The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: The Situation After the Repulse of the Second Anti-Communist Onslaught, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 2, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 18th of March, 1941. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 2, in 1951.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE SITUATION AFTER THE REPULSE OF THE SECOND ANTI-COMMUNIST ONSLAUGHT

#DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#18th of March, 1941

#★

#1

The second anti-Communist onslaught,¹ which was touched off by the telegram of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi (dated the 19th of October last year), reached its climax in the Southern Anhui Incident and Jiang Jieshi's Order of the 17th of January; the rearguard actions are his anti-Communist speech of the 6th of March and the anti-Communist resolution of the People's Political Council.² From now on, there may be some temporary easing of the situation. With the world's two major imperialist blocs on the eve of a decisive struggle, that faction of China's big bourgeoisie which is pro-British and pro-US and which is still opposed to the Japanese aggressors finds it necessary to seek a slight temporary relaxation in the present strained relations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party. Besides, the Nationalist Party cannot keep these relations strained to the pitch of the past five months, because of the situation within the Nationalist Party (there are contradictions between its central and local authorities, between the Central Club Clique and the Political Science Group, between the Central Club Clique and the Revival Society,³ and between the Right-wing and the Centrist factions, and also contradictions within the Central Club Clique and the Revival Society themselves), because of the domestic situation (the broad masses of the people are opposed to the Nationalist Party's tyranny and sympathize with the Communist Party) and because of our Party's own policy (of continuing the protest campaign). At the moment, therefore, Jiang Jieshi needs a slight temporary easing of the tension.

#2

The recent struggle points to a decline in the standing of the Nationalist Party and a rise in that of the Communist Party, and this is the key factor in certain changes that have occurred in the relative strength of the two political parties. All this has compelled Jiang Jieshi to reconsider his own standpoint and attitude. In stressing national defence and preaching that party politics are out of date, he is posing as a «national leader» who is above domestic contradictions and feigning impartiality to class and political party, his aim being to preserve the rule of the big landlord class and big bourgeoisie and the Nationalist Party. But this attempt of his will certainly prove futile, if it is only a subterfuge and means no real change in policy.

#3

At the beginning of the recent anti-Communist onslaught, the policy of conciliation and concession, which our Party adopted out of consideration for the general interest (as indicated in the telegram of the 9th of November last year) won the sympathy of the people, and we again won the support of the whole people when, after the Southern Anhui Incident, we turned to a vigorous counter-offensive (as indicated by our two sets of 12 demands,⁴ our refusal to attend the People's Political Council, and the countrywide protest campaign). This policy of ours, the policy of waging struggle on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint, was entirely necessary for repulsing the latest anti-Communist onslaught, and it has already proved fruitful. Until there is a reasonable settlement of the major points at issue between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, we must not show any slackening in our campaign of stern protest against the Southern Anhui Incident, which was engineered by the pro-Japanese and anti-Communist cliques in the Nationalist Party, and against their political and military oppression in all its forms, and must intensify our propaganda for the first 12 demands.

#4

The Nationalist Party will never relax its policy of oppression of our Party and other Left-wingers or its anti-Communist propaganda in the areas under its rule; therefore, our Party must heighten its vigilance. The Nationalist Party will continue its attacks on the areas north of the Huai River, in eastern Anhui, and in central Hubei, and our armed forces must not hesitate to repulse them. All base areas must strictly carry out the Central Committee's directive of the 25th of December last year,⁵ intensify inner-Party education on tactics, and rectify «Far Left» views, so that we can unfalteringly maintain the anti-Japanese democratic base areas. Throughout the country, including, of course, all the base areas, we must reject the erroneous estimate that a final split between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party has either already occurred or is about to occur, together with the many incorrect views arising therefrom.