Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: Strategy for the Second Year of the War of Liberation, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is an inner-Party directive drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in Zhuguanzhai, Jiaxian, Shaanxi, China on the 1st of September, 1947. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

The directive formulated the fundamental task for the second year of the War of Liberation. This task was to carry the war into the Nationalist areas with the people's main forces and to switch from fighting on interior lines to fighting on exterior lines, that is, to pass from the stage of the strategic defensive to that of the strategic offensive. In accordance with the strategic plan laid down by Comrade Mao Zedong, the People's Liberation Army went over to the offensive on a countrywide scale during July-September 1947. The Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army forced the Yellow River in south-western Shandong on the 30th of June, crossed the Longhai Railway early in August and thrust into the Dabie Mountains. The Taiyue Army of the Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan Field Army forced the Yellow River from southern Shanxi in late August and thrust into western Henan. The Eastern China Field Army thrust into south.western Shandong early in September after smashing a concentrated attack by the enemy. In the same month the Shandong Army of the Eastern China Field Army started an offensive against the enemy in eastern Shandong. The North-Western Field Army went over to the offensive late in August. The Shanxi-Chaha'er-Hebei Field Army started an offensive against the enemy along the northern section of the Beijing-Hankou Railway early in September. Immediately after its summer offensive throughout the North-East, the North-Eastern Field Army, beginning in September, launched a large-scale autumn offensive in the Changchun-Jilin-Sipingjie region and in the Jinxi-Yixian sector along the Beijing-Liaoning Railway. The offensives in all these theatres of war constituted a general offensive by the entire People's Liberation Army. This large-scale offensive led to a turning point in the War of Liberation, marking a radical change in the war situation.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#STRATEGY FOR THE SECOND YEAR OF THE WAR OF LIBERATION

#DIRECTIVE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA

#Mao Zedong

#1st of September, 1947

#★

#1

In the first year's fighting (from July last year to June this year), we wiped out 97 1/2 regular brigades, or 780'000 troops, and puppet troops, peace-preservation corps, and others totaling 340'000 — altogether 1'120'000 of the enemy. This was a great victory. It dealt the enemy a heavy blow, created profound defeatism in the whole enemy camp, elated the people throughout the country, and laid the foundation for the complete annihilation of the enemy by our army and for final victory.

#2

In the first year's fighting, the enemy launched a large-scale offensive against the Liberated Areas, using 218 of their 248 regular brigades, or more than 1'600'000 troops, and nearly 1'000'000 troops from the special arms (navy, air force, artillery, engineer corps, and armoured units) and from the puppet troops, communications police corps, and peace-preservation corps. Our army rightly adopted the strategy of fighting on interior lines, and in order to hold the initiative at all times and places, it did not balk at paying the price of over 300'000 casualties and of enemy occupation of large tracts of territory. Consequently, we succeeded in wiping out 1'120'000 enemy troops, forced the enemy to disperse their troops, tempered and strengthened our own forces, launched strategic counter-offensives in the North-East, Rehe, eastern Hebei, southern Shanxi, and northern Henan, recovered large territories, and liberated vast new areas.¹

#3

In the second year of fighting, our army's fundamental task is to launch a countrywide counter-offensive, that is, to use our main forces to fight our way to exterior lines, carry the war into the Nationalist areas, wipe out large numbers of the enemy on the exterior lines, and completely wreck the Nationalist Party's counter-revolutionary strategy, which is, on the contrary, to continue to carry the war into the Liberated Areas, further damage and drain our human and material resources, and make it impossible for us to hold out very long. In the second year's fighting, a partial task of our army is to use a portion of our main forces and large numbers of our regional troops to continue fighting on interior lines, wipe out the enemy there, and recover lost territory.

#4

Our army will of course meet many difficulties in carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines and bringing the war into the Nationalist areas. For it takes time to build new bases in the Nationalist areas and we can build stable bases only when we have wiped out large numbers of the enemy in many back-and-forth mobile operations, mobilized the masses, distributed land, established our political power, and built up the people's armed forces. Until then, there will be quite a few difficulties. But they can and must be overcome. For the enemy will be forced to spread out even more, and vast territories will be available to our army as battlefields for mobile operations, and so we will be able to wage mobile warfare; the broad masses in those territories hate the Nationalist Party and support us; and though part of the enemy forces still has a comparatively high combat effectiveness, on the whole, the enemy's morale and combat effectiveness are much lower than a year ago.

#5

The keys to victory in fighting in the Nationalist areas are, first, to be good at seizing the opportunities for fighting, to be brave and determined, and to win as many battles as possible; and, second, to carry out resolutely the policy of winning the masses and enable the broad masses to benefit, so that they side with our army. If these two points are carried out, we shall win victory.

#6

Up to the end of August this year, the distribution of enemy forces, including those which had been wiped out or dealt crushing blows, was 157 brigades on the southern front, 70 on the northern front, and 21 in the Nationalist rear areas. The total in the whole country was still 248 brigades and the actual number of troops was about 1'500'000. Troops in the special arms, puppet troops, communications police, and peace-preservation corps numbered about 1'200'000. Non-combatants in the military institutions in the enemy rear were about 1'000'000. The entire enemy forces totaled about 3'700'000 troops. Of the troops on the southern front, 117 brigades belong to Gu Zhutong's group, seven to Cheng Qian's group and others, and 33 to Hu Zongnan's group. Of the 117 brigades of Gu Zhutong's group, 63 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows. Of these, some have not been replenished; others, although they are being replenished, have few troops and low combat effectiveness; and others, although their troops and arms have been fairly well replenished and their combat effectiveness has to some extent been restored, are still far weaker than before. There are only 54 brigades which have neither been wiped out nor received crushing blows. Of Gu Zhutong's entire forces, 82 to 85 brigades are employed for garrison duty and can be used only for local manoeuvres, and no more than 32 to 35 brigades can be used for strategic manoeuvres. The seven brigades of Cheng Qian's group and others can in the main be used only for garrison duty, and one has already received a crushing blow. Of the 33 brigades of Hu Zongnan's group (including those east of Lanzhou, south of Ningxia and Yulin, and west of Linfen and Luoyang), 12 have been wiped out or received crushing blows, only seven can be used for strategic manoeuvres, and the rest are on garrison duty. On the northern front, the enemy has 70 brigades altogether. Of these, the North-Eastern group has 26 brigades, of which 16 have been wiped out or have received crushing blows; Sun Lianzhong's group has 19 brigades, of which eight have been wiped out or received crushing blows; Fu Zuoyi has ten brigades, of which two have received crushing blows; and Yan Xishan has 15 brigades, of which nine have been wiped out or received crushing blows. These enemy troops are now mainly on the defensive and only a small part is available for mobile operations. In the Nationalist rear areas, there are only 21 brigades on garrison duty. Of these, eight brigades are in Xinjiang and western Gansu, seven in Sichuan and Xikang, two in Yunnan, two in Guangdong (that is, the 69th Division that was wiped out), and two in Taiwan. There are no regular troops at all in the six provinces of Hunan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi. The Nationalist Party is planning, with US assistance, to draft 1'000'000 troops this year to replenish the front and to train a number of new brigades and replacement regiments. However, if our army can wipe out an average of eight enemy brigades a month, as it did in the first year of fighting, and wipe out another 96 to 100 brigades in the second year (already in July and August, 16 1/2 brigades were wiped out), then the enemy army will be further and greatly weakened, its strategic reserve will be reduced to the minimum, and it will be forced into a defensive position in all parts of the country and will be attacked by us everywhere. Although the Nationalist Party has this plan of drafting 1'000'000 troops and training new brigades and replacement regiments, it will be of no avail. Since its only methods of recruiting are press-ganging and hiring, to reach 1'000'000 will certainly be difficult, and many will desert. Moreover, by carrying out the policy of fighting on exterior lines, our army will be able to reduce the enemy's human and material resources.

#7

The operational principles of our army are still the same as those laid down before:

• Attack dispersed, isolated enemy forces first (this applies also to a large-scale campaign of annihilation directed against several brigades, such as the Laiwu Campaign² in February and the South-Western Shandong Campaign³ in July this year); attack concentrated, strong enemy forces later.
• Take middle and small cities and extensive rural areas first; take big cities later.
• Make wiping out the enemy's effective strength our main objective; do not make holding or seizing a place our main objective. Holding or seizing a place is the outcome of wiping out the enemy's effective strength, and often a place can be held or seized for good only after it has changed hands a number of times.
• In every battle, concentrate an absolutely superior force, encircle the enemy forces completely, strive to wipe them out thoroughly, and do not let any escape from the net. In special circumstances, use the method of dealing crushing blows to the enemy, that is, concentrate all our strength to make a frontal attack and also to attack one or both of their flanks, with the aim of wiping out one part and routing another, so that our army can swiftly move its troops to smash other enemy forces.
• On the one hand, be sure to fight no battle unprepared, fight no battle you are not sure of winning; make every effort to be well prepared for each battle, make every effort to ensure victory in the given set of conditions as between the enemy and ourselves. On the other hand, give full play to our fine style of fighting — courage in battle, no fear of sacrifice, no fear of fatigue, and continuous fighting (that is, fighting successive battles in a short time).
• Strive to draw the enemy into mobile warfare, but at the same time, lay great stress on learning the tactics of positional attack and on stepping up the building of the artillery and engineer corps, in order to capture enemy fortified points and cities on a large scale.
• Resolutely attack and seize all fortified points and cities which are weakly defended. Attack and seize at opportune moments all fortified points and cities defended with moderate strength, provided circumstances permit. For the time being, leave alone all fortified points and cities which are strongly defended.
• Replenish our strength with all the arms and most of the soldiers captured from the enemy (80 to 90% of the soldiers and a small number of the junior officers). Seek replenishment chiefly from the enemy and from the Nationalist areas and only partly from the old Liberated Areas; this applies especially to the armies on the southern front.

In all the new and old Liberated Areas, we must resolutely carry through the land reform (which is the most fundamental requirement for supporting a long war and winning countrywide victory), develop production, practise economy, and strengthen the building of war industry — all for victory at the front. Only by doing this can we support a long war and win victory in the whole country. If we do so, we shall certainly be able to support a protracted war and win victory throughout the country.

#8

The above sums up the year's fighting and puts forward the principles for future fighting. Leading comrades in all areas are requested to pass the contents on to all cadres of regimental rank and above, of the level of prefectural Party committee and above, and of the level of prefectural commissioner's office and above, so that everyone will understand their own task and carry it out resolutely and unwaveringly.