The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan

#PUBLICATION NOTE

This edition of The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan has been prepared and revised for digital publication by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism under the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Switzerland on the basis of the following edition: The Situation and Our Policy After the Victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan, in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, First English Edition, Vol. 4, Foreign Languages Press, Beijing, 1965.

#INTRODUCTION NOTE

This is a speech delivered by Comrade Mao Zedong at a meeting of cadres in Yan'an, Shaanxi, China on the 13th of August, 1945. It was first published in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, Vol. 4, in 1960.

Based on the Marxist method of class analysis, the speech presented a penetrating study of the fundamental political situation in China after victory in the War of Resistance Against Japan and put forward the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat. As Comrade Mao Zedong had pointed out in his opening address at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China in April 1945, China after defeating Japanese imperialism still faced two destinies, two futures — either to become New China or to remain Old China. The big landlords and big bourgeoisie of China, represented by Jiang Jieshi, wanted to wrest the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance from the hands of the people and to keep China a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under their dictatorship. The Communist Party of China, representing the interests of the proletariat and the masses of the people, on the one hand strove for peace and opposed civil war with all its strength. On the other hand, it had to prepare fully against Jiang Jieshi's counter-revolutionary plot of launching a countrywide civil war and had to adopt the correct policy, that is to say, to harbour no illusions about imperialism and reaction, to have no fear of their threats, to resolutely safeguard the fruits of the people's struggle, and to strive to build a New China — a new-democratic China of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat. The decisive struggle between the two destinies, the two futures facing China, constituted the content of the historical period from the conclusion of the War of Resistance Against Japan to the founding of the People's Republic of China, the historical period of the Chinese People's War of Liberation. After the War of Resistance, Jiang Jieshi, supported by US imperialism, tore up peace agreements again and again and launched a gigantic counter-revolutionary civil war without parallel in history in an attempt to wipe out the people's forces. Because of the correct leadership of the Communist Party of China, it took the Chinese people only four years of struggle to win a great countrywide victory — the overthrow of Jiang Jieshi and the creation of New China.


#Workers and oppressed people of the world, unite!

#THE SITUATION AND OUR POLICY AFTER THE VICTORY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AGAINST JAPAN

#SPEECH DELIVERED AT A MEETING OF CADRES IN YAN'AN

#Mao Zedong
#13th of August, 1945

#

These are days of tremendous change in the situation in East Asia. The surrender of Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. The decisive factor for Japan's surrender is the entry of the Council Union into the war. 1'000'000 Red Army troops are entering China's North-East; this force is irresistible. Japanese imperialism can no longer continue the fight.1 The Chinese people's hard and bitter War of Resistance is crowned with victory. As a historical stage, the War of Resistance Against Japan is now over.

In these circumstances, what are the relations among the different classes in China and what are the relations between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party at present? What will they be like in the future? What is the policy of our Party? These are questions of great concern to the people of the whole country and to all members of our Party.

What about the Nationalist Party? Look at its past, and you can tell its present; look at its past and present, and you can tell its future. In the past, this political party carried on a counter-revolutionary civil war for ten whole years. During the War of Resistance, it launched three large-scale anti-Communist onslaughts,2 in 1940, '41, and '43, each time attempting to develop the attack into a countrywide civil war. It was only because of the correct policy adopted by our Party and the opposition of the people of the whole country that its attempts failed. As everyone knows, Jiang Jieshi, the political representative of China's big landlords and big bourgeoisie, is a most brutal and treacherous fellow. His policy has been to look on with folded arms, wait for victory, conserve his forces, and prepare for civil war. Indeed, the victory he has been waiting for has arrived, and now this «Generalissimo» is about to «come down from the mountain».3 In the past eight years, we have changed places with Jiang Jieshi — formerly, we were on the mountain and he was by the water;4 during the War of Resistance, we were behind the enemy lines and he went up the mountain. Now, he is coming down from the mountain, coming down to seize the fruits of victory.

During the past eight years, the people and army of our Liberated Areas, receiving no aid whatsoever from outside and relying solely on their own efforts, liberated vast territories and resisted and pinned down the bulk of the Japanese invading forces and practically all the puppet troops. Only by our determined resistance and heroic struggle were the 200'000'000 people in the Great Rear Area5 saved from being trampled underfoot by the Japanese aggressors and the regions inhabited by these 200'000'000 people saved from Japanese occupation. Jiang Jieshi hid on Mount Emei with guards in front of him — the guards were the Liberated Areas, the people and army of the Liberated Areas. In defending the 200'000'000 people of the Great Rear Area, we protected this «Generalissimo» as well and gave him both the time and the space to sit around waiting for victory with folded arms. Time — eight years one month. Space — an area inhabited by 200'000'000 people. These conditions we provided for him. But for us, he could not have stood by looking on. Is the «Generalissimo» grateful to us, then? No, not he! This fellow has never known what it is to be grateful. How did Jiang Jieshi climb to power? By the Northern Expedition,6 by the first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation,7 by the support given him by the people, who had not yet seen through him. Once in power, Jiang Jieshi, far from being grateful to the people, knocked them down and plunged them into the bloodbath of ten years of civil war. You comrades are familiar with this segment of history. During the present War of Resistance, the Chinese people again defended him. This war is now ending in victory and Japan is on the point of surrender, but he is not at all grateful to the people. On the contrary, thumbing through the records of 1927, he wants to act in the same old way.8 He says there has never been any «civil war» in China, only «bandit suppression». Whatever he likes to call it, the fact is that he wants to start a civil war against the people, he wants to slaughter the people.

Until a civil war breaks out all over the country, many of the people and many of our Party comrades will not have a very clear understanding of this question. Since civil war is not yet here on a large scale, since it is not yet widespread or out in the open, and since the battles are not yet numerous, many people think: «Well, there may not be a civil war after all!» Many others are afraid of civil war. Their fear is not without reason. There were ten years of fighting and then another eight years of the War of Resistance; if the fighting keeps on, where will it all end? It is quite natural that such fears should arise. With regard to Jiang Jieshi's plot to launch a civil war, our Party's policy has been clear and consistent, that is, resolutely to oppose civil war, be against civil war, and prevent civil war. In the days to come, we shall continue, with the utmost effort and greatest patience, to lead the people in preventing civil war. Nevertheless, it is necessary to be soberly aware that the danger of civil war is extremely serious, because Jiang Jieshi's policy is already set. Jiang Jieshi's policy is civil war. Our policy, the policy of the people, is against civil war. The opponents of civil war consist only of the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people; it is a pity that they do not include Jiang Jieshi and the Nationalist Party. Here, one side does not want to fight and the other does. If both did not want it, there would be no fighting. Now, since only one side is against it and this side is not yet strong enough to check the other, the danger of civil war is extremely grave.

Our Party pointed out in good time that Jiang Jieshi would stick to his reactionary policy of dictatorship and civil war. Before, during and after the Seventh Party Congress,9 we did fairly adequate work to call the people's attention to the danger of civil war, so that the whole people, our Party members, and our troops should be mentally prepared well in advance. This is a very important point, and it makes a world of difference whether or not there is such preparedness. In 1927, our Party was still in its infancy and was mentally wholly unprepared for Jiang Jieshi's counter-revolutionary surprise attack. Consequently, the fruits of victory won by the people were soon lost, the people had to undergo long suffering, and a bright China was plunged into darkness. This time, things are different; our Party has acquired the rich experience of three revolutions10 and a much higher degree of political maturity. Time and again, the Party's Central Committee has clearly explained the danger of civil war, and so the whole people, all Party members, and the troops led by our Party are in a state of preparedness.

Jiang Jieshi always tries to wrest every ounce of power and every ounce of gain from the people. And we? Our policy is to give him tit for tat and to fight for every inch of land. We act after his fashion. He always tries to impose war on the people, one sword in his left hand and another in his right. We take up swords, too, following his example. We found this method only after research. Such research is very important. When we see the other person holding something in their hands, we should do some research. What do they hold in their hands? Swords. What are swords for? For killing. Whom do they want to kill with their swords? The people. Having made these findings, conduct further research — the Chinese people, too, have hands and can take up swords, they can forge a sword if there is none handy. The Chinese people have discovered this truth after long research. Warlords, landlords, local tyrants and evil gentry, and the imperialists all have swords in their hands and are out to kill. The people have come to understand this and so act after the same fashion. Some of us often neglect such research. Chen Duxiu,11 for example, did not understand that with swords one can kill people. Some say, this is a plain everyday truth; how can a leader of the Communist Party fail to know it? But you never can tell. Chen Duxiu conducted no research and so did not understand this, hence we called him an opportunist. Someone who conducts no research has no right to speak, and accordingly we deprived Chen Duxiu of that right. We have adopted a course different from Chen Duxiu's and enabled the people suffering from oppression and slaughter to take up swords. If ever again anybody wants to kill us, we will act after their fashion. Not long ago, the Nationalist Party sent six divisions to attack our Guanzhong sub-region, and three of them drove in and seized an area measuring 20 by 100 li [10 by 50 kilometres]. We acted after their fashion and wholly, thoroughly, and completely wiped out the Nationalist troops in this area of 20 by 100 li.12 Our policy is to give tit for tat and fight for every inch of land; we will never let the Nationalist Party easily seize our land and kill our people. Of course, to fight for every inch of land does not mean following the old «Left-wing» line of «not abandoning a single inch of land in the base area».13 This time, we abandoned an area of 20 by 100 li. Abandoned late in July, it was retaken early in August. After the Southern Anhui Incident of 1941,14 the Nationalist liaison staff officer once asked me what we intended to do. I answered: «You are here in Yan'an all the time and you don't know? If He goes for us, we'll go for him. If He stops, we'll stop, too.»15 At that time, Jiang Jieshi was not named, only He Yingqin. Today, we say: «If Jiang goes for us, we'll go for him. If Jiang stops, we'll stop, too.» We will act after his fashion. As Jiang Jieshi is now sharpening his swords, we must sharpen ours, too.

The rights the people have won must never be lightly given up, but must be defended by fighting. We don't want civil war. However, if Jiang Jieshi insists on forcing civil war on the Chinese people, the only thing we can do is to take up arms and fight him in self-defence to protect the lives and property, the rights and well-being of the people of the Liberated Areas. This will be a civil war he forces on us. If we do not win, we will blame neither Heaven nor Earth, but only ourselves. However, let no one think that the people can be easily robbed or defrauded of the rights they have won; that is impossible. Last year, an American correspondent asked me: «Who has given you the power to act?» I replied: «The people.» Who else indeed, if not the people? The ruling Nationalist Party hasn't given us any power. It doesn't recognize us. We take part in the People's Political Council in the capacity of a «cultural organization»16 as stipulated by its rules. But we are not a «cultural organization», we say, we have an army and are a «military organization». On the 1st of March this year, Jiang Jieshi stated that the Communist Party would have to turn over its army before it could acquire legal status. Jiang Jieshi's statement still stands. We have not turned over our army, and so we have no legal status and are «defying laws human and divine». Our duty is to hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must conform to the people's interests, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected — that is what being responsible to the people means. Comrades! The people want liberation and therefore entrust power to those who can represent them and work faithfully for them, that is, to us Communists. As representatives of the people, we must represent them well and not act like Chen Duxiu. Confronted by counter-revolutionary attacks against the people, Chen Duxiu did not adopt the policy of giving tit for tat and fighting for every inch of land; as a result, in 1927, within the space of a few months, he forfeited all the rights the people had won. This time, we must be on our guard. Our policy is absolutely different from Chen Duxiu's; no trickery can fool us. We must be clear-headed and have a correct policy; we must not make mistakes.

To whom should the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance belong? It is very obvious. Take a peach tree, for example. When the tree yields peaches, they are the fruits of victory. Who is entitled to pick the peaches? Ask who planted and watered the tree. Jiang Jieshi squatting on the mountain did not carry a single bucket of water, and yet he is now stretching out his arm from afar to pick the peaches. «I, Jiang Jieshi, own these peaches», he says, «I am the landlord, you are my serfs, and I won't allow you to pick any.» We have refuted him in the press.17 We say: «You never carried any water, so you have no right to pick the peaches. We, the people of the Liberated Areas, watered the tree day in and day out and have the most right to gather the fruit.» Comrades! The victory of the War of Resistance has been won by the people with bloodshed and sacrifice, it should be the victory of the people, and it is to the people that the fruits of the War of Resistance should go. As for Jiang Jieshi, he was passive in resisting Japan, but active in Anti-Communism. He was a stumbling block in the people's War of Resistance. Now, this stumbling block is coming forward to monopolize the fruits of victory, wants China after victory to relapse into its old, pre-war state, and does not tolerate the slightest change. This gives rise to struggle. Comrades! It is a most serious struggle.

That the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance should go to the people is one thing, but who will eventually get them and whether it will be the people is another. Don't be too sure that all the fruits of victory will fall into the hands of the people. Jiang Jieshi will grab a lot of big peaches, such as Shanghai, Nanjing, Hangzhou, and other big cities. He has ganged up with US imperialism, and in those places, they have the upper hand, while so far, the revolutionary people can by and large occupy only the rural areas. Another bunch of peaches will be contested by both sides. These are the middle and small towns situated along the section of the Datong-Puzhou Railway north of Taiyuan, the middle section of the Beijing-Suiyuan Railway, the Beijing-Liaoning Railway, the section of the Beijing-Hankou Railway north of Zhengzhou, the Zhengding-Taiyuan Railway, the Baigui-Jincheng Railway,18 the Dezhou-Shijiazhuang Railway, the Tianjin-Pukou Railway, the Qingdao-Jinan Railway, and the section of the Longhai Railway east of Zhengzhou. These middle and small towns must be contested; they are the middle and small peaches watered by the people of the Liberated Areas with their sweat and blood. It is difficult to say now whether these places will fall into the people's hands. Only two words can be said now: fight hard. Are there places which are sure to fall into the hands of the people? Yes, there are. They are the vast rural areas and the numerous towns in the provinces of Hebei, Chaha'er, and Rehe,19 most of Shanxi, Shandong, and the northern part of Jiangsu, with villages linked together and with about 100 towns in one area, 70 to 80 in another, 40 to 50 in a third — altogether three, four, five, or six such areas, big and small. What sort of towns? Middle and small towns. We are sure of them, we have the strength to pick these fruits of victory. In the history of the Chinese revolution, this will be the first time that we have got such a bunch of fruit. Historically, it was only after we smashed the enemy's third «encirclement and suppression» campaign20 in the latter half of 1931 that we had altogether as many as 21 county towns21 in the Central Red Base Area in Jiangxi Province, but there was not a single middle town among them. With 21 small towns linked together, the total population at its height reached 2'500'000. Relying on this base area, the Chinese people were able to continue the struggle for such a long time, win such big victories and smash such big «encirclement and suppression» campaigns. Later, we were defeated, for which we should blame, not Jiang Jieshi, but ourselves for not fighting well enough. This time, if scores of big and small towns are linked in a single contiguous area and if there are three, four, five, or six such areas, then the Chinese people will have three, four, five, or six revolutionary base areas, each larger than the Central Red Base Area in Jiangxi Province, and the situation for the Chinese revolution will be very promising indeed.

If one looks at the situation as a whole, the stage of the War of Resistance Against Japan is over and the new situation and task is domestic struggle. Jiang Jieshi talks about «national reconstruction». From now on, the struggle will be, what kind of national reconstruction? To rebuild China as a new-democratic country of the broad masses of the people under the leadership of the proletariat? Or to rebuild China as a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country under the dictatorship of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie? This will be a most complicated struggle. At present, it takes the form of a struggle between Jieshi, who is trying to usurp the fruits of victory of the War of Resistance, and ourselves, who oppose his usurpation. If there is any opportunism during this period, it will lie in failing to fight hard and in making a voluntary gift to Jiang Jieshi of the fruits which should go to the people.

Will an open and total civil war break out? That depends on internal and international factors. The internal factors consist chiefly of our strength and the degree of our political consciousness. Given the general trend of the international and internal situation and the feelings of the people, is it possible, through our own struggles, to localize the civil war or delay the outbreak of a countrywide civil war? There is this possibility.

Jiang Jieshi will face many difficulties if he tries to let loose a civil war. First, in the Liberated Areas, there are 100'000'000 people, 1'000'000 troops, and over 2'000'000 people's militia members. Second, the politically conscious people in the Nationalist areas are against civil war, and this is some kind of check on Jiang Jieshi. Third, inside the Nationalist Party also, there is a faction which is not in favour of civil war. The situation today is vastly different from that in 1927. In particular, the condition of our Party today is vastly different from what it was in 1927. In those days, our Party was still in its infancy and did not have a clear head or experience in armed struggle or the policy of giving tit for tat. Today, the level of political consciousness in our Party is very much higher.

Apart from our own political consciousness, the political consciousness of the vanguard of the proletariat, there is the question of the political consciousness of the masses of the people. When the people are not yet politically conscious, it is entirely possible that their revolutionary gains may be handed over to others. This happened in the past. Today, the level of political consciousness of the Chinese people is likewise very much higher. The prestige of our Party among the people has never been so great. Nevertheless, among the people, and chiefly among those living in the Japanese-occupied and Nationalist areas, there are still a good many who believe in Jiang Jieshi and have illusions about the Nationalist Party of China and the United States of America, illusions which Jiang Jieshi is working hard to spread. The fact that a section of the Chinese people is not yet politically conscious shows that much remains to be done in our propaganda and organizational work. The political awakening of the people is not easy. It requires much earnest effort on our part to rid their minds of wrong ideas. We should sweep backward ideas from the minds of the Chinese people, just as we sweep our rooms. Dust never vanishes of itself without sweeping. We must carry on extensive propaganda and education among the masses, so they will understand the real situation and trend in China and have confidence in their own strength.

It is up to us to organize the people. As for the reactionaries in China, it is up to us to organize the people to overthrow them. Everything reactionary is the same; if you don't hit it, it won't fall. It is like sweeping the floor; where the broom does not reach, the dust never vanishes of itself. There is a river called the Jiezi, south of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. South of the river is Luochuan County, and north of it Fuxian County. North and south of the river are two different worlds. The south is under the Nationalist Party; since we have not reached there, the people are unorganized, and there is much filth and rottenness. Some of our comrades put their faith only in political influence, fancying that problems can be solved merely by influence. That is blind faith. In 1936, we were in Bao'an.22 40 to 50 li [20 to 25 kilometres] away, there was a fortified village held by a landlord despot. The Central Committee of the Party was then in Bao'an, and our political influence could be considered very great indeed, but the counter-revolutionaries in this village obstinately refused to surrender. We swept to the south, we swept to the north, all in vain. Not until our broom swept right into the village did the landlord cry out: «Ow, I give up!»23 That is how things are in this world. Bells don't ring until you strike them. Tables don't move until you shift them. Japan would not surrender until after the Red Army of the Council Union entered north-eastern China. The enemy and puppet troops never handed over their arms until our troops fought them. Only where the broom reaches can political influence produce its full effect. Our broom is the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army, and the New Fourth Army. Broom in hand, you must learn to sweep; don't lie in bed, fancying that a gust of wind will somehow rise and blow all the dust away. We Marxists are revolutionary realists and never indulge in idle dreams. There is an old saying in China: «Rise at dawn and sweep the courtyard.»24 Dawn is the breaking of a new day. Our ancestors told us to rise and start sweeping at the very break of day. They were setting us a task. Only by thinking and acting in this way will we benefit and find work to do. China has a vast territory, and it is up to us to sweep it clean inch by inch.

On what basis should our policy rest? It should rest on our own strength, and that means regeneration through one's own efforts. We are not alone; all the countries and people in the world opposed to imperialism are our friends. Nevertheless, we stress regeneration through our own efforts. Relying on the forces we ourselves organize, we can defeat all Chinese and foreign reactionaries. Jiang Jieshi, on the contrary, relies entirely on the aid of US imperialism, which he looks upon as his mainstay. The trinity of dictatorship, civil war, and selling out the country has always been the basis of his policy. US imperialism wants to help Jiang Jieshi wage civil war and turn China into a US dependency, and this policy, too, was set long ago. But US imperialism, while outwardly strong, is inwardly weak. We must be clearheaded, that is, we must not believe the «nice words» of the imperialists nor be intimidated by their bluster. An American once said to me: «You should listen to Hurley and send a few people to be officials in the Nationalist government.»25 I replied: «It is no easy job to be an official bound hand and foot; we won't do it. If we become officials, our hands and feet must be unfettered, we must be free to act, that is, a coalition government must be set up on a democratic basis.» He said: «It will be bad if you don't.» I asked him: «Why bad?» He said: «First, the Americans will curse you; second, the Americans will back Jiang Jieshi.» I replied: «If you Americans, sated with bread and sleep, want to curse people and back Jiang Jieshi, that's your business and I won't interfere. What we have now is millet plus rifles, what you have is bread plus cannons. If you like to back Jiang Jieshi, back him, back him as long as you want. But remember one thing. To whom does China belong? China definitely does not belong to Jiang Jieshi, China belongs to the Chinese people. The day will surely come when you will find it impossible to back him any longer.» Comrades! This American was trying to scare people. Imperialists are masters at this sort of stuff, and many people in the colonial countries do get scared. The imperialists think that all people in the colonial countries can be scared, but they do not realize that, in China, there are people who are not afraid of that sort of stuff. In the past, we have openly criticized and exposed the US policy of aiding Jiang Jieshi to fight the Communists; it was necessary, and we shall continue to do so.

The Council Union has sent its troops, the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressor; such an event has never happened before in Chinese history. Its influence is immeasurable. The propaganda organs of the United States and Jiang Jieshi hoped to sweep away the Red Army's political influence with two atomic bombs.26 But it can't be swept away; that isn't so easy. Can atomic bombs decide wars? No, they can't. Atomic bombs could not make Japan surrender. Without the struggles waged by the people, atomic bombs by themselves would be of no avail. If atomic bombs could decide the war, then why was it necessary to ask the Council Union to send its troops? Why didn't Japan surrender when the two atomic bombs were dropped on it, and why did it surrender as soon as the Council Union sent troops? Some of our comrades, too, believe that the atomic bomb is omnipotent; that is a big mistake. These comrades show even less judgement than a British aristocrat. There is a certain British aristocrat called Lord Mountbatten. He said that the worst possible mistake is to think that the atomic bomb can decide the war.27 These comrades are more backward than Mountbatten. What influence has made these comrades look upon the atomic bomb as something miraculous? Bourgeois influence. Where does it come from? From their education in bourgeois schools, from the bourgeois press and news agencies. There are two worldviews and two methodologies, the proletarian worldview and methodology and the bourgeois worldview and methodology. These comrades often cling to the bourgeois worldview and methodology and often forget the proletarian worldview and methodology. The theory that «weapons decide everything», the purely military standpoint, a bureaucratic style of work divorced from the masses, individualist thinking, and the like — all these are bourgeois influences in our ranks. We must constantly sweep these bourgeois things out of our ranks just as we sweep out dust.

The entry of the Council Union into the war has decided Japan's surrender, and the situation in China is entering a new period. Between the War of Resistance and the new period, there is a transitional stage. The struggle during this transitional stage is to oppose Jiang Jieshi's usurpation of the fruits of victory in the War of Resistance. Jiang Jieshi wants to launch a countrywide civil war, and his policy is set; we must be prepared for this. No matter when this countrywide civil war breaks out, we must be well prepared. If it comes early, say, tomorrow morning, we should also be prepared. That is point one. In the present international and domestic situation, it is possible that, for a time, the civil war may be kept restricted in scale and localized. That is point two. Point one is what we should prepare for, point two is what has existed for a long time. In short, we must be prepared. Being prepared, we shall be able to deal properly with all kinds of complicated situations.


  1. Editor's Note: On the 8th of August, 1945, the Council Government declared war on Japan. On the 10th of August, the Mongolian People's Government declared war on Japan. The Soviet Red Army moved by land and sea into China's North-East and into Korea and swiftly routed the Japanese Guandong Army. The joint Soviet-Mongolian armies crossed the Inner Mongolian desert and entered Rehe and Chaha'er Provinces. On the 10th of August, the Japanese government was compelled to send a note begging to surrender, and on the 14th, it formally announced its unconditional surrender. The Guandong Army was the cream of the main force of the Japanese army and constituted Japan's general strategic reserve. The Japanese imperialists had dreamed of relying on this force to carry on a long, protracted war from their favourable strategic position in China's North-East and in Korea. This scheme was completely wrecked by the entry of the Council Union into the war, and the Japanese government had to admit defeat and surrender. 

  2. See: Mao Zedong: A Comment on the Sessions of the Nationalist Central Executive Committee and of the People's Political Council (Before the 5th of October, 1943) 

  3. Editor's Note: The «mountain» here refers to Mount Emei in Sichuan Province and more generally to the mountainous areas in south-western and north-western China. After Wuhan was occupied by the Japanese army in 1938, Jiang Jieshi and the main force under his command took refuge in these mountainous areas and sat there watching the bitter struggle against the Japanese aggressors which was being waged behind the enemy lines by the army and people of the Liberated Areas. 

  4. Editor's Note: Prior to the War of Resistance Against Japan, most of the revolutionary base areas led by the Communist Party of China were in mountainous regions. At that time, Jiang Jieshi's rule was centred in the large cities along the big rivers and the coast. Accordingly, Comrade Mao Zedong said that «we were on the mountain and he was by the water»

  5. Editor's Note: During the War of Resistance, the front lines were in northern, eastern, central, and southern China. People usually referred to the Nationalist areas in south-western and north-western China, which were not occupied by the Japanese invaders, as the Great Rear Area. 

  6. Editor's Note: The Northern Expedition was the punitive war against the Northern Warlords launched by the revolutionary army which marched north from Guangdong Province in May-July 1926. The Northern Expeditionary Army, with the Communist Party of China taking part in its leadership and under the Party's influence (the political work in the army was at that time mostly under the charge of Communist Party members), gained the warm support of the broad masses of workers and peasants. In the second half of 1926 and the first half of 1927, it occupied most of the provinces along the Yangzi and Yellow Rivers and defeated the Northern Warlords. In April 1927, this revolutionary war failed as a result of betrayal by the reactionary clique under Jiang Jieshi within the revolutionary army. 

  7. Editor's Note: In 1924, with the help of the Communist Party of China, Sun Yixian reorganized the Nationalist Party of China and effected Nationalist-Communist cooperation. The National Revolutionary War of 1924-27 was launched on the basis of this cooperation. This first period of Nationalist-Communist cooperation was wrecked as a result of betrayals by Jiang Jieshi and Wang Jingwei in 1927. 

  8. Editor's Note: This refers to Jiang Jieshi's betrayal of the revolution in 1927. After betraying the revolution, Jiang Jieshi massacred great numbers of Communists, workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals and unleashed a counter-revolutionary war against the revolutionary masses. 

  9. Editor's Note: This Congress was held in Yan'an in April 1945. It was there that Comrade Mao Zedong delivered the political report On Coalition Government

  10. Editor's Note: The first revolution was the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal revolutionary struggle waged from 1924 to '27 by the Chinese people under the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the Northern Expedition was the main content of this revolution. The second revolution was the revolutionary struggle from 1927 to '37 to create and develop the Council Power. The third revolution was the War of Resistance Against Japan from 1937 to '45. 

  11. Editor's Note: Chen Duxiu was originally a professor at Beijing University and became famous as an editor of the Xin Qingnian [New Youth]. He was one of the founders of the Communist Party of China. Owing to his reputation at the time of the 4th of May Movement, and owing to the Party's immaturity in its initial period, he became General Secretary of the Party. In the last period of the Revolution of 1924-27, the Right-wing thinking in the Party represented by Chen Duxiu developed into a line of capitulationism. In The Present Situation and Our Tasks, Comrade Mao Zedong said that the capitulationists at that time «voluntarily gave up the Party's leadership of the peasant masses, urban small bourgeoisie, and middle bourgeoisie, and in particular gave up the Party's leadership of the armed forces, thus causing the defeat of the revolution». After the defeat in 1927, Chen Duxiu and a handful of other capitulationists lost faith in the future of the revolution and became liquidators. They took the reactionary Trotskijite standpoint and together with the Trotskijites formed a small anti-Party clique. Consequently, Chen Duxiu was expelled from the Party in November 1929. He died in 1942. 

  12. Editor's Note: On the 21st of July, 1945, the Provisional 59th Division and Second Cavalry Division under Hu Zongnan, Commander of the Nationalist Party's First War Zone, suddenly attacked Mount Yetai in Chunhua County in the Guanzhong sub-region of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. On the 23rd of July, Hu Zongnan sent his Third Reserve Division to join in the attack. On the 27th of July, the Communist-led forces withdrew on their own initiative from Mount Yetai and 41 villages west of it. The Nationalist forces continued their attacks on Xunyi, Yaoxan, and other points. On the 8th of August, the Communist-led forces struck back at the invading Nationalist troops and recovered the Mount Yetai area. 

  13. Editor's Note: This slogan was raised by the «Left-wing» opportunists during the period from October 1933 to October 1934 when the Red Army of the Central Red Base Area was repulsing the Nationalist Party's fifth «encirclement and suppression» campaign. The slogan was diametrically opposed to the strategy formulated by Comrade Mao Zedong, which was to lure the enemy deep into our territory, concentrate a superior force, and select the enemy's weak points, in order to wipe them out in mobile warfare. 

  14. Editor's Note: In January 1941, as demanded by Jiang Jieshi, the Headquarters of the New Fourth Army led by the Communist Party of China and the units under the direct command of this headquarters moved north from southern Anhui Province to cross the Yangzi River. While on the march, they were encircled and ambushed by Jiang Jieshi's troops and lost more than 9'000 killed, wounded, and captured. Subsequently, Jiang Jieshi announced the cancellation of the designation of the New Fourth Army and ordered attacks against its other units. The event was called the Southern Anhui Incident. 

  15. Editor's Note: During the War of Resistance, the Nationalist Party kept a staff officer in Yan'an for liaison. «He» refers to He Yingqin, Chief of the Nationalist General Staff. On the 19th of October and 8th of December, 1940, Jiang Jieshi sent two telegrams in the names of He Yingqin and Bai Chongxi, Deputy Chief of the Nationalist General Staff, outrageously slandering the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which were fighting stubbornly behind the Japanese lines, and arbitrarily ordering the people's anti-Japanese armed forces operating south of the Yellow River to withdraw north of the river within a definite time-limit. The Nationalist reactionaries then launched a sudden attack on units of the New Fourth Army which were moving north and thus created the Southern Anhui Incident. At that time, the Communist Party of China pointed to He Yingqin as the representative of the Nationalist reactionaries who had launched the large-scale anti-Communist onslaught, but actually, Jiang Jieshi was meant. 

  16. Editor's Note: The «People's Political Council» was an advisory body set up by the Nationalist government after the start of the War of Resistance. Its members were all «selected» by the Nationalist government; the majority belonged to the Nationalist Party of China, and only a very few belonged to the Communist Party of China and other political parties. Moreover, the Nationalist government did not recognize the equal and legal status of the political parties which were opposed to Japanese aggression, nor did it allow their members to sit in the «People's Political Council» as representatives of their political parties. One of the stipulations of the «Organic Rules of the People's Political Council» promulgated by the Nationalist government was that those persons might become members of the Council«"who have served in important cultural or economic organizations for three years or more and enjoy prestige, or those who devote themselves to affairs of State and have long enjoyed prestige». It was on the basis of this stipulation that the Nationalist Party «selected» some councilors from the Communist Party of China. 

  17. See: Mao Zedong: Jiang Jieshi Is Provoking Civil War (Before the 12th of August, 1945) 

  18. Editor's Note: An unfinished railway line in south-eastern Shanxi Province, between Baigui in Jixian County and Jincheng. 

  19. Editor's Note: The province of Chaha'er was abolished in 1952. The province of Rehe was abolished in 1955. The territories originally under their jurisdiction were transferred to Hebei, Shanxi, and Liaoning Provinces and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region. 

  20. Editor's Note: From July to September 1931, Jiang Jieshi personally held the post of commander-in-chief and moved 300'000 reactionary troops in an «encirclement and suppression» campaign against the Central Red Base Area in Jiangxi. The Red Army smashed this «encirclement and suppression» campaign and won a great victory. 

  21. Editor's Note: The 21 county towns here referred to were Ruijin, Huichang, Xunwu, Anyuan, Xinfeng, Yudu, Xingguo, Ningdu, Guangchang, Shicheng, and Lichuan in Jiangxi Province, and Jianning, Taining, Ninghua, Qingliu, Guihua, Longyan, Changting, Liancheng, Shanghang, and Yongding in Fujian Province. 

  22. Editor's Note: Bao'an was a county in the north-western part of Shaanxi Province. It is now called Zhidan County. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China had its headquarters there from early July 1936 to January 1937. Later, it moved to Yan'an. 

  23. Editor's Note: The fortified village referred to was Danbazhai in the south-west of Bao'an County. There were over 200 households in the village, which occupied a highly strategic position. Cao Junzhang, a landlord despot who headed a reactionary local armed band of over 100 troops,, had long entrenched himself in this village. The Chinese Red Army repeatedly besieged the village, but failed to capture it. In August 1936 the Red Army, while surrounding Danbazhai with the local armed forces, proceeded to win over the lowest masses in the village and disintegrate the enemy from within. In December of the same year, the bandit Cao fled with a handful of his troops, and Danbazhai was liberated. 

  24. Source: Zhu Bolu: Maxims for the Good Household (17th Century) 

  25. Editor's Note: The American referred to was Colonel David D. Barrett, head of the US Army Observer Group in Yan'an. With the consent of the Communist Party of China, this group was sent to Yan'an in 1944 by the US forces fighting against Japan. Patrick J. Hurley, a reactionary politician of the Republican Party, came to China in September 1944 as the personal representative of the US President and at the end of the year became US Ambassador to China. 

  26. Editor's Note: The United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima on the 6th of August, 1945, and another on Nagasaki on the 9th of August. The propaganda organs of the United States and of the Nationalist Party of China made much of the event, alleging that the Japanese government had surrendered because it was afraid of the US atomic bombs. By such propaganda, they hoped to belittle the decisive role played by the entry of the Council Union into the war in compelling Japan to surrender. 

  27. Editor's Note: Mountbatten, then Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in South-East Asia, made a statement on the 9th of August, 1945, welcoming the entry of the Council Union into the war against Japan. He also said that the worst possible mistake would be to believe that the atomic bomb could end the war in the East Asia.