, which shows the stupidity of the enemy command.

These five errors — piecemeal reinforcement, absence of a main direction of attack, lack of strategic coordination, failure to grasp opportunities, and encirclement of large, but annihilation of small, numbers — were all points of incompetence in the Japanese command before the Tai'erzhuang Campaign. Although the enemy has since made some improvements, they cannot possibly avoid repeating their errors, because of their shortage of troops, their internal contradictions, and other factors. In addition, what they gain at one point they lose at another. For instance, when they concentrated their forces in northern China on Xuzhou, they left a great vacuum in the occupied areas in northern China, which gave us full scope for developing guerrilla warfare. These mistakes were of the enemy's own making and not induced by us. On our part, we can deliberately make the enemy commit errors, that is, we can mislead them and manoeuvre them into the desired position by ingenious and effective moves with the help of a well-organized local population, for example, by «making a feint to the East, but attacking in the West». This possibility has already been discussed. All the above shows that, in the enemy's command, too, we can find some basis for victory. Of course, we should not take it as an important basis for our strategic planning; on the contrary, the only reliable course is to base our planning on the assumption that the enemy will make few mistakes. Besides, the enemy can exploit our mistakes, just as we can exploit theirs. It is the duty of our command to allow them the minimum of opportunities for doing so. Actually, the enemy command has committed errors, will again commit errors in the future, and can be made to do so through our endeavours. All these errors we can exploit, and it is the business of our generals in the War of Resistance to do their utmost to seize upon them. However, although much of the enemy's strategic and campaign command is incompetent (not all of it is incompetent), there are quite a few excellent points in their battle command, that is, in their unit and small formation tactics, and here we should learn from them.

#19. THE QUESTION OF DECISIVE ENGAGEMENTS IN THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR

The question of decisive engagements in the anti-Japanese war should be approached from three aspects: we should resolutely fight a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are sure of victory; we should avoid a decisive engagement in every campaign or battle in which we are not sure of victory; and we should absolutely avoid a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked. The characteristics differentiating our War of Resistance Against Japan from many other wars are also revealed in this question of decisive engagements. In the first and second stages of the war, which are marked by the enemy's strength and our weakness, the enemy's objective is to have us concentrate our main forces for a decisive engagement. Our objective is exactly the opposite. We want to choose conditions favourable to us, concentrate superior forces, and fight decisive campaigns or battles only when we are sure of victory, as in the battles at Pingxingguan, Tai'erzhuang, and other places; we want to avoid decisive engagements under unfavourable conditions when we are not sure of victory, this being the policy we adopted in the Changde and other campaigns. As for fighting a strategically decisive engagement on which the fate of the whole nation is staked, we simply must not do so, as witness the recent withdrawal from Xuzhou. The enemy's plan for a «quick decision» was thus foiled, and now they cannot help fighting a protracted war with us. These principles are impracticable in a country with a small territory, and hardly practicable in a country that is very backward politically. They are practicable in China, because it is a big country and is in an era of progress. Our worry is that our country's main forces may be tricked by the enemy into a decisive engagement and thus sacrificed. If strategically decisive engagements are avoided, then, «as long as the green mountains are there, one need not worry about firewood», for, even though some of our territory may be lost, we shall still have plenty of room for manoeuvre and thus be able to promote and await domestic progress, international support, and the internal disintegration of the enemy; that is the best policy for us in the anti-Japanese war. Unable to endure the arduous trials of a protracted war and eager for an early triumph, the impetuous theorists of quick victory clamour for a strategically decisive engagement the moment the situation takes a slightly favourable turn. To do what they want would be to inflict incalculable damage on the entire war, spell finish to the protracted war, and land us in the enemy's deadly trap; actually, it would be the worst policy. Undoubtedly, if we are to avoid decisive engagements, we shall have to abandon territory, and we must have the courage to do so when (and only when) it becomes completely unavoidable. At such times, we should not feel the slightest regret, for this policy of trading space for time is correct. History tells us how Russia made a courageous retreat to avoid a decisive engagement and then defeated Napoleon, the terror of his age. In late August 1914, France avoided a decisive engagement on the Franco-Belgian border, made a courageous retreat, and defeated the German army, which menaced Europe. Today, China should do likewise. The loss of some territory is the precondition for the liberation of the whole country, and temporary suffering is the precondition for eternal happiness. All true patriots should know this truth.

Are we not afraid of being denounced as «non-resisters»? No, we are not. Not to fight at all, but to compromise with the enemy — that is non-resistance, which should not only be denounced, but must never be tolerated. We must resolutely fight the War of Resistance, but, in order to avoid the enemy's deadly trap, it is absolutely necessary that we should not allow our main forces to be finished off at one blow, which would make it difficult to continue the War of Resistance and affect national survival — in brief, it is absolutely necessary to avoid national subjugation. To have doubts on this point is to be short sighted on the question of the war and is sure to lead one into the ranks of the subjugationists. We have criticized the desperate recklessness of «only advance, never retreat» precisely because, if it became the fashion, this doctrine would make it impossible to continue the War of Resistance and would lead to the danger of ultimate national subjugation.

We are for decisive engagements whenever circumstances are favourable, whether in battles or in major or minor campaigns, and, in this respect, we should never tolerate passivity. Only through such decisive engagements can we achieve the objective of annihilating or depleting the enemy forces, and all soldiers in the anti-Japanese war should resolutely play their parts. For this purpose, considerable partial sacrifices are necessary; to avoid any sacrifice whatsoever is the attitude of cowards and of those afflicted by the fear of Japan and must be firmly opposed. The execution of Li Fuying, Han Fuqu, and other flightists was justified. Within the scope of correct war planning, encouraging the spirit and practice of heroic self-sacrifice and dauntless advance in battle is absolutely necessary and inseparable from the waging of protracted war and the achievement of final victory. We have strongly condemned the flightism of «only retreat, never advance» and have supported the strict enforcement of discipline, because it is only through heroic decisive engagements, fought under a correct plan, that we can vanquish the powerful enemy; flightism, on the contrary, gives direct support to the theory of national subjugation.

Is it not self-contradictory to fight heroically first and then abandon territory? Will not our heroic fighters have shed their blood in vain? That is not at all the way questions should be posed. To eat and then to empty your bowels — is this not to eat in vain? To sleep and then to get up — is this not to sleep in vain? Can questions be posed in such a way? I would suppose not. To keep on eating, to keep on sleeping, to keep on fighting heroically all the way to the Yalu River without a stop — these are subjectivist and formalist illusions, not realities of life. As everybody knows, although, in fighting and shedding our blood in order to gain time and prepare the counter-offensive, we have had to abandon some territory, in fact, we have gained time, we have achieved the objective of annihilating and depleting enemy forces, we have acquired experience in fighting, we have mobilized until now inactive people and improved our international standing. Has our blood been shed in vain? Certainly not. Territory has been given up in order to preserve our military forces and indeed to preserve territory, because, if we do not abandon part of our territory when conditions are unfavourable, but blindly fight decisive engagements without the least assurance of winning, we shall lose our military forces and then be unable to avoid the loss of all our territory, to say nothing of recovering territory already lost. Capitalist must have capital to run their businesses, and if they lose it all, they are no longer capitalists. Even gamblers must have money to stake, and if they risk it all on a single throw and their luck fails, they cannot gamble anymore. Events have their twists and turns and do not follow a straight line, and war is no exception; only formalists are unable to comprehend this truth.

I think the same will also hold true for the decisive engagements in the stage of strategic counter-offensive. Although by then the enemy will be in the inferior and we in the superior position, the principle of «fighting profitable decisive engagements and avoiding unprofitable ones» will still apply and will continue to apply until we have fought our way to the Yalu River. This is how we will be able to maintain our initiative from beginning to end, and as for the enemy's «challenges» and other people's «taunts», we should imperturbably brush them aside and ignore them. In the War of Resistance, only those generals who show this kind of firmness can be deemed courageous and wise. This is beyond the ken of those who «jump whenever touched». Even though we are in a more or less passive position strategically in this first stage of the war, we should have the initiative in every campaign; and, of course, we should have the initiative throughout the later stages. We are for protracted war and final victory, we are not gamblers who risk everything on a single throw.

#20. THE ARMY AND THE PEOPLE ARE THE FOUNDATION OF VICTORY

Japanese imperialism will never relax in its aggression against and repression of revolutionary China; this is determined by its imperialist nature. If China did not resist, Japan would easily seize all China without firing a single shot, as it did the four north-eastern provinces. Since China is resisting, it is an inexorable law that Japan will try to repress this resistance until the force of its repression is exceeded by the force of China's resistance. The Japanese feudal class and bourgeoisie are very ambitious, and in order to drive south to South-East Asia and north to Siberia, they have adopted the policy of breaking through in the centre by first attacking China. Those who think that Japan will know where to stop and be content with the occupation of northern China and of Jiangsu and Zhejiang Provinces completely fail to perceive that imperialist Japan, which has developed to a new stage and is approaching extinction, differs from the Japan of the past. When we say that there is a definite limit both to the number of troops Japan can throw in and to the extent of its advance, we mean that, with its available strength, Japan can only commit part of its forces against China and only penetrate China as far as their capacity allows, for it also wants to attack in other directions and has to defend itself against other enemies; at the same time, China has given proof of progress and capacity for stubborn resistance, and it is inconceivable that there should be fierce attacks by Japan without inevitable resistance by China. Japan cannot occupy the whole of China, but it will spare no effort to suppress China's resistance in all the areas it can reach, and will not stop until internal and external developments push Japanese imperialism to the brink of the grave. There are only two possible outcomes to the political situation in Japan. Either the downfall of its entire ruling class occurs rapidly, political power passes to the people, and war thus comes to an end, which is impossible at the moment; or its feudal class and bourgeoisie become more and more fascist and maintain the war until the day of their downfall, which is the very road Japan is now travelling. There can be no other outcome. Those who hope that the moderates among the Japanese bourgeoisie will come forward and stop the war are only harbouring illusions. The reality of Japanese politics for many years has been that the bourgeois moderates of Japan have fallen captive to the feudal lords and the financial magnates. Now that Japan has launched war against China, so long as it does not suffer a fatal blow from Chinese resistance and still retains sufficient strength, it is bound to attack South-East Asia or Siberia, or even both. It will do so once war breaks out in Europe; in their wishful calculations, the rulers of Japan have it worked out on a grandiose scale. Of course, it is possible that Japan will have to drop its original plan of invading Siberia and adopt a mainly defensive attitude toward the Council Union on account of Soviet strength and of the serious extent to which Japan itself has been weakened by its war against China. But, in that case, so far from relaxing its aggression against China, it will intensify it, because then the only way left to it will be to gobble up the weak. China's task of persevering in the War of Resistance, the united front, and the protracted war will then become all the more weighty, and it will be all the more necessary not to slacken our efforts in the slightest. «When Lord Bei beat the tofu, he chose a weak object to bully.» This is a law of the natural world and of class society.

Under the circumstances, the main prerequisites for China's victory over Japan are nationwide unity and all-round progress on a scale ten or even a hundred times greater than in the past. China is already in an era of progress and has achieved a splendid unity, but its progress and unity are still far from adequate. That Japan has occupied such an extensive area is due not only to its strength, but also to China's weakness; this weakness is entirely the cumulative effect of the various historical errors of the last 100 years, and especially of the last ten years, which have confined progress to its present bounds. It is impossible to vanquish so strong an enemy without making an extensive and long-term effort. There are many things we have to exert ourselves to do; here, I will deal only with two fundamental aspects, the progress of the army and the progress of the people.

The reform of our military system requires its modernization and improved technical equipment, without which we cannot drive the enemy back across the Yalu River. In our employment of troops, we need progressive, flexible strategy and tactics, without which we likewise cannot win victory. Nevertheless, soldiers are the foundation of an army; unless they are imbued with a progressive political spirit, and unless such a spirit is fostered through progressive political work, it will be impossible to achieve genuine unity between officers and soldiers, impossible to awaken their enthusiasm for the War of Resistance to the full, and impossible to provide a sound basis for the most effective use of all our technical equipment and tactics. When we say that Japan will finally be defeated despite its technical superiority, we mean that the blows we deliver through annihilation and attrition, apart from inflicting losses, will eventually shake the morale of the enemy army, whose weapons are not in the hands of politically conscious soldiers. With us, on the contrary, officers and soldiers are at one on the political aim of the War of Resistance. This is fundamentally different from the civil war period. This gives us the foundation for political work among all the anti-Japanese forces. A proper measure of democracy should be put into effect in the army, chiefly by abolishing the feudal practice of bullying and beating and by having officers and soldiers share weal and woe. Once this is done, unity will be achieved between officers and soldiers, the combat effectiveness of the army will be greatly increased, and there will be no doubt of our ability to sustain the long, cruel war.

The richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people. It is mainly because of the unorganized state of the Chinese masses that Japan dares to bully us. When this defect is remedied, then the Japanese aggressors, like a mad bull crashing into a ring of flames, will be surrounded by hundreds of millions of our people standing upright, the mere sound of their voices will strike terror into them, and they will be burned to death. China's armies must have an uninterrupted flow of reinforcements, and the abuses of press-ganging and of buying substitutes,³⁴ which now exist at the lower levels, must immediately be banned and replaced by widespread and enthusiastic political mobilization, which will make it easy to enlist millions and even tens of millions of troops. We now have great difficulties in raising money for the war, but, once the people are mobilized, finances, too, will cease to be a problem. Why should a country as large and populous as China suffer from lack of funds? The army must become one with the people, so that they see it as their own army. Such an army will be invincible, and an imperialist power like Japan will be no match for it.

Many people think that it is wrong methods that make for strained relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people, but I always tell them that it is a question of fundamental attitude (or fundamental principle), of having respect for the soldiers and the people. It is from this attitude that the various policies, methods, and forms ensue. If we depart from this attitude, then the policies, methods, and forms will certainly be wrong, and the relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people are bound to be unsatisfactory. Our three major principles for the army's political work are: first, unity between officers and soldiers; second, unity between the army and the people; and, third, the disintegration of the enemy forces. To apply these principles effectively, we must start with this fundamental attitude of respect for the soldiers and the people, and of respect for the human dignity of prisoners of war once they have laid down their arms. Those who take all this as a technical matter and not one of fundamental attitude are indeed wrong, and they should correct their view.

At this moment, when the defence of Wuhan and other places has become urgent, it is a task of the utmost importance to awaken the initiative and enthusiasm of the whole army and the whole people to the full in support of the war. There is no doubt that the task of defending Wuhan and other places must be seriously posed and seriously performed. But whether we can be certain of holding them depends not on our subjective desires, but on concrete conditions. Among the most important of these conditions is the political mobilization of the whole army and people for the struggle. If a strenuous effort is not made to secure all the necessary conditions, indeed even if one of these conditions is missing, disasters like the loss of Nanjing and other places are bound to be repeated. China will have its Madrids in places where the conditions are present. So far, China has not had a Madrid, and, from now on, we should work hard to create several, but it all depends on the conditions. The most fundamental of these is extensive political mobilization of the whole army and people.

In all our work, we must persevere in the Anti-Japanese National United Front as the general policy. For only with this policy can we persevere in the War of Resistance and in protracted warfare, bring about a widespread and profound improvement in the relations between officers and soldiers and between the army and the people, awaken to the full the initiative and enthusiasm of the entire army and the entire people in the fight for the defence of all the territory still in our hands and for the recovery of what we have lost, and so win final victory.

This question of the political mobilization of the army and the people is indeed of the greatest importance. We have dwelt on it at the risk of repetition precisely because victory is impossible with out it. There are, of course, many other conditions indispensable to victory, but political mobilization is the most fundamental. The Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front of the whole army and the whole people, it is certainly not a united front merely of the headquarters and members of a few political parties; our fundamental objective in initiating the Anti-Japanese National United Front is to mobilize the whole army and the whole people to participate in it.

#★ ★ ★

What are our conclusions? They are:

QUESTION: Under what conditions can the Chinese people defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?

ANSWER: Three conditions will guarantee our success:

• Firstly, the achievement of China's Anti-Japanese National United Front.
• Secondly, the formation of a worldwide anti-Japanese united front.
• Thirdly, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism.

**Of these, the central necessity is the unity of the Chinese people themselves.

QUESTION: How long do you think such a war would last?

ANSWER: That depends on the strength of the Chinese united front, many conditioning factors in China and Japan, and the degree of international help given to China, as well as the rate of revolutionary development in Japan. If the Chinese united front is powerfully homogeneous, if it is effectively organized horizontally and vertically, if the international aid to China is considerable from those governments which recognize the menace of Japanese imperialism to their own interests, if revolution comes quickly in Japan, the war will be short and victory speedily won. If these conditions are not realized, however, the war will be very long, but, in the end, just the same, Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world. The Communist Party of China, the Council Government, the Red Army, and the Chinese people are ready to unite with any power to shorten the duration of this war, but if none joins us, we are determined to carry on alone.

QUESTION: What is your opinion of the probable course of development of such a war, politically and militarily?

ANSWER: Two questions are involved here — the policy of the foreign powers, and the strategy of China's armies.

Now, the Japanese continental policy is already fixed, and it is well known. Those who imagine that by further sacrifices of Chinese sovereignty, by making economic, political, or territorial compromises and concessions, they can halt the advance of Japan, are only indulging in utopian fancy. Nanjing has in the past adopted erroneous policies based on this strategy, and we have only to look at the map of East Asia to see the results of it.

But we know well enough that not only northern China, but the lower Yangzi River Valley and our southern seaports are already included in the Japanese continental programme. Moreover, it is just as clear that the Japanese navy aspires to blockade the China seas and to seize the Philippines, Thailand, Indo-China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In the event of war, Japan will try to make them its strategic bases, cutting off Britain, France, and the United States from China, and monopolizing the seas of the southern Pacific Ocean. These moves are included in Japan's plans of naval strategy, copies of which we have seen. And such naval strategy will be coordinated with Japan's land strategy.

China will, of course, be in an extremely difficult position at such a time. But the majority of the Chinese people believe that they can overcome these difficulties. Only the rich in China's seaports are defeatists. They are afraid that they will lose their property.

So, as China considers questions of economy, sources of war materiel, and so on, these questions of the Japanese naval blockade, the cessation of commerce, and so on must inevitably come up for answer by the foreign powers. If Japan is to be allowed to isolate China as easily as it did Manchuria, if the powers are to do nothing more than they did there, then naturally Japan's task will tend to be minimized.

Ideally, of course, our military strategy should be the strategy of the «inner front». That is, if the foreign nations, if Britain, the United States, France, and the Council Union resist the Japanese blockade, they will arrange themselves in the strategy of the «outer front». China would then fight in the milieu of Japanese imperialism, while the other countries opposed Japan on the periphery. In such a situation, the possible «encirclement and suppression» of Japan's imperial war machine in a brief period would be manifest.

Many people think that it would be impossible for China to continue its fight against Japan once the latter had seized certain strategic points on the coast and enforced a blockade. This is nonsense. To refute it, we have only to refer to the history of the Red Army. In certain periods, our forces have been exceeded numerically some 10 or 20 times by the Nationalist troops, which were also superior to us in equipment. Their economic resources many times surpassed ours, and they received material assistance from the outside. Why, then, has the Red Army scored success after success against the White troops, and not only survived, but increased its power until today?

The explanation is that the Red Army and the Council Government had created among all people within their areas a rock-like solidarity, because everyone in the council areas was ready to fight for their government against the oppressors, because everyone was voluntarily and consciously fighting for their own interests and what they believed to be right. Secondly, in the struggle of the councils, the people were led by people of ability, strength, and determination, equipped with deep understanding of the strategic political, economic, and military needs of their position. The Red Army won its many victories — beginning with only a few dozen rifles in the hands of determined revolutionaries — because its solid mass basis attracted friends among the civilian population and even among the White troops. The enemy was infinitely our superior militarily, but politically they were immobilized.

In the anti-Japanese war, the Chinese people would have on their side greater advantages than those the Red Army has utilized in its struggle against the Nationalist Party. China is a very big nation, and it cannot be said to have been conquered until every inch of it is under the sword of the invader. If Japan should succeed in occupying even a large section of China, getting possession of an area with as many as 100'000'000 or even 200'000'000 inhabitants, we will still be far from defeated. We shall still have left a great force to fight against the Japanese warlords, who will also have to fight a heavy and constant rear-guard action throughout the entire war.

As for munitions, the Japanese cannot seize our arsenals in the interior, which are sufficient to equip Chinese armies for many years, nor can they prevent us from capturing great amounts of arms and ammunition from their own hands. By the latter method, the Red Army has equipped its present forces from the Nationalist forces; for nine years, they have been our «quartermasters». What infinitely greater possibilities would open up for the utilization of such tactics as won our arms for us if the whole Chinese people were united against Japan!

Economically, of course, China is not unified. But the uneven development of China's economy also presents advantages in a war against Japan's highly centralized and highly concentrated economy. For example, to sever Shanghai from the rest of China is not as disastrous to the country as would be, for instance, the severance of New York from the rest of the United States. Moreover, it is impossible for Japan to isolate all of China; China's North-West, South-West, and West cannot be blockaded by Japan, which is continentally still a naval power.

Thus, once more, the central point of the problem becomes the mobilization and unification of the entire Chinese people and the construction of a united front, such as has been advocated by the Communist Party ever since 1932.

[...]

QUESTION: In case the Sino-Japanese War extends over a very long period and Japan is not completely defeated, would the Communist government agree to make a peace recognizing Japanese control over Manchuria?

ANSWER: Impossible! The Chinese Communists, like the Chinese people, will not permit Japan to retain one inch of Chinese territory!

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QUESTION: What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy to be followed in this «war of liberation»?

ANSWER: The strategy should be that of mobile warfare, over an extended, shifting, and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale mobile war rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines, and heavy fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the theatre in which the war will take place, and this dictates a mobile war.

This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be mobile warfare, and important reliance must be placed on guerrilla tactics. Positional warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and ultimately of secondary strategic importance.

Geographically, the theatre of war is so vast that it is possible for us to pursue mobile warfare with the utmost efficiency and with a telling effect on a slow-moving war machine like Japan's cautiously feeling its way in front of fierce rear-guard actions. Deep-line concentration and the exhausting defence of a vital position or two on a narrow front would be to throw away all the tactical advantages of our geography and economic organization, and to repeat the mistake of the Ethiopians. Our strategy and tactics must aim to avoid great decisive battles in the early stages of the war, and gradually break the morale, fighting spirit, and military efficiency of the living forces of the enemy.

The mistake of the Ethiopians, quite aside from the internal political weakness of their position, was that they attempted to hold a deep front, enabling the fascists to bombard, gas, and strike with their technically stronger military machines at heavy immobile concentrations, exposing themselves to vital organic injury.

Besides the regular Chinese troops, we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of guerrilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy 24 hours a day and worry them to death.

It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communication, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

The process of the war will present to China the possibility of capturing many Japanese prisoners, arms, ammunition, war machines, and so on. A point will be reached where it will become more and more possible to engage Japan's armies on the basis of positional warfare, using fortifications, deep entrenchment, and so on, for, as the war progresses, the technical equipment of the anti-Japanese forces will greatly improve, and will be reinforced by important foreign aid. Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long expensive occupation of China, and the morale of its forces will break under the trial of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human resources in the Chinese people will still be pouring troops ready to fight for their freedom into our front lines long after the tidal wave of Japanese imperialism has wracked itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance.

All these and other factors will condition the war and will enable us to make the final and decisive attacks on Japan's fortifications and strategic bases and to drive Japan's army of occupation from China.⁶

The military provocation by the Japanese aggressors at Marco Polo Bridge and their occupation of Beijing and Tianjin represent only the beginning of their large-scale invasion of China south of the Great Wall. They have already begun their national mobilization for war. Their propaganda that they have «no desire to aggravate the situation» is only a smokescreen for further attacks.

The resistance at Marco Polo Bridge on the 7th of July marked the starting point of China's national War of Resistance.

Thus, a new stage has opened in China's political situation, the stage of actual resistance. The stage of preparation for resistance is over. In the present stage, the central task is to mobilize all the nation's forces for victory in the War of Resistance.

The key to victory in the war now lies in developing the resistance that has already begun into a war of total resistance by the whole nation. Only through such a war of total resistance can final victory be won.

The existence of serious weaknesses in the War of Resistance may lead to many setbacks, retreats, internal splits, betrayals, temporary and partial compromises, and other such reverses. Therefore, it should be realized that the war will be an arduous and protracted war. But we are confident that, through the efforts of our Party and the whole people, the resistance already started will sweep aside all obstacles and continue to advance and develop.

— Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Resolution on the Present Situation and the Party's Tasks (25th of August, 1937)

These are our conclusions. In the eyes of the subjugationists, our enemies are superhumans and we Chinese are worthless, while, in the eyes of the theorists of quick victory, we Chinese are superhumans and our enemies are worthless. Both are wrong. We take a different view: The War of Resistance Against Japan is a protracted war, and the final victory will be China's. These are our conclusions.

My lectures end here. The great War of Resistance Against Japan is unfolding, and many people are hoping for a summary of experience to facilitate the winning of complete victory. What I have discussed is simply the general experience of the past ten months, and it may perhaps serve as a kind of summary. The problem of protracted war deserves wide attention and discussion; what I have given is only an outline, which I hope you will examine and discuss, amend, and amplify.