Tactical Problems of Rural Work in the New Liberated Areas
#PUBLICATION NOTE
This edition of Tactical Problems of Rural Work in the New Liberated Areas has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:
- Tactical Problems of Rural Work in the New Liberated Areas, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
- Telegram to Comrade Deng Xiaoping on the Tactical Problems in Work in the Newly Liberated Areas, in Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 10, Routledge, New York and London, 2023.
#INTRODUCTION NOTE
This is a telegram from Comrade Mao Zedong in Xibaipo, Pingshan, Hebei, China to Deng Xiaoping dated the 24th of May, 1948. It was first published by the Huazhong Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in October 1949.
#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!
#TACTICAL PROBLEMS OF RURAL WORK IN THE NEW LIBERATED AREAS
#TELEGRAM TO DENG XIAOPING
#Mao Zedong
#24th of May, 1948
#★
According to the results of the discussion here with Chen Yi, Su Yu, Li Xiannian, and Bo Yibo, we think that it is necessary to give overall consideration to the tactical problems of rural work in the new Liberated Areas. In these areas, we must make full use of the experience gained in the period of the War of Resistance Against Japan; for a considerable period after their liberation, we should apply the social policy of reducing rent and interest and properly adjusting the supplies of seed and food grains and the financial policy of reasonable distribution of burdens; we should aim our main blows only at the important counter-revolutionaries who side politically with the Nationalist Party and stubbornly oppose our Party and our army, just as we only arrested the traitors and confiscated their property during the period of the War of Resistance, and we should not immediately apply the social reform policy of distributing movable property and land. The reason is that only a few bolder elements would welcome the premature distribution of movable property and that the lowest masses would not get anything and would therefore be dissatisfied. Moreover, hasty dispersal of social wealth is to the disadvantage of the army. Premature distribution of land would prematurely place the entire burden of military requirements on the peasants instead of on the landlords and rich peasants. In the sphere of social reform, it is better not to distribute movable property and land, but instead to reduce rent and interest universally, so that the peasants will receive tangible benefits, and in financial policy, we should effect a reasonable distribution of burdens, so that the landlords and rich peasants will pay more. In this way, social wealth will not be dispersed and public order will be comparatively stable, and this will help us concentrate all our forces on destroying the Nationalist reactionaries. After one, two, or even three years, when the Nationalist reactionaries have been wiped out in extensive base areas, when conditions have become stable, when the masses have mobilized and organized themselves, and when the war has moved far away, we can enter the stage of land reform — the distribution of movable property and land as in northern China. We believe that the stage of rent and interest reduction cannot be skipped in any new Liberated Area, and we shall make mistakes if we skip it. The above tactics must also be carried out in those parts of the large Liberated Areas in northern, north-eastern, and north-western China which border on enemy territory. In addition, the slogan, «Open the granaries to relieve the poor», is also detrimental to the army. It can only be implemented temporarily in and around the big cities whose garrisons are preparing to retreat, and it should not be widely applied.