The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Political Problems and the Tasks of the Border Area Party Organization has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following editions:

• Why Is It That Red Political Power Can Exist in China?, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 1, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.
• Mao's Road to Power, First English Edition, Vol. 3, M.E. Sharpe, Armonk, 1995.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a resolution drafted by Comrade Mao Zedong for the Second Congress of the Communist Party of China in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area at Mount Buyun, Ninggang, Jiangxi, China on the 5th of October, 1928. It was first published in full in The Revolutionary Base Area in the Jinggang Mountains, Vol. 1, 1987.

#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND THE TASKS OF THE BORDER AREA PARTY ORGANIZATION

#RESOLUTION OF THE SECOND CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA IN THE HUNAN-JIANGXI BORDER AREA

#Mao Zedong

#5th of October, 1928

#★

#1. WHY IS IT THAT COUNCIL POWER CAN EXIST IN CHINA?

#1.1. THE POLITICAL SITUATION

The present regime of the new warlords of the Nationalist Party of China remains a regime of the comprador class in the cities and the feudal class in the countryside; it is a regime which has capitulated to imperialism in its foreign relations and which at home has replaced the old warlords with new ones, subjecting the working class and the peasantry to an even more ruthless economic exploitation and political oppression The bourgeois-democratic revolution which started in Guangdong Province had gone only halfway when the comprador and feudal classes usurped the leadership and immediately shifted it on to the road of counter-revolution; throughout the country, the workers, the peasants, the other sections of the common people, and even the bourgeoisie¹ have remained under counter-revolutionary rule and obtained not the slightest particle of political or economic emancipation.

Before their capture of Beijing and Tianjin, the four cliques of the new Nationalist warlords — Jiang Jieshi, the Guangxi warlords, Feng Yuxiang, and Yan Xishan² — formed a temporary alliance against Zhang Zuolin.³ As soon as these cities were captured, this alliance broke up, giving way to bitter struggle among the four cliques, and now a war is brewing between the Jiang and the Guangxi cliques. The contradictions and struggles among the cliques of warlords in China reflect the contradictions and struggles among the imperialist powers. Hence, as long as China is divided among the imperialist powers, the various cliques of warlords cannot under any circumstances come to terms, and whatever compromises they may reach will only be temporary. A temporary compromise today engenders a bigger war tomorrow.

China is in urgent need of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and this revolution can be completed only under the leadership of the proletariat. Because the proletariat failed to exercise firm leadership in the revolution of 1926-27, which started from Guangdong and spread toward the Yangzi River, leadership was seized by the comprador and feudal classes, and the revolution was replaced by counter-revolution. The bourgeois-democratic revolution thus met with a temporary defeat. Broadly speaking, this defeat was similar to that of the Russian revolution in 1905. This defeat was a heavy blow to the Chinese proletariat and peasantry, and also a blow to the Chinese bourgeoisie (but not to the comprador and feudal classes). Yet, in the last few months, both in the North and in the South, there has been a growth of organized strikes by the workers in the cities and of armed uprisings by the peasants in the countryside under the leadership of the Communist Party. Hunger and cold are creating great unrest among the soldiers of the warlord armies. Meanwhile, urged on by the clique headed by Wang Jingwei and Chen Gongbo, the bourgeoisie is promoting a reform movement of considerable proportions⁴ in the coastal areas and along the Yangzi River. This is a new development; as regards its nature, it is part of the democratic revolution China urgently needs.

According to the directives of the Communist International and the Central Committee of our Party, the content of China's democratic revolution consists in overthrowing the rule of imperialism and its warlord tools in China, so as to complete the national revolution, and in carrying out the agrarian revolution, so as to eliminate the feudal exploitation of the peasants by the feudal class. Such a revolutionary movement has been growing day by day since the Ji'nan Massacre⁵ in May 1928.

The situation in China has undergone tremendous changes in the last few months, and the same is true of the international situation. Since the two developments represented by Japan's invasion of China and the signing of the naval treaty between Britain and France have taken place, the United States, on the one hand, and Britain, France, and Japan, on the other, have found themselves polarized in positions of irreconcilable opposition. The present international situation is that, on questions touching China and Europe, the United States has adopted a policy of active intervention, while Britain, France, and Japan have adopted a policy of active resistance. Thus, a world war is brewing, and its outbreak is merely a matter of time.

#1.2. REASONS FOR THE EMERGENCE AND SURVIVAL OF COUNCIL POWER IN CHINA⁶

The long-term survival inside a country of one or more small areas under Council Power completely encircled by a White regime is a phenomenon that has never occurred anywhere else in the world. There are special reasons for this unusual phenomenon. It can exist and develop only under certain conditions.

First, it cannot occur in any imperialist country or in any colony under direct imperialist rule,⁷ but can only occur in China, which is economically backward, and which is semi-colonial and under indirect imperialist rule. For this unusual phenomenon can occur only in conjunction with another unusual phenomenon, namely, war within the White regime. It is a feature of semi-colonial China that, since the first year of the Republic (1912), the various cliques of old and new warlords have waged incessant wars against one another, supported by imperialism from abroad and by the comprador and feudal classes at home. Such a phenomenon is to be found in none of the imperialist countries nor for that matter in any colony under direct imperialist rule, but only in a country like China, which is under indirect imperialist rule. Two things account for its occurrence, namely: a localized agricultural economy (not a unified capitalist economy), and the imperialist policy of marking off spheres of influence in order to divide and exploit. The prolonged splits and wars within the White regime provide a condition for the emergence and persistence of one or more small Red areas under the leadership of the Communist Party amidst the encirclement of the White regime. The independent regime carved out on the borders of Hunan and Jiangxi Provinces is one of many such small areas. In difficult or critical times, some comrades often have doubts about the survival of the Council Power and become pessimistic. The reason is that they have not found the correct explanation for its emergence and survival. If only we realize that splits and wars will never cease within the White regime in China, we shall have no doubts about the emergence, survival, and daily growth of the Council Power.

Second, the regions where China's Council Power has first emerged and is able to last for a long time have not been those unaffected by the democratic revolution, such as Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, and the northern provinces, but regions such as the provinces of Hunan, Guangdong, Hubei, and Jiangxi, where the masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers rose up in great numbers in the course of the bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1926 and '27. In many parts of these provinces, trade unions and peasant associations were formed on a wide scale, and many economic and political struggles were waged by the working class and the peasantry against the feudal class and the bourgeoisie. This is why the people held political power for three days in the city of Guangzhou and why independent regimes of peasants emerged in Haifeng and Lufeng, in eastern and southern Hunan, in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, and in Huang'an, Hubei Province.⁸ As for the present Red Army, it is a split-off from the National Revolutionary Army which underwent democratic political training and came under the influence of the masses of workers and peasants. The elements that make up the Red Army cannot possibly come from armies like those of Yan Xishan and Zhang Zuolin, which have not received any democratic political training or come under the influence of the workers and peasants.

Third, whether it is possible for the people's political power in small areas to last depends on whether the nationwide revolutionary situation continues to develop. If it does, then the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will, moreover, inevitably become one of the many forces for winning nationwide political power. If the nationwide revolutionary situation does not continue to develop, but stagnates for a fairly long time, as in the case of Russia from 1905 to '17, then it will be impossible for the small Red areas to last long. Actually, the revolutionary situation in China is continuing to develop with the continuous splits and wars within the ranks of the comprador and feudal classes and of the international bourgeoisie. Therefore, the small Red areas will undoubtedly last for a long time, and will also continue to expand and gradually approach the goal of conquering political power throughout the country.

Fourth, the existence of a regular Red Army of adequate strength is a necessary condition for the existence of the Council Power. If we have local Red Guards⁹ only, but no regular Red Army, then we cannot cope with the regular White forces, but only with the feudal lords' levies. Therefore, even when the masses of workers and peasants are active, it is definitely impossible to create an independent regime, let alone an independent regime which is durable and grows daily, unless we have regular forces of adequate strength. It follows that the idea of «establishing independent regimes of the workers and the peasants by armed force» is an important one, which must be fully grasped by the Communist Party and by the masses of workers and peasants in areas under the independent regime.

Fifth, another important condition in addition to the above is required for the prolonged existence and development of the Council Power, namely, that the Communist Party organization should be strong and its policy correct.

#1.3. THE INDEPENDENT REGIME IN THE HUNAN-JIANGXI BORDER AREA AND THE AUGUST DEFEAT

Splits and wars among the warlords weaken the power of the White regime. Thus opportunities are provided for the rise of the Council Power in small areas. But fighting among the warlords does not go on every day. Whenever the White regime in one or more provinces enjoys temporary stability, the ruling classes there inevitably combine and do their utmost to destroy the Council Power. In areas where all the necessary conditions for its establishment and persistence are not fulfilled, the Council Power is in danger of being overthrown by the enemy. This is the reason why many Red regimes emerging at favourable moments before last April in places like Guangzhou, Haifeng, and Lufeng, the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, southern Hunan, Liling, and Huang'an were crushed one after another by the White regime. From April onward, the independent regime in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area was confronted with a temporarily stable ruling power in the south, and Hunan and Jiangxi would usually dispatch eight, nine, or more regiments — sometimes as many as 18 — to «suppress» us. Yet, with a force of less than four regiments, we fought the enemy for four long months, daily enlarging the territory under our independent regime, deepening the agrarian revolution, extending the organizations of the people's political power, and expanding the Red Army and the Red Guards. This was possible, because the policies of the Communist Party organizations (local and army) in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area were correct. The policies of the Border Area Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party were then as follows:

• Struggle resolutely against the enemy, set up political power in the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountain Range,¹⁰ and oppose flightism.
• Deepen the agrarian revolution in areas under the independent regime.
• Promote the development of the local Party organization with the help of the army Party organization, and promote the development of the local armed forces with the help of the regular army.
• Concentrate the Red Army units in order to fight the enemy confronting them when the time is opportune, and oppose the division of forces, so as to avoid being destroyed one by one.
• Adopt the policy of advancing in a series of waves to expand the area under the independent regime, and oppose the policy of expansion by adventurist advance.

Thanks to these proper tactics, to a terrain favourable to our struggle, and to the inadequate coordination between the troops invading from Hunan and those invading from Jiangxi, we were able to win a number of victories in the four months from April to July. Although several times stronger than we, the enemy was unable to prevent the constant expansion of our regime, let alone to destroy it, and our regime tended to exert an ever-growing influence on Hunan and Jiangxi. The sole reason for the August defeat was that, failing to realize that the period was one of temporary stability for the ruling classes, some comrades adopted a strategy suited to a period of political splits within the ruling classes and divided our forces for an adventurous advance, thus causing defeat both in the border area and in southern Hunan. Comrade Du Xiujing, the representative of the Hunan Provincial Committee, failed to grasp the actual situation and disregarded the resolutions of the joint meeting of the Special Committee, the Army Committee and the Yongxin County Committee of the Party; he just mechanically enforced the order of the Hunan Provincial Committee and echoed the views of the Red Army's 29th Regiment, which wanted to evade struggle and return home, and his mistake was exceedingly grave. The situation arising from this defeat was salvaged as a result of the corrective measures taken by the Special Committee and the Army Committee of the Party after September.

#1.4. THE ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT REGIME OF THE HUNAN-JIANGXI BORDER AREA IN HUNAN, HUBEI, AND JIANGXI

The significance of the armed independent regime of workers and peasants in the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Area, with Ninggang as its centre, is definitely not confined to the few counties in the Border Area; this regime will play an immense role in the process of the conquest of political power in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi through the uprising of the workers and peasants in these three provinces. The following are tasks of great importance for the Party in the Border Area in connection with the uprisings unfolding in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi:

• First, extend the influence of the agrarian revolution and of the people's political power in the Border Area to the lower reaches of the rivers in Hunan and Jiangxi and as far as Hubei.
• Second, constantly expand the Red Army and enhance its quality through struggle, so that it can fulfil its mission in the coming general uprising of the three provinces.
• Third, enlarge the local armed forces in the counties, that is, the Red Guards and the workers' and peasants' uprising detachments, and enhance their quality, so that they are able to fight the feudal lords' levies and small armed units now and safeguard the political power of the Border Area in the future.
• Fourth, gradually reduce the extent to which local work is dependent on the assistance of the Red Army personnel, so that the Border Area will have its own personnel to take charge of the work and even provide personnel for the Red Army and the expanded territory of the independent regime.

#1.5. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

The shortage of necessities and cash has become a very big problem for the army and the people inside the White encirclement. Because of the tight enemy blockade, necessities such as salt, cloth, and medicines have been very scarce and expensive all through the past year in the independent Border Area, which has upset, sometimes to an acute degree, the lives of the masses of the workers, peasants, and small bourgeois,¹¹ as well as of the soldiers of the Red Army. The Red Army has to fight the enemy and to provision itself at one and the same time. It even lacks funds to pay the daily food allowance of 5 cents per person, which is provided in addition to grain; the soldiers are undernourished, many are ill, and the wounded in the hospitals are worse off. Such difficulties are of course unavoidable before the nationwide conquest of political power; yet there is a pressing need to overcome them to some extent, to make life somewhat easier, and especially to secure more adequate supplies for the Red Army. Unless the Party in the Border Area can find proper ways to deal with economic problems, the independent regime will have great difficulties during the comparatively long period in which the enemy's rule will remain stable. An adequate solution of these economic problems undoubtedly merits the attention of every Party member.

#1.6. THE PROBLEM OF MILITARY BASES

The Party in the Border Area has another task, namely, the consolidation of the military bases at Five Wells¹² and Jiulong. The Five Wells mountain area at the juncture of Yongxin, Lingxian, Ninggang, and Suichuan Counties, and the Jiulong mountain area at the juncture of Yongxin, Ninggang, Chaling, and Lianhua Counties, both of which have topographical advantages, are important military bases, not only for the Border Area at present, but also for uprisings in Hunan, Hubei, and Jiangxi in the future, and this is particularly true of Five Wells, where we have the support of the people as well as a terrain that is especially difficult and strategically important. The way to consolidate these bases is: first, to construct adequate defences; second, to store sufficient grain; and, third, to set up comparatively good Red Army hospitals. The Party in the Border Area must strive to perform these three tasks effectively.

#2. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARTY IN THE COUNTIES OF THE BORDER AREA AND SOME RECOMMENDATIONS

The Special Committee of the Border Area was founded only four months ago. During this short period of time, it has done a great deal in leading the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in tasks such as carrying out the agrarian revolution, establishing the Council Power, and striking devastating blows at the old society. Nevertheless, because of the rural economic environment of the Border Area, because the Party's history is very short, and because there have been very few independent struggles (since there is the Red Army to rely on), the tendency toward a peasants' party marked by an opportunist heritage is frightfully apparent in every Party branch at all levels in the Border Area. It is an important responsibility of every Party branch from now on to point out all the past errors within the Party, eliminate the evil legacy of opportunism within the Party, reform the Party branches at all levels, and cause the Party to take the road of true proletarian leadership.

The Party has not yet been set up in Youxian. The influence of the Party in the other counties can only reach most or part of those counties. Special district committees have not been set up, nor has the Party extended its influence to the broad masses in every direction. Hence, it is also an important responsibility of Party branches in the Border Area from now on to set up a Party branch in Youxian and special district committees in every county, and establish a foundation for the Party in every county.

#2.1. THE PARTY'S PAST MISTAKES

In the past, the evil legacy of opportunism has been excessively strong in the Party in every county, and we have relied on the army rather than leading an independent mass struggle. This has been a very great error.

In the past, the Party in every county has strongly marked characteristics of a peasants' party, and showed a tendency to evolve toward non-proletarian leadership. The Party in Yongxin wanted to break away publicly from the Special Committee and set up an «independent kingdom». The other counties, such as Ninggang, Lingxian, Lianhua, and so on, also paid no attention to reporting to the Special Committee and thereby forming a connection with it. These were all serious organizational errors.

In the past, in the early period, the Party bodies were all individual dictatorships, autocracies of the Party secretary; there was no collective leadership nor democratic spirit whatsoever. For instance, Mao Zedong was the only member of the Special Committee, and Liu Zhen was the only member of the Yongxin County Party Committee. In practice, this led to the error that the masses knew only the individual, but not the Party. This is absolutely not a Majoritarian Party. Although this mistake was forcefully pointed out at the August 1928 Emergency Conference, and there are always three Standing Committee members supervising the work of the Special Committee, it is still impossible to set up the various departments and the Secretariat, because of the shortage of personnel. In addition, many people working for the Special Committee are ill. Policy is constantly changing, the relation between the various county Party committees and the Special Committee cannot become intimate, and, as a result, the Special Committee itself opposes the directives from the general headquarters at various levels, and has not tried its best to carry out the decisions of the Emergency Conference.

Most of the leading bodies are headed by small-bourgeois intellectuals, and not enough attention is paid to promoting people of worker and peasant origin to serve on the leading bodies.

In the expansion of the Party organization in the past, attention was paid exclusively to quantitative development, rather to improving the quality. Party and class were not clearly distinguished, and press-ganging was the only method of recruitment employed. This will ruin the Party organization, and, as a result, the Party will become incapable of struggle.

In the past, the Party neglected the grassroots organization — the branch.

In the past, the Party's methods of work were wrong. The authority for dealing with every problem concerning the Party should be concentrated in the Standing Committee, and in the Organizational Department, the Propaganda Department, and so on, which are, after all, the technical departments of the Standing Committee. In the Party in the Border Area, however, not only is authority not concentrated in the Standing Committee, but there is not even an Organizational Department. It is merely a matter of the autocracy of the Party secretary. After the August 1928 Emergency Conference, things in the Special Committee itself and in the Yongxin County Party Committee improved a bit (all work is decided by the Standing Committee). The Party organizations at various levels below the Special Committee, however, still suffer from the same defects and have not corrected these errors at all.

In the past, the Party in the various counties of the Border Area paid much too little attention to secret work, to the point where quite a large number of Party members did not understand secret work. When conquering political power, they made everything public; when they lost political power, they would simply «lie in ambush».

In our past work, the upper levels were always separated from the lower levels, and the upper levels did not satisfactorily inspect and supervise the lower levels. The Party only paid attention to the work in the various bodies, and committed the error of separating itself from the masses.

In the past, the Party paid very little attention to the work in the urban areas and to the labour movement.

In the past, the Special Committee only paid attention to military dispositions, for example, to the work in the two counties of Ninggang and Yongxin. It did not take account of the whole, to the extent that it became a subsidiary of the army. If the army conquered a certain county, it would begin to pay attention to the work there; if the army did not reach a certain county, the work in that county would be ignored.

In the past, the Party slighted the work of the Communist Youth League to an extreme degree, or even displayed a tendency to liquidate the Youth League.

#2.2. TRANSFORMING AND BUILDING THE PARTY FROM NOW ON

The Party must be thoroughly transformed, starting with the transformation of the branches, eliminating opportunist leadership both in organization and in policy.

The Special Committee and the county committees should each have at least four inspectors. They should regularly guide the work at the lower levels, and aid in the transformation of Party organizations at all levels.

Do your utmost to promote as many worker comrades as possible to leading bodies. Executive committees and standing bodies at every level should have more than half worker and peasant comrades participating. In promoting worker and peasant elements, we should pay special attention to the significance of education.

The Party bodies at all levels must be fully organized, and individual leadership must be opposed. All authority should be concentrated in the standing committees, while the various departments are the technical bodies.

In the course of transforming the Party, we must adopt a completely proletarian standpoint. We must make the utmost efforts to pay attention to discussing and carrying out the Party's new policies. We must resolutely distance ourselves from the small-bourgeois, individualist, independent-minded, and romanticist elements in the Party's past, and be strictly on guard against the tendency to form «independent kingdoms».

The Party should extend democratization to the highest possible degree. Every policy should be discussed enthusiastically and understood thoroughly by the Party members, so that the masses of Party members will be able to establish their work plans in accordance with Party policy. Party committee members as well as secretaries at all levels should be chosen by the method of elections.

Party members should be progressive, conscious, loyal, and courageous poor peasants and workers; strict limits should be set on small-bourgeois elements, intellectuals, and rich peasants.

In the development of the Party, special attention should be paid to quality. When introducing Party members, the sponsors should do a lot of propaganda work toward, and investigation work about, those being introduced. Whenever a new comrade is introduced, they should be approved at a Party branch meeting, and then endorsed by the district committee. We oppose the press-gang method of recruiting Party members. We must make sure that every Party member is a proletarian fighter. The Party organization must not seek to become universal, but should rather pay special attention to creating the basis for a strong Party in the central districts.

The Party should pay attention to its grassroots organization — the branch — and put into practice the slogan: «In the final instance, all of our work depends on the Party branch.» At the same time, special attention should be paid to branch work in the urban areas, and excellent worker comrades should also be promoted to become Party branch secretaries and committee members in the rural areas, so as to increase the leadership capacity of the workers and be strictly on guard against the tendency toward a peasants' party. We must choose progressive elements among the Party members in the rural areas and give them special education, so as to prepare them to become the backbone of the Party.

The Party organization should be absolutely underground. Every Party member in every Party organization at every level should make the utmost effort to pay attention to secret work. We oppose relying on military and political power to organize the Party. The Party should be organized underground within the areas controlled by the enemy; flightism and «lying in ambush» should be opposed.

The Special Committee should pay the utmost attention to the soundness of its own organization, as well as that of every county committee. The Youxian County Committee should be set up at once, and there should be overall arrangements for the Party's work in each and every one of the counties in the Border Area.

«Iron discipline» is the primary trait of a Majoritarian Party. Only in this way can we prevent the Party from taking a non-proletarian road. Only by wiping out opportunists and eliminating corrupt elements who refuse to fight can we gather together the strength of the revolutionary progressive elements and unite them around the Party, so that the Party will be strongly consolidated and march in step to become a powerful fighting organization. Only thus can we enhance the leadership capacity of the proletariat. Consequently, the strict application of discipline is an important task in transforming and building the Party's central bodies.

#2.3. THE QUESTION OF THE WORK IN THE DIFFERENT COUNTIES

It is the responsibility of the Special Committee to discuss a detailed plan for the work in every county.

#2.4. THE QUESTION OF THE STRUGGLE IN THE RURAL AREAS

In the past, the struggle in the rural areas did not carry out the agrarian revolution at all resolutely. The so-called redistribution of the land wholly failed to satisfy the thoroughgoing demands of the impoverished farmworkers. Instead, it was an equal distribution based on the compromising standpoint of the rich, middle, and poor peasants. This is a great mistake which has been made in the past.

In the past, while carrying out the agrarian revolution, we entirely failed to impose a severe Red terror, and to massacre the landlords and evil gentry as well as their lackeys (this was done somewhat better in Lianhua and Chaling).

In the past, under the Council Power in the rural areas, we largely neglected the class struggle between the rich, middle, and poor peasants in the countryside. As a result, there was no unity and strength of the poor peasants under the White terror, the rich peasants defected, and the middle peasants wavered.

Our overall strategy in the rural struggles from now on is: unite the poor peasants; pay attention to the middle peasants; plunge into the agrarian revolution; strictly impose Red terror; massacre the landlords and the evil gentry as well as their lackeys without the slightest compunction; threaten the rich peasants by means of the Red terror, so that they will not dare to assist the landlord class.

On the basis of this strategy, we should immediately organize the following:

• First, a farmworkers' union (poor sharecroppers should join this organization), which will serve to unite the farmworkers, enhance their strength, and make them the backbone in the countryside.
• Second, Red execution teams, which should be organized under the White terror from the bravest workers and peasants. Each Red execution team should consist of five to seven persons. They should carry out guerrilla attacks in the dead of night to create a Red terror in the countryside. When political power has been conquered, the Red execution team can be changed into the Red Guards.
• Third, select the brave elements from among the workers and peasants, and organize them into insurrectionary detachments to develop the armed uprising in the countryside and conquer political power there.

#2.5. THE QUESTION OF THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The workers are the vanguard of all the working masses, they are the leaders of all the working people. In the past, we paid no attention to the labour movement, let alone leadership by the workers. As a result, the tendency toward a peasants' party emerged. This is a very serious crisis for the Party.

Our Party should make a great effort to organize trade unions among the handicraftspeople in the countryside, as well as among the workers in the urban areas, lead the workers from fragmentary economic struggles to armed uprising, and correct our past mistake of ignoring the labour movement.

Party headquarters and councils at every level should make great efforts to promote workers, so that they will be able to assume leading posts and lead the struggle.

#2.6. THE QUESTION OF THE SOLDIERS' MOVEMENT

The reason the Communist Party of China advocates the policy of «armed uprising to conquer political power» is that, in carrying out this policy, it is necessary to coordinate very well the three forces represented by the workers, peasants, and soldiers, for only then will a victorious uprising be possible. Because China's democratic revolution has not yet been carried out, the warlords, evil gentry, and compradors are able to make use of feudal relations to fool the workers and peasants and to make mercenaries of them, claiming that the warlord armies are instruments for protecting them. As a result, the majority of those now serving as soldiers feel quite at ease living a hungry and bitter life under the command of their class enemies (some soldiers in the enemy armies have not received any pay for years). Before the Nationalist Party of China turned traitor, the National Revolutionary Army had, however, received some kind of propaganda regarding the class struggle. As for those who gravitated to the military camps after the 12th of April Incident in 1927 (employees of the peasant associations or the trade unions), they are naturally endowed with even more consciousness. Under great pressure and close watch from the reactionary officers, it is not easy for these conscious elements to find leaders, so they do not dare rashly to conduct propaganda and organizational work in the reactionary military camp. In reality, however, they are filled with revolutionary sentiments, and are very willing to defect. This serves to demonstrate that the possibility of a soldiers' movement already exists objectively. Moreover, the success of this kind of movement has been proved a reality in Hunan, Guangdong, and other provinces. The present obstacle of reactionary violence depends entirely on the several millions of as yet unawakened soldiers of the National Revolutionary Army. If we do a good job with our soldiers' movement, reactionary rule will quickly collapse. If, on the other hand, we ignore the soldiers' movement and focus exclusively on work with the peasants instead, the Chinese revolution will never succeed.

The Party organizations at all levels in the Border Area have always paid little attention to work with the soldiers, and focused on the peasant movement alone. (Some Party organizations have nothing but peasant work.) We should bear in mind that many of our experiences of failure in the past can be attributed mainly to the absence of participation by the soldiers' movement in the uprising. (The uprisings in Guangdong at the end of last year, the repeated failure of uprisings in Hunan, and so on, are examples of this.) If we continue to pay no attention to this, then future failures can be predicted. It is very evident that, if we now rely solely on the subjective forces in the Border Area, it will be impossible to entertain vain hopes of carving out an independent regime for ourselves, or to set up a bigger independent regime. Therefore, Party organizations at all levels must make great efforts to develop the soldiers' movement. We must never forget that the policy of an armed uprising to conquer political power can only be carried out if the three forces of the workers, peasants, and soldiers are coordinated.

At present, the soldiers' movement is as important as the labour movement and the peasant movement. Every county should select a large number of worker and peasant comrades, in a planned and organized way, and send them to the reactionary army to become soldiers, porters, cooks, and so on, and thus play a role within the enemy's forces. Special attention should be paid to this work in Yongxin, Chaling, Suichuan, and other counties, where large numbers of enemy troops are concentrated.

Strengthen the propaganda work directed toward the enemy soldiers.

Send some people to the interior of the enemy forces to organize the Party. Do not organize soldiers' councils, so as to avoid organizational complexities and the risk of discovery by enemy officers.

Use inconspicuous comrades and women in the rural areas to conduct verbal propaganda and agitation.

Spread rumours and instigate terror in order to shake the morale of the enemy, thus leading to wavering and ultimately to collapse.

#2.7. THE QUESTION OF PROPAGANDA

In the past, the Party organizations in all the counties of the Border Area paid no attention at all to propaganda, imagining that they could establish an independent regime with nothing but a few rifles. They did not know that the Communist Party can overthrow the enemy only by holding propaganda pamphlets in its left hand and a rifle with bullets in its right hand. Meanwhile, in none of their work (such as organizing councils and insurrectionary detachments, redistributing the land, organizing the Party, and so on) did they make propaganda about their methods and their significance. They made use only of military and political power to force others to do things, saying: «If you don't obey, we will kill you.» This was an extremely serious mistake.

We must find a way to perfect the Propaganda Department of the Special Committee as well as the propaganda departments of the county Party committees. Every week, slogans and a propaganda outline should be sent out on time. The daily wall newspaper should also be distributed to the Party organizations at every level for them to copy and post. Whenever a guerrilla unit sets out on a guerrilla mission, there should be good propaganda (mass meetings, cultural performances, propaganda teams, and individual propaganda).

In the future, the work reports of subordinate Party organizations to their superior Party organizations must include a report on propaganda work. When inspecting and investigating the work of lower levels, the higher levels should also pay attention to the inspection and examination of their propaganda work. The Special Committee, as well as the county Party committees, should distribute their propaganda outlines to all lower-level Party organizations on a weekly basis.

At present, we should try our best to make a political analysis of the internal clashes among the warlords, and pay attention to propaganda work directed against the chaotic struggles among the warlords. At the same time, we should make extremely forceful propaganda about the great strength of the workers, peasants, and the Communist Party, explaining that, in the end, the chaotic struggles among the warlords will be wiped out by a workers' and peasants' uprising.

At present, our propaganda toward the worker and peasant masses as a whole should forcefully expose the policies of the warlords and evil gentry for cheating the workers and peasants, and forcefully propagate our Party's views.

The Council Power, the agrarian revolution, Communism, the Red Army, and the insurrectionary detachments should all be the subject of specialized propaganda outlines. We should intensify this propaganda, and cause it to penetrate deeply into the minds of the masses.

Right now, we should analyse in detail for our comrades and for the masses the political and economic contradictions and clashes within the ruling class. We should do our best to make propaganda about the strength of the workers and peasants themselves, as well as the forces of the uprising in various regions, and shatter the defeatist view that there is no hope of recovery. At the same time, we should also shatter among our comrades and the masses the passive view of relying solely on the army. (Of course, we do not deny the strength of the army in launching uprisings, and in assisting the workers and peasants to launch uprisings.)

#2.8. THE QUESTION OF EDUCATION

In the past, the reason why the local Party organizations were not strong was that Party members lacked education, even to the extent that there was no ceremony of admission into the Party. Now, every Party member must receive education in the Party's fundamental theories.

The Special Committee will organize an education and propaganda committee, compile educational materials, and plan the weekly educational work.

The Special Committee should organize regular study groups. Every county should also run as many short-term study groups as possible, in order to produce people qualified to be cadres.

At the Party organization meetings at various levels, and in the course of actual work, we should try our best to promote worker and peasant elements, and educate these workers and peasants as people qualified to be cadres.

At present, basic educational work should strive to eliminate the opportunist, feudal, and small-bourgeois thinking of the ordinary comrades, and to establish among them the revolutionary worldview of the proletariat.

Raise the level of literary and political education of our comrades. At the same time, we should also launch a literacy drive, so as to raise the writing and reading ability of our worker and peasant comrades.

#2.9. THE QUESTION OF THE COUNCILS

In the past, the council was really nothing but a metamorphosis of the peasant association, so its work was monopolized by the general secretary and the chairperson. Some of the council governments were even controlled by rich peasants and became magistrate's yamens. These so-called council governments should all without exception be reorganized.

The Special Committee should enact a law regarding council organization, and all county, district, and township councils should be organized according to this organizational law.

The councils must have workers, poor peasants, and revolutionary soldiers as their main force. They must oppose the control of rich-peasant general secretaries, and put into practice the slogan: «All power to the councils!»

The Government of the Hunan-Jiangxi Border Region must once again be thoroughly transformed.

The relation between Party organizations and councils at all levels should be clarified, so as to eliminate the evil of equating the Party with the government. The Special Committee must issue a circular regarding the difference between the Party and the government, and the Party organizations at various levels should conduct extensive propaganda.

#2.10. THE LAND QUESTION

We accept the Central Committee's circular regarding the land question, and will hand it over to the Special Committee for discussion before making a final decision.

#2.11. THE QUESTION OF THE COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE

The Communist Youth League is a political organization of the Party among the masses of workers and peasants. In the past, many of the League headquarters at various levels in the Border Region were unclear about the political tasks of the Youth League. In the various counties of the Border Area, the Youth League only carried out a few cultural movements intended to expand its influence. In reality, it became a subordinate body of the Party, and this led to an even more serious mistake by the Party organizations at various levels in the Border Area — they advocated liquidating the League.

At present, all the counties of the Border Area should engage in the work of building the Youth League. Since, however, the strength of the League itself is deficient, and it can scarcely shoulder this responsibility alone, the Party organizations at various levels must set aside part of their strength for this purpose, and constantly pay attention to Youth League work. They should help it to establish League branches in every county in the Border Area, expand League organizations, and perfect the leading bodies of the Youth League.

The budget of the League should be independent, so that it will be able to do what it wants as far as its operations are concerned, and avoid budgetary dependence of the Youth League on the Party.

Paying attention to the work of the Youth League is a responsibility which must be assumed by the Party organizations at all levels. From now on, the reports of Party organizations at all levels to their superiors must include a section entitled «The Work of the Youth League». While investigating the work at various levels, inspectors from higher levels must also pay attention to Youth League work.

Most of the Party organizations and League organizations at various levels have not understood the relation between the Party and the League, and, as a result, there has been a tendency for each to go its own way.