Overcome the Danger of Capitulation and Strive for a Turn for the Better

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Overcome the Danger of Capitulation and Strive for a Turn for the Better has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: Overcome the Danger of Capitulation and Strive for a Turn for the Better, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 28th of January, 1940. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2 (1951).


#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#OVERCOME THE DANGER OF CAPITULATION AND STRIVE FOR A TURN FOR THE BETTER

#DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong
#28th of January, 1940

#

Current developments confirm the correctness of the Central Committee's appraisals. The line of capitulation taken by the big-landlord class and the big bourgeoisie runs sharply counter to the line of armed resistance taken by the proletariat, the peasantry, the urban small bourgeoisie, and the middle bourgeoisie, and there is a struggle between the two. Both lines exist at present, and one or the other can win out in the future. What all our Party comrades must realize in this connection is that the serious cases of capitulation, anti-Communism, and retrogression, which have occurred in various places, should not be viewed in isolation. We should realize their seriousness, combat them resolutely, and not be overwhelmed by their impact. If we lack this spirit and a correct policy for dealing firmly with these incidents, if we let the Right-wing Nationalists continue their «military and political restriction of the Communist Party», and are in constant dread at the thought of the breakup of the united front, then the War of Resistance will be jeopardized, capitulation and anti-Communism will spread throughout the country, and there will be a real danger of the breakup of the united front. But it must be made abundantly clear that many objective conditions favourable to our struggle for continued resistance, unity, and progress are still present both at home and abroad. For example, Japan's policy towards China remains as tough as ever; it is very difficult to rig up an East Asian Munich Conference, because there has been no real reconciliation between Japan, on the one hand, and Britain, the United States, and France, on the other, despite some lessening of the contradictions between them, and because the British and French positions in Asia have been weakened by the European war; and the Council Union is actively helping China. These are the international factors, which render it difficult for the Nationalist Party to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nationwide anti-Communist war. At home, the Communist Party and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are firmly opposing capitulation and upholding the policy of resistance and unity; the middle classes, too, are against capitulation; and the capitulators and the Right-wing elements within the Nationalist Party, though in power, are numerically a minority. These are the domestic factors, which render it difficult for the Nationalist Party to capitulate or compromise, or to launch a nationwide anti-Communist war. In these circumstances, our Party has a two-fold task. On the one hand, it must resolutely resist the military and political offensives of the capitulators and Right-wing elements. On the other, it must actively develop the united front of the political parties, the government bodies, the armed forces, the civilian population, and the intellectuals; it must do its utmost to win over the majority of the Nationalists, the middle classes, and the sympathizers in the armies fighting Japan, to deepen the mass movement, to win over the intellectuals, to consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas, expand the anti-Japanese armed forces and the bodies of anti-Japanese political power, and consolidate our Party and ensure its progress. If we do both these tasks simultaneously, we shall be able to overcome the danger of capitulation by the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie and to bring about a turn for the better in the whole situation. Therefore, the present general policy of the Party is to strive for a turn for the better and at the same time to be on guard against any emergencies (such emergencies, so far, being on a limited and local scale).

Now that Wang Jingwei has announced his traitorous pact1 and Jiang Jieshi has published his message to the nation, it is beyond doubt that the agitation for peace will suffer a setback and that the forces favouring resistance will grow; on the other hand, the «military and political restriction of the Communist Party» will continue, there will be more local incidents, and the Nationalist Party may stress so-called «unification against the foreign enemy» in order to attack us. The reason is that the forces supporting resistance and progress cannot build up enough strength in the immediate future to overwhelm the forces supporting capitulation and retrogression. Our policy is to spare no effort in extending the propaganda campaign against Wang Jingwei's traitorous pact in all parts of the country having Communist Party organizations. In his message, Jiang Jieshi states that he will carry on the War of Resistance, but he does not stress the need to strengthen national unity, nor does he mention any policy for persevering in resistance and progress, without which it would be impossible to persist in the war. Hence, in the campaign against Wang Jingwei, we should stress the following points:

  • First, support the national policy of waging the War of Resistance to the very end, and oppose Wang Jing's traitorous pact.
  • Second, the whole country must unite and overthrow the traitor Wang Jingwei and his puppet «Central Government».
  • Third, support Nationalist-Communist cooperation and crush Wang Jingwei's anti-Communist policy.
  • Fourth, down with the hidden traitors of the Wang Jingwei brand, anti-Communism being Wang Jingwei's plot for splitting the anti-Japanese united front.
  • Fifth, strengthen national unity and eliminate internal «friction».
  • Sixth, introduce political reforms, unfold the movement for constitutionalism, and institute democracy.
  • Seventh, lift the ban on political parties and grant legal status to anti-Japanese political parties and groups.
  • Eighth, guarantee the people freedom of speech and assembly in order to combat the Japanese and the traitors.
  • Ninth, consolidate the anti-Japanese base areas and oppose the disruptive plots of the Wang Jingwei brand of traitors.
  • Tenth, support the troops who are fighting really well in the war and give adequate supplies to the fronts.
  • Eleventh, promote cultural activities which help the cause of resistance, protect the progressive youth, and proscribe all expression of collaborationist views.

The above slogans should be widely publicized. Large numbers of articles, manifestos, leaflets, and pamphlets should be published and speeches delivered, and other slogans suitable to local circumstances should be added.

A mass rally to denounce Wang Jingwei's traitorous pact is scheduled to be held on the 1st of February in Yan'an. Together with the people of all circles and with the anti-Japanese members of the Nationalist Party, we should organize similar mass rallies in all areas in the early part or the middle of February in order to create a nationwide upsurge against capitulation, against the collaborators, and against «friction».


  1. Editor's Note: Wang Jingwei signed a traitorous secret pact, called the «Programme for Readjusting Sino-Japanese Relations», with the Japanese aggressors at the end of 1939. According to its main provisions: (1) North-eastern China was to be ceded to Japan, and «Mengguguo» (that is, what was at that time Suiyuan, Chaha'er, and northern Shanxi) were to be marked off as «zones for close Sino-Japanese collaboration», that is, as zones permanently occupied by Japanese troops. (2) From its central government down to the local governments, the puppet regime was to be under the supervision of Japanese advisors and officials. (3) The puppet troops and police were to be trained by Japanese military. (4) The puppet government's fiscal and economic policies, its industrial and agricultural enterprises, and its means of communication were to be controlled by Japan, and China's natural resources were to be freely exploited by Japan. (5) All anti-Japanese activities were to be prohibited.